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This dissertation presents a time motion study of what actually happens
at the busiest U.S-Mexican border crossing at Laredo. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) assumes seamless border
crossings without detailing however how this would be achieved parti-
cularly in the case of trucking, the most important cargo transport
mode. This dissertation presents evidence that NAFTA has not led to an
efficient border crossing: a border that could be crossed in 15 minutes
with a single truck and driver takes several days, drivers, and pieces of
equipment. In fact it takes longer to cross the Rio Grande than go from
Chicago to Laredo by truck. This is contrasted with a mini-time motion
study of an efficient border crossing at Ambassador bridge between the
United States and Canada, which has more traffic than all Laredo bridges
combined, yet it has only 4 lanes versus the 22 crossing lanes available at
Laredo, presenting the effects of the attempt to solve an institutional
problem by building more infrastructure. The time-motion study
establishes which practices or regulations cause which inefficiencies and
what are the consequences in terms of time, money, and equipment. This
analysis shows the way in which interest groups profit from inefficiency,
and it also reveals the economic forces at work on the local and national
level in both countries. Such inefficiencies not only cost importers and
exporters time and money – they also cause welfare losses to the entire
economy because of the distortions they introduce to consumption and
sourcing decisions. In order to measure the macro-economic impact of
these non-tariff barriers, the dissertation uses the General Trade Analysis
Project – GTAP model – to simulate the removal of iceberg trade costs.
The results of the analysis indicate that the removal of such barriers
would benefit the Mexican economy by $1.8 billion per year, while the
U.S. economy would see a welfare increase of about $1.4 billion per year.
Trade flows between Mexico and the United States would likewise
increase, with southbound trade expanding by about $6 billion and
northbound trade growing about $1 billion per year. This work is
relevant for business and government people pressing the case for well
intended free trade agreements and promoting the technology that can
expedite greater volumes of trade. Further research along the lines of
this work may provide a refined theoretical and methodological basis for
cross-border policy.
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Preface 
 
There is a French saying: “gratitude is the heart’s memory”.  My heart is full of gratitude to 
all the people and organizations that contributed to this research.  I want to express my 
gratitude to my parents from whom I learned the principles of international trade.  They 
owned a high couture clothing business for women in Colombia, South America that 
required a big amount of imported machinery and components from Europe and the United 
States.  Those years were before today’s international trade agreements; hence, the import 
processes were very complicated and expensive in an environment where the fashion 
industry requires timely delivery; that principle itself is timeless.  My parents were good at 
promoting Colombian products to substitute imports.  Their product was fit for a queen. 
During my university years in Colombia I wrote a case study about my family business.  I 
later learned that other universities in the country were using it as a tool to teach business 
strategy.  Thanks to all the professors who taught me how to present the case, and then 
used it to help them teach about constraints to trade. 
  
The idea of doing the PhD came from my husband Paul Kent, a PhD economist well 
known in the international port community.  I have enjoyed working with him in different 
port projects around the world; he is an impressive, bright, and insightful consultant with a 
vision for port efficiency and its impact on international trade.  Too bad that maritime 
transportation was not NAFTA’s main mode of transportation, but Paul’s background 
opened the door for me to explore a new territory: the cross-border economics. Paul not 
only has given me his unconditional love and encouragement through all these years of 
work in three countries, but also contributed with his thoughts, guidance, and countless 
hours of review and editing.  Surely the completion of my dissertation will make him feel 
like he has finally retired! 
 
Very few doctoral students are given the opportunity for some of the world’s leading 
specialists to be engaged in their research efforts.  Paul introduced me to one of them, 
Professor Haralambides, a renowned maritime industry expert.  Professor Haralambides 
enthusiastically welcomed the idea of research on the emerging interest in border crossing 
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economics and opened for me the doors at Erasmus University to complete the research.  I 
want to express to him my gratitude for being my promotor, for much time and effort 
expended on my behalf, and the useful advice and encouragement during my graduate 
studies.  I also want to thank my co-promotor Professor Joe Francois, a leading expert in 
international trade analysis, for his contribution: he encouraged me to think about the 
macroeconomic effect of the analysis of border-crossing inefficiencies in the trade flows; 
this became a new challenge in the research. Finally, I also thank Mr. Michael Hathaway, 
Esq., a leading trade negotiator and NAFTA Arbitral Panel Member in the Dispute of 
Cross-Border Trucking Services, for his comments and insight into the border crossing 
problems; his advice and experience in international trade law enabled me to understand 
the legal complexities of border crossings. 
 
I am extremely grateful to Dr. Alan Fox from the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(USITC) for tutoring me and helping me to apply the General Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model. I am indebted to him and his organization for such tangible items as time, 
office space, equipment, and library facilities, and for equally important intangibles such as 
extensive discussions and helpful comments. I owe many thanks also to Robert Ehinger, 
former Executive Director of International Trade Data Systems (ITDS) and his staff for 
their enthusiastic support during the months of data collection in Washington, Laredo and 
Nuevo Laredo and on numerous other occasions.  Additionally, Professor James 
Giermanski, perhaps the U.S.’s leading specialist on issues of inefficiency at the 
U.S./Mexico border, walked me through the process in Laredo and Nuevo Laredo and 
shared with me his works and experience on the subject. 
 
At the risk of omitting some names, I would like to express special thanks to the following:  
Dr. Kevin Horn for his review and comments on the thesis, Dr. Guillermo Perry, Chief 
Economist for the Latin American Office of the World Bank, who considered the analysis 
of non-tariff barriers fascinating; Dr. Daniel Lederman from the World Bank who invited 
me to write a paper on the same subject for their study of Lessons from NAFTA to 
CAFTA. 
 
I am deeply appreciative of my daughter Marie-Claire, now ten years old, who was born 
during the course of this work; she matured along with the progress of my research, and in 
her own way contributed with her sketches of drawings on the drafts of my thesis.  I thank 
all my friends in Colombia, the United States, and Europe who have been so supportive of 
my work.  And also to my Jesuit friends, I thank them for their wisdom and grace, which 
motivated me to do the best work for the major glory of God and the economic benefit of 
the less privileged in the world, with the hope that free trade agreements will help the poor 
out of their plight. 
 
Finally, in loving memory of Charles Wright, to whom I also dedicate this thesis.  Charles 
was a dear friend and served as my tutor; he took on the burden of answering my many 
questions with remarkable kindness and contagious joy, and taught me to think logically 
about a seemingly illogical cross border environment.  Charles took his notion of transport 
efficiency to heart, reviewing and editing my drafts while sitting on a subway car on his 
way to work.  Charles was a prominent PhD transport economist, university professor for 
many years, and Senior Transport Economist at the Interamerican Development Bank. It 
was a privilege to have known Charles through all the years of my work. 
 
The responsibility for the opinions expressed and any remaining errors rests exclusively 
with the author. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The real world is anything but 
seamless: it remains separated by 
oceans, rivers and deserts, by 
cultural and language differences, 
and by national boundaries that 
continue to impose substantial 
practical obstacles to trade even 
when there are no formal trade 
barriers. 
      -Fujita, Krugman and Venables 
 
1.1 The Problem 
 
This research examines the economics of border crossing of goods transported by truck 
between the United States and Mexico from the aspects of theoretical efficiency and 
institutional barriers to achieving such efficiency. 
 
In a formal sense, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) expanded trade 
links between Canada, Mexico and the United States, eliminated all non-tariff barriers, and 
established rules guaranteeing the permanent access of domestic products to the North 
American markets.  
 
The agreement recognizes and encourages the large and growing trade among the three 
countries.  The trade between United States and Mexico increased from $ 27 billion in 
1982 to an estimated $ 239 billion in 2000 (December 2000 U.S. Department of Commerce 
statistics).  Trucking is the primary form of transportation in the trade between the two 
countries, representing over 70 percent of the freight bill and 70 percent of the merchandise 
traded by value.  Trucking is one of the most disputed elements of the agreement.  NAFTA 
did not specify how trade should be administered by the Government agencies of the 
NAFTA countries.  The implicit assumption was that it would take only one truck and 
minimum time to go from point A in the United States to point B in Mexico and vice-versa.  
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In reality, however, it takes two days to go from Chicago to Laredo, a 1600 mile trip, while 
to cross the border from Laredo, Texas, to New Laredo just across the Rio Grande in 
Mexico, it takes from three to five days and at least four pieces of equipment (trucks and 
trailers) and three or four drivers, to cross the Rio Grande river with a loaded truck. 
Obviously, there is a large gap between NAFTA’s underlying assumption and reality.  
 
More than one-half of the value of all U.S. exports to Mexico and one-third of all imports 
from Mexico pass through Laredo alone, whose trade volume has grown by $3 billion 
annually since 1990 (Nolle 2000).  Laredo’s proximity to major highways gives motor 
carriers quick access to Mexico’s industrial triangle of Monterrey, Guadalajara, and 
Mexico City.  Laredo handles more freight than any U.S. Mexico crossing in terms of 
value, volume and number of entries.  
 
Customs officials report that Laredo, Texas, the principal crossing point for long-haul trade 
between the two countries, has more than 10,000 trucks crossings daily, while Orreneus, 
Phillips and Blackburn (2001) place the figure at 15,000, carrying 40 percent of U.S.-
Mexico overland merchandise trade by volume and 50 percent by value. 
 
Later chapters show that a complex border crossing system exists at Laredo, despite 
NAFTA, creating delays, extra costs, congestion, pollution that have effectively become 
non-tariff barriers to trade.  The present border system entails inefficiencies that have 
extended from the 1980’s to the new millennium.  They include time-consuming hurdles 
that take the form of long standing practices of governments, transportation interests, 
customs brokers and other businesses.  
1.2 Contribution 
   
This thesis examines the topic of transportation and border crossing in international trade 
using the joint framework of economic analysis, public choice theory and behavioral 
economic theories that include institutional arrangements. The analysis provides insight 
into the characteristics of the underlying economic, social, and political situation, along 
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with the likely effects of alternative strategies for dealing with the changes in the cross-
border transport system. 
 
This thesis researches the actual delays, costs and inefficiencies that exist at the Laredo 
border crossing, and explores the reasons of why they exist and what theory apply.  It 
measures impacts, show causes, rooted in local microeconomic interest, with ramification 
in the political system of two countries. It provides the theoretical explanation based in 
public choice and behavioral economics, areas in which not much work have been done, 
and almost none with concrete examples.  This thesis presents a theory that explains the 
causes, as well as quantifying the microeconomic impact.  
  
The inefficiencies present at the Laredo Border Crossing have a secondary impact on 
overall trade more difficult to measure because many other variables affect overall trade.  
To measure the net impact of the border related inefficiencies on the trade flows between 
the United States and Mexico the GTAP model is applied due to its capability to provide 
an elaborate and realistic representation of the economy, including relationships among all 
sectors, agents and other economies. 
 
As Hummels (2001) asserts in its paper:  
  
“non tariff barriers of various sorts and structural impediments are less 
obvious and perhaps more interesting, but also much more difficult to directly 
measure. As consequence, researchers rely primarily on indirect methods: positing 
a model of bilateral trade flows and correlating flows with proxy variables meant 
to represent trade barriers.” 
 
The novelty of this research is that it identifies, analyzes the institutional and legal barriers 
that impede the economic efficiency of border crossing, and studies the theories of 
economic behavior and political choice that are applied to explain this economic reality.  
Then the GTAP model is applied to quantify the macro-economic effect of the border 
related inefficiencies. 
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1.3 Methodology  
 
1.3.1 Objectives 
The general objective of this research is to provide a conceptual framework for 
understanding the economics of cross border trucking problems in the trade between the 
United States and Mexico, a pre-requisite to achieving free trade among these two NAFTA 
countries. 
 
The specific objectives are to: 
 1)  determine if there are substantial inefficiencies in the border crossing process, 
and   quantify their times and costs at the most important crossing at the two 
Laredos; 
2) if (1) holds, quantify the benefits of an efficient border crossing by truck in 
terms of:   
a) how improvements in border crossing procedures will affect 
trucking  times and costs;   
  b) the impact in the trucking industry and type of operation; 
c) the competitiveness of trucking, against rail; 
3) if (1) holds, define and analyze the factors that explain the differences 
between the economically efficient solution and the reality found at the 
Laredo/Nuevo Laredo border crossing. 
4) formal presentation of the implications of border related trade barriers on the 
trade between the United States and Mexico.  
 
 
To achieve objectives (1) and (2), I examined the cross-border problem using an 
institutional analysis cost model that assigns times and costs to each activity phase of the 
cross-border operation.  I identify the various bottlenecks with the model and quantify their 
component costs to the truck transportation service.  I then use the least cost solution as a 
standard of comparison for simulating short-run improvements.  These include: decreased 
congestion time; improved custom inspections; and enhancements in cross-border transport 
operations.  I then use the model to simulate major institutional modifications based on an 
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“intermediate” and “high” estimate of growth rates for trade between United States and 
Mexico.  The simulated changes include: congestion time improvement; efficient 
Government inspections; and improvement of cross-border operations (interlining, 
interchanging).  
 
To achieve the third objective, the institutional analysis, I identify the major players, their 
interests, and the legal framework in the context of theories on the differences between 
“rational” expectations and real economic behavior.  I analyze the pertinent economic 
theory.  Traditional microeconomic theory assumes that, in the absence of substantial 
economies of scale, competition among economic agents will lead to increased efficiency 
and cost minimization. The persistence over many years of massive inefficiencies in an 
otherwise competitive environment composed of numerous well-informed brokers and 
trucking firms can only be explained by legal, quasi-legal and other institutional or 
behavioral barriers to free trade.  I thus review the literature on public choice theory in the 
Buchanan-Tullock tradition and the behavioral economics theory typified by the recent 
work by Hugh Schwartz.  
 
To achieve objective (4) after presenting the microeconomic impact of the inefficiencies of 
border crossing I present the secondary impact on overall trade.  For this section I review 
the literature on border economies and border effects within the NAFTA countries, 
focusing on models for measuring the effects of imposing import duty on trade.  Then The 
General Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is used to introduce the border crossing 
inefficiencies as an imposed import duty to see what the effects are in the trade between 
United States and Mexico. The following scenarios are investigated: a) the Mexican tariff 
on U.S. and Canadian products is increased by the measured friction of border crossing 
inefficiencies (money paid by shippers for charges for non-essential border crossing 
services; and b) an iceberg tariff to account for the value of time it takes to cross the border.  
Then the experiment involves simultaneously removing both (a) and (b).  The experiment 
reports the impact on welfare (EV) as well as trade relative trade flows. 
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1.3.2 Hypothesized Model of Border Crossing 
The conceptual framework for conducting this investigation was the hypothetical model of 
border crossing assumed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).   
 
1.3.3 Hypotheses 
This research examines the economics of border crossing of goods transported by truck 
between the United States and Mexico from the aspects of theoretical efficiency and 
institutional barriers to achieving such efficiency. 
 
The working hypothesis is that an efficient border crossing, with other factors, promotes 
free trade.  In other words, a border crossing is an independent variable that directly affects 
the dependent variable free trade.  The motive for free trade is to create wealth; free trade 
expands economic markets and interaction, which in turn leads to more wealth through 
greater specialization, competition, and more efficient combinations of factors of 
production.  This lowers total costs of production and distribution, along with the costs of 
all associated services, research and development. 
   
However, an efficient border crossing is not simply an independent variable, but a 
necessary condition for free trade to occur.  
 
To investigate the hypothesis of the existence of the efficient border crossing that NAFTA 
drafters assumed, I studied the border crossing and conceptualized it as a dependent 
variable for this thesis. 
 
As the research progressed, I focused on the characteristics that showed them to be the key 
elements of a seamless border. As seen in Chapter 2, the trucking industry is the most 
important element of the conceptual border crossing due to the importance of this mode in 
the transportation of trade between United States and Mexico.  Trucking represents 75 
percent of the freight bill, 70 percent of the tonnage, and 80 percent of the value of the 
trade between United States and Mexico.  Therefore, I focused on applying the concept of 
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border crossing to the trucking industry.  Thus, the dependent variable becomes border 
crossing for trucks. 
 
The research focuses on the most important border crossing for trucks that transport 
traditional trade.  This port of entry is Laredo, Texas, and its sister city, Nuevo Laredo, in 
Mexico. Laredo handles more freight than any other U.S.-Mexican crossing in terms of 
value, volume, and number of entries. 
 
What, conceptually, are the key elements that would lead to an efficient border for trucks?  
In other words, what are the independent variables that affect this dependent variable? 
 
 Seamless border +other conditions -----Free Trade -----Wealth 
 
 A seamless border crossing is a function of:  
 A:  Adequate infrastructure to serve demand for transport: bridges, access 
roads, governmental inspection facilities, commercial infrastructure 
 B: Lack of institutional constraints 
 C: Homogeneous government systems 
 D: Cultural understanding: social, political and business 
 A+B+C+D--------- Seamless border 
Thus, my working hypothesis is that an efficient border crossing promotes trade, or 
 Trade = F (costs of border crossing, other variables). 
  
By accepting this as my working hypothesis, I am able to test the following null hypothesis 
against its alternative: 
 Ho : Formal NAFTA provisions have led to an efficient border crossing. 
 Ha : NAFTA provisions have not led to an efficient border crossing. 
 Ho, efficient conditions in the border crossing environment, require only one truck 
and at most a 4 hour delay at the border to go from point A in the United States to point B 
in Mexico or vice-versa. As shown in Chapter 4, however, it takes two days to go from 
Chicago to Laredo, a 1,600 mile trip, while to cross the border from Laredo, Texas, to New 
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Laredo just across the Rio Grande in Mexico, takes from three to five days and at least four 
pieces of equipment and three drivers.  Obviously, there is a large gap between NAFTA’s 
formal provisions and reality.  The quantitative evidence rejects Ho and accepts Ha  
(Chapter 4). 
 
These independent variables required me to collect the following types of data: (1) 
distinctive features of the U.S.-Mexican border; (2) the impact of NAFTA on the border 
crossing situation; (3) the problem context (the geographical region, the trends of trade, the 
principal commodities, the trade corridors); (4) the U.S. and Mexican trucking industries; 
(5) border crossing infrastructure; (6) the traditional trade and border crossing flow process; 
(7) costs of border crossing; and (8) institutional factors. 
 
The next section explains how I collected and analyzed these data. 
 
1.3.4 Research Instruments  
 
1.3.4.1 Literature Review   
The first part of the research consisted of a literature review of demand for transportation 
and general background theory about principles of transport economics.  Subsequently, my 
review focused on demand for transportation in the trade between the United States and 
Mexico. As the  predominance of trucking became evident in transport between the United 
States and Mexico, the corresponding literature became both scarce and difficult to obtain.  
I reviewed various journals of transportation, newspapers, articles, and specialized trade 
journals,1 but located only a few pertinent items. Cross-border trucking became the most 
interesting problem to investigate, when I verified that this was a largely unexplored area 
that was attractive for original research and one that would require considerable field 
research and collection of some key primary data. 
                                                          
 1A partial list of the journals consulted is: Traffic World, The Economist, The 
Journal of Commerce, The Wall Street Journal, American Shipper, Transportation Journal, 
and Logistics online Magazine. 
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The study of the European context of cross-border initiatives was relevant with respect to 
the basic hypothesis of this research as general background.  These studies do not explicitly 
consider the role of transport in international trade; they implicitly consider that it is one of 
the elements subject to local initiatives, or the municipalities on each side of a land border. 
The study of regional trading blocs in Europe and North America confirmed the key 
variables of the hypothesis. 
 
The study of NAFTA and its implications for the trucking industry and border crossings 
became an important tool to define the hypothesis of the study and the model of border 
crossing. 
 
To quantify the macro-economic impact of the costs surveyed in the trade flows it was 
necessary to review econometric models to introduce the border crossing inefficiencies as 
an imposed duty on trade. 
 
1.3.4.2 Statistical Data  
I reviewed the statistical data on trade, corridors of trade, main products of trade, and main 
modes of transportation.  I obtained this data from government agencies, through 
publications and from electronic data bases.  I collected the statistics of daily truck 
crossings directly from the customs officials at the Laredo bridges. 
 
1.3.4.3 Interview Data: The Context  
I faced a number of difficulties when collecting information for this study due to the 
economic and political interests involved in cross-border activities: (i) access to relevant 
key officials; (ii) access to internal data regarding the border crossing problem; (iii) access 
to memorandums and internal studies; and (iv) access to correspondence and quantitative 
data. 
 
It was relatively easy to identify whom to interview, which were the key officials of the 
groups and organizations listed later in this chapter.  It was difficult to get access to them. 
The most difficult problem in gathering data from key officials was setting up interviews, 
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because many representatives have little to gain from an interview and have bureaucratic 
and political reasons for avoiding it.   
 
First, officials have to protect the interests of the organizations they represent and tend to 
view interviewers with suspicion.  They are concerned about protecting their budgets, 
staffs, and other critical resources from potential criticism. Representatives of private firms 
fear that prospective interviewers claiming to be researchers or students are in reality either 
consultants or members of client or competing firms who aim to obtain privileged 
information for their own economic gain. 
 
Finally, there is a third issue that revolves around the desire to keep potentially 
controversial information at arm’s length.  This seems counterintuitive, but makes political 
sense.  The Department Of Transportation (DOT), for example, signs a significant number 
of contracts with consulting firms to gather information, in part as a mechanism to distance 
itself from the most politically sensitive issues that are also potentially the most damaging 
issues.  For example, when I asked DOT for information about the Laredo border crossing, 
they referred me to a consultant who had done extensive studies.  I then called the 
consultant, who did not trust my condition as a student.  Fortunately, at that time I had a 
meeting with an old friend from another governmental organization from my days as an 
international trade official.  He helped me obtain studies (including those of the 
uncooperative consultant) and memos, and set up meetings with key persons. 
 
When combined, these factors create significant difficulties in gaining access to key 
officials.  The problems can reinforce each other, so the researcher can break the log jam 
only through persistence and contacts within these organizations.  
 
As explained below, quantitative data came almost exclusively from written sources.  
Interviews were useful in locating these sources.  Their primary use, however, was in 
revealing institutional barriers to efficiency and the “territorial defenses” of bureaucracies 
and private interest groups. 
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The face- to-face interaction was an important data collection tool, useful in locating 
sources of information and discovering what people think about key issues, particularly 
with regard to maintaining the status quo or seeking change, and indications of their 
economic interests. 
 
I began each interview with a set of standard key questions related to the principal 
variables being studied.  This was useful for comparing and evaluating answers across 
cases and respondents.  Triangulation was used to corroborate information. 
 
Since quantitative information was almost always obtained from written sources, I used the 
second, open-ended part of the interview, to gain insight and information about 
institutional factors and the economic interests and political pressures involved.  
 
There were often conflicting views, representing conflicting economic interests.  The 
border-crossing process involves key actors and organizations. I interviewed 
representatives from these sectors, and was usually able to talk separately to both senior 
officials and technical or field officers and to people outside the organization that knew the 
organization (such as ex-employees), and outside individuals such as academics or 
consultants that are knowledgeable because of their own research. 
 
1.3.4.4 Interview Data: Sources and Use   
I verified the information about infrastructure by obtaining and analyzing maps and 
making site visits to the different processing sites, parking areas, routes, and bridges. The 
information about infrastructure, cultural factors, and the institutional constraints present at 
the U.S.-Mexican border crossings was obtained through interviews I conducted with 
members of private and public organizations involved in the border crossing problem, and 
in discussions I conducted with working groups.  I was able to confirm the institutional 
constraints at the border crossing itself that were identified in the interviews through 
several sources and by observation of the practices that resulted.  For example, the 
statements of Mexican customs brokers and American trucking representatives described 
the same steps for processing the paperwork and shuffling the equipment and goods back 
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and forth.  I was able to objectively calculate the consequences in terms of delays and costs 
based on driver’s logs, dates and times on bills of lading, interviews, observations “in 
sitio.”  I was able to document other institutional factors in legal texts, such as the NAFTA 
legislation and the transcripts of the hearings in the U.S. Congress. 
 
I found the “cultural” factors hardest to document with any “hard” data.  In any case, they 
are used only as general background and are not required for verification of any of the data, 
the hypothesis, or conclusions in this study.   
 
The organizations interviewed included: 
 
Washington D.C. 
 American Trucking Association 
 Booz-Allen and Hamilton Inc. (consultants for the border crossing project)  
 George Mason University 
 George Washington University 
 Georgetown University  
 Interamerican Development Bank, (IDB) 
International Trade Data System (ITDS), U.S. International Trade Administration  
 Mexican Customs  
 Mexican Embassy, Economic Office 
 National Ports and Waterways Institute 
 U.S.  Customs Service 
 U.S. Department of Transportation 
 U.S. Department of Commerce 
 U.S. International Trade Commission 
 World Bank  
 
Laredo (Texas) 
 International Trade Data Systems (ITDS)  
 Mexican brokers association 
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 Mexican Customs 
 Texas A&M International University 
 U.S. Customs 
 U.S. and Mexican rail industry 
 U.S. and Mexican trucking industry 
 
The International Trade Data System (ITDS) and the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC) gave important support in the development of this research.  ITDS’s 
endorsement of my research opened doors for meetings with people that otherwise would 
not have participated and enabled me to obtain information from primary sources on the 
topics discussed in the following paragraphs. USITC gave me access, guidance and 
assistance to the application of the GTAP model, necessary to quantify the macro-
economic effect of the data collected. 
 
The subject of border crossings on the U.S.-Mexican border is a difficult one, due to the 
economic interests and the politics involved.  People are reluctant to give names or even be 
listed as sources of information. The interviews were directed to specific subjects: (1) 
NAFTA and its implications on the trucking industry; (2) the socio-political background of 
the border; (3) the trade flow and the border crossing processes; (4) the bottlenecks in the 
border crossing process, including infrastructure and businesses practices ; (5) the costs of 
the border crossing; and (6) simulations of border crossing improvements.  The interviews 
were done in an open form, focusing on the subject of the discussion previously agreed to 
by phone or in a previous meeting.  Some interviews were in English; Spanish was used 
when the person or persons interviewed were Spanish-speaking and no persons were 
present that spoke only English.   
 
Most of the people that participated in the interviews were candid in their answers; others 
were very diplomatic, or  vague, reflecting their business or political position.  The 
“vagueness” was related to two basic concerns: (i) information about their costs and 
pricing that might be useful to their competitors or clients; and (ii) rent-seeking behavior as 
related to political influence.  I was able to overcome limitation (i) by agreeing to use only 
14 
aggregate data so that individual firms would not lose confidential data to potential 
competitors or clients with whom they negotiate (see section 2.5 below).   
 
The mechanics of how people wield their political influence and what their psychological 
motivations are pertain to disciplines such as political science and psychology and are 
outside the scope of this research.  However, the “vagueness” or “diplomatic” answers 
alerted me to areas where concrete economic interests are at stake and economic theory is 
relevant (Buchanan and Tullock 1963; Schwartz 1998).  The three central areas are: (i) the 
U.S. trucking interest in limiting access of Mexican drivers and trucks in the U.S. market, 
and the parallel restrictions on U.S. operations in Mexico; (ii) the network of personal and 
political influence that maintains Mexican brokers, drayage firms, and other intermediaries 
in business; and (iii) the secondary effects that (ii) has on the economy of border towns and 
their political representatives. 
 
The U.S. interest groups phrased their concerns in terms of “public safety,” while 
Mexicans referred to “legal provisions” or nationalistic interests. 
 
 
1.3.5 Original Documents  
I faced difficulties in obtaining copies of original documentation from both government 
agencies and private firms.  Official organizations are reluctant to release documents that 
question their policies or actions. Such information can be - and often is - used by actors in 
the national governments back in Washington or Mexico City when budget cuts, personnel 
cuts, or other politically generated reasons for government “efficiency” or dispensing of 
favors arise. Private firms fear the information will be useful to their competitors and 
clients, and documentation, particularly quantitative information, is considered classified 
by negotiators, truckers, shippers, and brokers.  All of these actors have vested interest in 
limiting access of outside parties to this information to maintain or gain an edge when 
conducting negotiations.  For this study, the documentations has three basic forms: (i) 
quantitative: numerical information concerning billing, invoices, time logs, border crossing 
logs, and container contents, etc.; (ii) correspondence: memorandums, e-mails, telephone 
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logs, briefing papers, and slides from limited-access conferences, point papers, and non-
official papers; and (iii) internal assessments: internal studies of problem areas, copies of 
contractor studies with limited internal distribution and briefings of internal assessments. 
 
I obtained original documents during my field research trip to the two Laredos, such as the 
paper with the model that Smith-Giermanski (1997) developed to quantify the costs of 
southbound border crossing for the automotive industry in 1995. I expanded the model by 
analyzing the times involved in each step of the border crossing system.  Times reveal 
inefficiencies clearly, unambiguously, while costs can fluctuate with seasonal factors or 
appear small in relation to a high-value shipment.  Also, lengthy delays and uncertainties 
can hurt “just-in-time” processes and other time-sensitive trade. Since the times are crucial 
for the current research, I further adapted and updated the Giermanski-Smith model to 
analyze the times and costs involved in the transportation of manufactures across the 
border.  I applied the new model using a hypothetical example of a shipment from Chicago 
in the United States to Monterrey in Mexico.    
 
The quantitative information on “costs and times” of border crossing was obtained through 
interviews with shippers, truckers, ITDS members, and transport consultants.  I verified 
this information by examining invoices obtained from the Mexican brokers by Texas A&M 
University.  I was allowed to consult this material with the understanding that individual 
data that referred to specific invoices or brokers are confidential information between the 
truckers and the Mexican brokers. Furthermore, these data change according to the time of 
the year (there are cycles of higher costs, for example, near Christmas). I used this data to 
calculate low and high cost ranges, indicative of the approximate costs paid by the shipper, 
who passes them on to the final consumer.  There are no official printed rates of border 
crossing services; they change from trucker to trucker and from broker to broker, and are 
confidential between brokers and truckers. The cost numbers used in my quantitative 
model are estimates that illustrate the problems faced by the border crossing system.  They 
are important to test the hypothesis of the excessively high cost of the border crossing.  The 
data on the time delays and equipment and driver use at the border crossing provide a more 
objective data test of the inefficiencies. 
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I obtained the information about the Laredo border crossing infrastructure by interviewing 
the Director of ITDS and consultants of Booz, Allen and Hamilton for the ITDS border 
crossing project. I corroborated the information through my interviews with the bridge 
managers and personal observation of the Laredo-Nuevo Laredo bridges #1 and #2 and by 
examining maps of the area. 
1.4  The Thesis 
 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents the context of the research by 
outlining earlier work on transferred arrangements in Europe, and North America.  The key 
factors at the core of all these developments are identified, along with the main areas of 
debate, which  allowed me to build the central hypothesis that this research tests.  That 
chapter also analyzes the environment of the US-Mexican border crossing, describing its 
elements, such as the geographical region, the trade flows, and the characteristics of the 
trucking industry in both countries.  The objectives of NAFTA are analyzed and compared 
with the reality of the border crossing.  
 
Chapter 3 presents in more detail the Laredo border crossing, the prominent one in trade 
volume and value, the volume and nature of movements, the infrastructure, and the trade 
flow process. 
 
Chapter 4 reviews the models and approaches available to quantify border crossing costs 
and formulates an economic model for the analysis of truck transportation and border 
crossings at Laredo.  Costs and times are quantified for each activity of the actual cross-
border operation described in Chapter 3. The specific causes of the delays and high costs in 
the border crossing are identified along with their consequences.  Both benefits and costs 
are examined to explain the relatively high level and the longevity of excessive costs and 
delays found at the border crossing at Laredo.  This chapter shows that the traditional 
economic models and transportation theories do not explain the longevity of the inefficient 
border crossing.  Institutional and behavioral approaches are then presented to explain the 
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anomalies between the economic rationality versus the specific interests and decisions 
identified in the border crossing at Laredo.    
 
Border Crossing inefficiencies have a secondary impact on overall trade that is more 
difficult to measure because many other variables affect overall trade.  To measure the 
impact of these inefficiencies on the trade between the United States and Mexico I review 
the literature on border economies and border effects within NAFTA countries focusing on 
econometric models for measuring the effects of imposing import duty on trade.  Then one 
of these models, the General Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, is used to introduce 
the border crossing inefficiencies as an imposed import duty to see what the effects are in 
the trade between United States and Mexico. The following scenarios are investigated: a) 
the Mexican tariff on U.S. and Canadian products is increased by the measured friction of 
border crossing inefficiencies (money paid by shippers for charges for non-essential border 
crossing services; and b) an iceberg tariff to account for the value of time it takes to cross 
the border.  Then the experiment involves simultaneously removing both (a) and (b).  The 
experiment reports the impact on welfare (EV) as well as trade relative trade flows. 
 
Chapter 5 develops solution scenarios for the border crossing problem, including: the 
implementation of NAFTA; moving the Mexican brokers from the U.S. side to the 
Mexican side of the border; leasing; multi-modal transport; and the use of the International 
Trade Data System, ITDS.   Quantitative analysis of the results is presented using the 
model solution.  An economic interpretation of the sub-problems is given and the 
implications are discussed with respect to the overall strategy for transportation, 
recognizing the probable competition of the rail transportation. Chapter 5 also presents the 
projects for improving the border crossing infrastructure, highways, railroads and 
government agencies related to the inspection process. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the effort to solve the border crossing by constructing new 
infrastructure at Laredo: the World Trade Bridge with access roads and inspecting booths 
at the Laredo crossing point.  This Chapter describes the new bridge and discuss the 
principal characteristics of the Laredo border crossing problem, the interest groups, their 
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objectives, and how they interact.  This Chapter compares the operations near the Laredo 
bridge on the U.S. southern border with those near the Ambassador bridge on the U.S. 
northern border to show the institutional differences in the two border crossing systems and 
how they impact the costs and timeliness of trade. Chapter 7 summarizes the findings, 
presents the conclusions, and explores some of the implications of the research. 
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2 Context of the Study 
 
2.1  Introduction 
  
This chapter contextualizes the research by outlining the previous work on transfer 
arrangements on border crossings in Europe and North America.  The key factors in all 
these developments are identified, along with the main areas of debate, allowing me to 
build the central hypothesis that this research tests.  This chapter also analyzes the 
environment of the U.S.-Mexican border crossing, describing its elements, such as the 
geographical region, the trade flows, and the characteristics of the trucking industry in both 
countries.  The objectives of NAFTA and its impact on the situation are analyzed and 
compared with the reality of the most important border crossing, the one at Laredo, in the 
context of the economics of U.S.- Mexican trade and transportation.  Later chapters 
investigate the scale, nature, cost and implications of the Laredo bottleneck.  These events 
lead to the identification of who gains and who loses, and to the question of why economic 
inefficiencies persist over long time periods. 
 
The U.S.-Mexican border crossing economics are different from the U.S.-Canadian 
crossings or other crossings in the European Union.  The following section reviews the 
literature on border crossings and some aspects of the European Union and the U.S.-
Canadian border before returning to the U.S.-Mexican case. 
2.2 Previous Work on Border Crossing in Europe 
 
Europe seems to be the continent where regional trading arrangements are the most 
advanced, both in terms of formal agreements and the level of intra-regional trade.  Most of 
this trade can be explained by the EC members’ size, level of development, proximity, and 
common borders (Frankel 1997, p.78). The European Union accounts for 30 percent of the 
world gross product, evaluated at recent exchange rates (Frankel, 1997, p. 37).  
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European countries speak different languages than their neighbors and this creates a 
problem in trade and in the process of political integration. Frankel (1997, p. 119) 
estimates that if the European Union attained the same degree of political and border 
integration as the United States and Canada, trade among the European countries would 
increase dramatically (as much as 21-fold). 
 
Koeing (April 2000) presents the case of Poland, adding a border crossing for trucking to 
shorten transit times and ease delays at the congested border with Germany, between the 
Polish town of Gubin and the German town of Guben.  A step backward, at least for the 
German and Dutch motor carriers, is a new Polish government requirement that freight and 
customs documents be in Polish.  “This requirement is likely to lead to longer backups at 
the border crossings,” (Koeing 2000, p. 1) as truckers with documents in German or 
English are turned away or referred to a translator. 
 
During the last decade, the European Commission has promoted the interaction between 
border crossing regions in Europe. Andrew Church and Peter Reid have done extensive 
work about cross-border co-operation, institutionalization, and political space across the 
English Channel.  These papers explore the significance of cross-border strategies for the 
development and restructuring of the role of local governments in institutional 
arrangements and territories.  
 
Church and Reid (April 1999, pp.643-655) view the financial support of the European 
Commission (EC) as partly responsible for the growth of transfrontier initiatives involving 
regional and local authorities on the internal and external boundaries of the European 
Union.  These transfrontier initiatives are equivalent to an informal policy for border 
regions in Europe. Even though the financial support is limited, it is politically significant 
(Williams, 1996). European Union assistance for Central Europe has also supported border 
crossing programs in Poland and Hungary aimed to restructure the economies of these 
countries. 
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Church and Reid provide the conceptual elements of the “new institutionalist” perspective 
to examine the broader effects of transfrontier regions on political space and 
institutionalization, taking elements from regional and urban development analysis  in 
Europe  (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Healey et al., 1995; Grabher and Stark, 1996). Local and 
regional authorities play a major role in the evolution of these transfrontier initiatives.   
 
The meanings and characteristics of institutions are recognized in general terms as the 
formal and informal practices that govern and regulate social, political, and economic life 
(O’Riordan and Jordan, 1996). 
 
Transfrontier initiatives are a minor element of government structures, composed of 
numerous actors, practices, and bureaucratic organizations that contribute to the 
development of political institutions (March and Olsen, 1984).  Cross-border co-operation 
is part of an ongoing process of institutionalization that results in the continual 
restructuring of organizational forms. 
 
From the European Commission’s perspective, cross-border initiatives are one of the 
programs designed to promote integration, but the actual outcomes of these initiatives are 
not easy to pin down (Brown, 1998). 
 
Local authorities become involved with transfrontier initiatives to get funding, information, 
promotion, cultural and education exchange.  These activities enhance the private sector 
and its political positioning in relation to other tiers of government. Cross-border initiatives 
also may help authorities in politically marginalized areas, helping the process of 
integration.  Integration has political, social, cultural and physical dimensions, and may be 
an uneven process (Church and Reid, 1996, p. 644).    
 
Some cross-border projects have over-emphasized infrastructure and the physical 
environment, such as the Dutch-German border (Scott, 1996).  In Scandinavia the 
transfrontier projects often concentrate on major infrastructure projects that promote 
economic development but are a problem for the environment (Vartiainen, 1994).  
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Previous studies have identified political problems of cross-border initiatives such as 
accountability shortcomings, political asynchronicity, and conflict between different scales 
of government (Church and Reid, 1998, p.  644). 
 
The terms “institutional thickness” and “territorial embeddedness” are used by the 
institutionalists to asses the way individual organizations and networks contribute to the 
process of regional and urban change (Amin and Thrift, 1994).   
 
The term “Institutional thickness” is not defined in the literature, but I assume it is the 
cohesion that reflects the relationships between old and new structures as institutional 
legacies create frictions for newly emerging entities.  In certain cases, institutional 
thickness can have negative implications for economic growth as old organizations resist 
change and contribute to institutional over-capacity, while new structures can be used to 
disrupt economic stability (Amin and Thrift, 1994). Often, institutional thickness can be 
related to territorial embeddedness so that “institutions act to stabilize a range of collective 
economic practices in a particular territory”, and territorialities provide a place-
centeredness that facilitates production and regulation in an increasingly globalized 
economy (Amin and Thrift, 1994, p. 16) . 
 
The components of institutional thickness and territorial embeddedness are not always easy 
to identify, but in general they involve the use of complex networks and alliances to 
influence the local outcomes of global-local interactions.  Thrift, 1994, identified four 
elements of institutional thickness: 1) copresence; 2) trust relations; 3) common enterprise; 
and 4) uneven distribution of power.  Other studies add a fifth element: organizational 
fluidity and dynamism. Grabher and Stark (1997) argue that variety and diversity are 
essential for successful economic development since a large ‘genetic pool’ of new 
organizational forms allows a broad range of alternatives and a risk reduction. 
 
Church and Reid’s empirical analysis assesses cross-border initiatives in terms of four 
issues: (1) the nature and integrity of co-operation; (2) the positioning strategies and power 
relations between co-operating participants; (3) the contribution to organizational diversity; 
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and (4) the interaction of new organizational features and political spaces with existing 
structures and territorialities. 
 
Their case study areas are in southern England and northern France and involve local 
authorities with few ethnic links, except the historical and cultural connections between 
parts of southwest England and Bretagne.  While cross-Channel trade and transport links 
are extensively developed, the Channel still represents a relatively significant barrier in EU 
terms to the development of a well integrated transfrontier economic space.  Church and 
Reid explore the implications of cross-border initiatives for political space and 
institutionalization in a part of Europe where coherent transfrontier spaces and shared 
ethnic politics are not strongly developed, despite the growing links between the regions on 
either side of this sea border.   
 
Church and Reid arrive at mixed conclusions.  The Transmanche region has developed 
over ten years a relative degree of stability; by contrast, the Arc Manche, which includes 
authorities along the coast of northern France and southern England, faces problems in 
establishing initial structures.  There are similar mixed conclusions in terms of the role of 
local governance in institutional arrangements.  The most effective cases show authorities 
reconciling certain competitive differences.  As the cross-border initiatives mature, they 
involve cooperation between local government, business and educational entities.  The 
most optimistic conclusion is that cross-border initiatives can lead to a growing co-
operative capacity and contribute to longer- term institutional thickness.  However, 
problematic aspects of institutional relations may limit the influence of the cross-border 
initiatives.  
 
The analysis of the territorial characteristics of cross-border initiatives also produces mixed 
conclusions.  Cross-border spaces are flexible, “imaginary spaces” envisioned by 
politicians.  A positive interpretation of the flexible territorial characteristics of cross-
border initiatives indicates a will to adopt less bounded strategies in the development of 
territorial embeddedness that allow the local government a wider institutional scope to 
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intervene in economic globalization and transnational reordering of political space being 
promoted by the EC.  
 
In an earlier paper Church and Reid (Vol.29.3, p. 297-316), analyze the function of the 
local and regional state in the process of regional economic change. Castells and Hall 
(1994) argue that cities and regions are the “new economic actors.” Despite having less 
power than national governments, regional and urban agencies have a greater response 
capacity to generate targeted development projects.  Hirst and Thompson (1992) analyze 
the potential problems of the political institutionalization of regions in Europe since they 
may lead to political opportunism and the strengthening of the power bases of existing 
regional elites. 
 
The new cross-border initiatives in Europe are of particular theoretical interest since they 
represent a new, or at least, different scale of regulation.  The EU sees cross-border co-
operation as a pre-cursor to European integration.  Cross-border co-operation is part of a 
well established tradition between France, Germany, and Switzerland where in the early 
1990s a number of local and regional authorities formed the Maas Rhine Euroregion 
(Dankbaar et al.,1994). 
 
Several studies highlight what Capellin (1992) calls the “ambiguous effects” of border 
regions.  For example, the removal of customs barriers can lead to either the concentration 
or the dispersal of economic activity (Maillot, 1990; Capellin, 1992.)  The economic 
benefits of removing customs barriers occur in one of two ways: (1) peripherality may be 
reduced; or (2) comparative advantage can be strengthened (Balassa, 1989).  In the Alps 
Maritimes border between France and Italy, economic changes resulted in political and co-
operative ventures that reduced cross-border friction (Minghi,1991). 
 
The emergence of transfrontier initiatives across the Channel highlights the problems and 
advantages of co-operation.  Within individual authorities, the commitment of limited 
public funds to international co-operation may conflict with the more local concerns of 
elected councilors. 
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Some problems can have beneficial outcomes.  Existing regional elites in Europe seek to 
gain from political institutionalization of regions, but co-operative initiatives allow urban 
and local authorities in nations with a weak or virtually non-existent tier of regional 
government to construct alliances and develop a role at the regional level. 
 
Church and Reid (1998, p. 305) conclude that, politically, Euro-sceptics argue that 
international initiatives could lead to a detachment of local government from the more 
immediate local needs of their electorates.  By contrast, federalists argue that local needs 
can only be properly be fulfilled by action on European scale.   
2.3 Border Crossing Between The United States and Canada 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The total length of the U.S.-Canadian boundary is 5,525 miles.  There are 28 major land 
entry ports at the border, 13 in the northwestern United States and 15 in the northeast, at 
which bulk commodities are processed.  In total there are about 130 land ports on entry on 
the U.S.-Canadian border.  
 
Canada is the United States’ largest trading partner, currently accounting for about 20 
percent of U.S. total merchandise trade with the world.  In 1999 Canada exported US$270 
billion to the United States, importing US$164 billion (Di Sanza, December 15, 1999) .   
 
The largest concentration of trade with Canada is in the Great Lakes area, including 
Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.  This region alone accounted for 39 
percent of the value of U.S. imports from Canada and 36 percent of the value of U.S. 
exports in 1998.  Much of this is accounted for by the high value automobile trade between 
Michigan and Ontario. The second largest regional concentration of trade is in the mid-
Atlantic area, which includes New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.   
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Di Sanza (1999) presentation showed that in terms of value, most cargo transported 
between the United States and Canada travels by highway (70 percent in 1999) or rail.  On 
this northern border, the eastern ports of entry in Michigan and New England handle about 
80 percent of cross-border traffic.  Of the remaining 20 percent of traffic, the Washington 
ports of entry handle most of northwestern cross-border trade and highway traffic volume. 
 
Most trade flow patterns between the United States and Canada are intra-regional in nature.  
The communities on both sides of the northern border have developed regional economies 
that are truly binational.  There are high levels of cross-border commuting, shopping, and 
movement of goods and services to support these binational regional economies.  These 
movements are best accommodated by regional transportation systems. 
 
2.3.2 Previous Studies on the U.S. Canadian Border 
In 1991, previous to the negotiations of NAFTA,  the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act (ISTEA), Public Law 102-240, directed the Secretary of Transportation to 
conduct studies relating to the movements on international trade between the United States, 
Canada and Mexico (U.S. Department of Transportation).  The complaints of lengthy 
delays and backups of trucks and cars at international border crossings were the principal 
motivation of the study. Trade among the three  North American nations had increased 
significantly since 1984, threatening to outstrip the ability of the nations’ transportation 
systems to handle additional traffic.  
 
The principal findings of the study were: (1) volumes of trade and traffic would continue to 
increase among the three North American countries at rates significantly higher than 
average national growth rates; (2) U.S.-Canadian trade processed through border ports of 
entry in the western region would increase by 16 to 24 percent in the following 10 years; (3) 
the facilities at the border crossings, principally bridges, tunnels and Federal inspection 
agency structures  (the U. S. Customs Service, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and their Mexican and Canadian counterparts), 
were adequate; (4) arterials leading to and from border crossing sites were under stress and 
inadequate to handle significantly greater amounts of cross-border traffic; (5) a significant 
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proportion of the delays at border crossings were attributed to the volume of trade, 
complexities of inspection requirements, and poor traffic management and cargo-clearance 
procedures; (6) inadequate or incomplete paperwork accompanying cross-border shipments 
was common and caused delays; (7) inspection agency staffing shortages caused excessive 
waiting time; (8) traffic at most crossings was typically concentrated during peak hours, 
and border facilities often were idle for long periods during off-peak hours; and (9) policies 
and practices of the three governments often contributed to congestion at the border, e.g., 
inspection agencies on either side of the border worked different hours. 
 
The study recommended creating multi-task forces composed of Federal, state, and local 
government agencies and the private sector to address congestion at border crossings.  
They were to exam problems  in general and, at specific crossings, identify critical border 
initiatives and to aggressively promote new technologies and other non-capital-intensive 
methods of facilitating the movement of cargo through major border crossings. The study 
also recommended a more efficient use of border facilities to spread traffic over more 
hours of the day. 
 
2.3.3 Features of the U.S.- Canadian Border 
The similarities of culture, language, race, economic development, and capital have helped 
create a sense of trust between Canada and the United States.  The trading environment is 
comfortable, and United States and Canada have a trusting relationship for border crossing 
inspections, with a post-audit approach. The United States and Canada consider each other 
as equal partners.  They have 150 years experience of doing business successfully and have 
created institutions and systems to deal with them (Ehinger and Nolle, 1999).  Isolated 
cases of friction do occur from time to time, but as the exceptions that confirm the rule. 
 
Canadian and the United States are a good example of  two geographical units that share 
such links as common language that clearly boost their bilateral trade.  When two units 
share a common cultural heritage or legal system, their trade will be enhanced (Frankel 
1997, p.117). 
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Positive aspects of U.S.-Canada trade include the ease of doing business within the same 
legal system, an integrated media, cultural proximity, and liberalized trade relations 
between Canada and the United States.  The Canadian federation of provinces and the 
American federation of states provide possible models for the European Union.  The very 
high effects of political union in the Canadian-U.S. case tell us that trade among European 
countries would increase dramatically if the European Union attained the same degree of 
political integration that Canada and the United States have each achieved within their 
borders.  European countries still speak different languages than their neighbors. The 
European Union has a very long way to go before attaining that degree of integration.  The 
formation of the common market may turn out to be a relatively small step by comparison 
(Frankel, 1997, pp. 118-119). 
 
2.3.4 The Main Crossing Points in the Canada-U.S. Border 
The main crossing points in the Canada- U.S. border are the Ambassador Bridge between  
Detroit (Michigan) and Windsor (Ontario) and the Peace Bridge between Buffalo New 
York) and Forth Erie (Ontario).  Most Canadians live within 100 miles from the U.S. 
border where the industries and population are located. 
 
At these northbound cross points there are lines of trucks (less than one mile) and delays 
(less than 3 hours) due to the very large volumes of trade. These are never as bad as in the 
U.S.-Mexican border. Almost 40 percent of U.S. total imports come from Canada.  They 
share, besides culture and language, a similar system to process things. 
 
The Ambassador bridge has 2 lanes in each direction; the Peace bridge has 3 lanes total, 
the middle lane is switched according to the volume of trade (south or northbound).  These 
are older bridges than the Colombia bridge and the World Trade bridge at the southern U.S. 
border. 
 
In U.S.-Canada Customs operate 24 hours/day.  Canadian drivers are allowed to drive in 
the United States and U.S. drivers are allowed in Canada.  The drivers’ salaries are similar 
in both countries.  There is a toll to cross the bridge (U.S.$15-30).  
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The Ambassador Bridge has 8,000 trucks/day in each direction; the Peace Bridge has 3,000 
trucks/day in each direction. 
2.4 Border Crossing Between the United States and Mexico 
 
2.4.1 Introduction  
This section presents the characteristics of the U.S.-Mexican trade border and explores the 
key factors that distinguish it from the U.S.-Canadian border. It analyzes the environment 
of the U.S.-Mexican border crossing, describing its elements, such as the geographical 
region, the trade flows, and the characteristics of the tracking industry in both countries.  
The objectives of NAFTA and its impact on the situation are compared with the reality of 
the border crossing at Laredo.  In this context, this research  investigates the economics of 
U.S.- Mexican trade transportation crossing the border at Laredo,  Later chapters look at 
the scale, nature, cost and implications of the Laredo bottleneck identifying who gains, and 
who loses, and why inefficiencies have persisted for so long.   
 
2.4.2 Features of the U.S.- Mexican Border 
The literature reviewed above examined specific border trade between the United States 
and Canada, and among the European Community countries.  This analysis is applicable 
only in a generic sense to the subject of this theses, the U.S. - Mexican border crossing.  
The U.S.-Mexican case is unique since interdependency covers virtually every aspect of 
the sociopolitical and economic spectrum while the cultures, economic and social policies, 
and regulatory frameworks are diverse, which is not characteristic of the previously studied 
border-specific cases.  This diversity presents serious challenges to Mexican and U.S. 
negotiators in their efforts to harmonize the trade facilitation policies across the borders.  
Furthermore, I will show that the convergence (a key element of institutional thickness) 
found in the U.S.-Canadian border crossings has not occurred in the U.S.-Mexican case, 
requiring additional economic theory to elucidate the causes of the cross- border problem. 
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The U.S.-Mexican case also differs from the European context by having the world’s 
longest border between an industrial country and a developing one.  There is some limited 
cultural and economic integration between the two countries.  The population of the U.S. 
border states is 10 percent Mexican ancestry  and shares some of Mexico’s cultural values 
and attributes.   
 
Mexico is a very important trade partner of the United states.  The entire population of 
Canada is the same as that of Mexico City (25 million people).  The total population of 
Mexico is 100 million people, with 50 percent under 25 years of age.  In ten years most of  
this younger generation will be entering the labor market and demanding goods and 
services (Vallejo, R.1999).  Both countries would therefore also benefit substantially from 
optimizing efficiencies in transport movements and associated logistics of cross-border 
trade.    
 
There is a cultural difference in the relationship between the United States and Canada and 
the relationship between the United States and Mexico.  The U.S.-Canadian relationship is 
based on a similarity of economic development, language, legal tradition, culture, and race. 
 
The U.S.-Mexican border features sharp differences in all these factors.  In addition, 
Mexico is a major source country for drugs smuggled into the United States along with 
illegal aliens.  There is an ethnic and race issue, with brown skinned Spanish-speaking 
people predominating on one side of the border and white English-speaking people 
predominating on the other.  Because the differences of culture, language, and race, a war 
in which Mexico lost half its territory to the United States, and other armed conflicts, there 
is little trust between the two countries. 
 
The elements of culture affect the economic performance of the U.S. northern and southern 
borders.  Even though the three countries have the same North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the characteristics of the problems on the northern border differ from those in 
the south.  There is little literature on the topic and, even in conference and discussions, the 
mention of cultural factors is often hesitant and quasi-apologetic (Gereffi and Wyman, 
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1991, p. 362).  Gereffi and Wyman argue that one reason for the reluctance to talk about 
culture is fear of appearing racist.  They refer to the need for “empathy” and “trust in 
people” for economic growth.  These are important elements in the border crossing 
environment, present in the U.S.-Canada case but absent on the U.S. Mexican border. 
 
This chapter describes the institutional environment of the border crossing, the 
geographical region, the trade flows, the characteristics of the trucking industry in both 
countries, and the infrastructure.  I then analyze the objectives of NAFTA and compare 
with the reality of the border crossing, identifying  the specific causes of the delays and 
high costs. I conclude the chapter by posing the question of why the real costs and delays 
are so high and why swift actions are not taken to reduce them.  
 
2.4.3 Geographical Region 
Geography should be part of trade theory.  As surprising as it sounds, most international 
economists until quite recently ignored distance and other geographical factors as 
determinants of trade (Frankel 1997, p.37). 
 
The U.S.-Mexican boundary is of 1,933 miles, separates four U.S. states (California, 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) from six Mexican states (Baja California, Sonora, 
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas), as shown in Figure 2.1.   
 
From an economic point of view, trade between the two countries nearly tripled in value 
between 1982 and 1992, from about US$27 billion to US$76 billion.  Since then, growth 
has been even more remarkable, tripling again from the $76 billion figure to an estimated 
US$220 billion by 1999 (Table 2.1) despite the slowdown of the Mexican economy (Hall 
1998). 
 
There is a high degree of economic interdependency between the two countries: Mexico 
exports about 80 percent of its trade value to the United States, while Mexico is the world’s 
largest importer of U.S. products after Canada, exceeding Japan and the European 
Community.  Each side of the border benefits from the economic activities on the other  
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Figure 2.1: U.S./Mexico Gateways and Border Crossing Stations 
Highway and Rail 
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Table 2.1: Mexico-U.S. trade. 1987-1999 (billions of U.S. dollars) 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
U.S. - 
Mexico 
14.6 20.6 25.0 28.3 33.3 40.6 41.6 50.8 46.3 56.8 71.4 78.8 105.0 
Mexico  
- U.S. 
20.3 23.3 27.2 30.2 31.1 35.2 39.9 49.5 62.8 74.3 85.9 94.6 110.0 
Total 34.9 43.9 52.2 58.5 64.4 75.8 81.5 100.3 109.1 131.1 157.3 173.4 215 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
 
side.  Conversely, both countries would also benefit from improving the efficiency of  
transport movements and associated logistics of cross-border trade. 
 
Eighty percent of the tonnage and 85 percent of the value of the cross-border trade is 
moved by truck.  Handling this trade are 10 principal crossing points along the border 
states of Texas (Brownsville, McAllen, Hidalgo, Laredo, Eagle Pass, Del Rio, El Paso), 
California (Otay Mesa, Calexico) and Arizona (Nogales) (Best 1992, Nov. 16, pp. 32-33).  
The busiest border crossing cities are Laredo, El Paso, and Otay Mesa.  The busiest port of 
entry for commercial trucks is Laredo. 
 
2.4.4 Trends of the Mexico-U.S. Trade 
International trade moves between centers of manufacturing production and consumption.  
In theory, production centers are located where economies of scale, raw materials, and the 
availability of technology can produce goods at the least possible cost and the highest rate 
of return (Magee, 1968).   
 
The Mexican centers of production, the consumption of intermediate goods and 
consumption of consumer goods define the origins and destinations for the majority of 
trade which flows between the United States and Mexico.  The consumption of 
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intermediate goods at manufacturing centers, especially the maquiladoras 2 ,  plays an 
important role in the U.S.-Mexico trade flow and creates an additional complexity in the 
definition of origin and destination. 
 
The United States is the most important commercial trading partner for Mexican exports, 
representing nearly 80 percent of Mexico’s total foreign trade (Table 2.2).   For U.S. 
exports, Mexico ranks as its second highest trading partner as shown in Table 2.3.  
 
The United States maintains a more diversified trade clientele than Mexico.  Its top four 
trading partner countries represent only 47 percent of total U.S. exports by value. The 
United States remains Canada’s and Mexico’s largest trading partner.  Canada is the 
United States largest trading partner.  Canada is the third-largest market for Mexican goods. 
 
The rapid growth of U.S.-Mexican trade started in 1986, when Mexico reduced its tariffs 
and joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  This growth has 
continued with the implementation of NAFTA.  Table 2.1 above showed Mexico-U.S. 
trade figures from 1987 to 1999 in millions of dollars.  A point of inflexion occurred in 
1995 when the value of U.S. imports from Mexico exceeded U.S. exports to that country, 
mainly due to the 50 percent devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994. 
 
The devaluation of the peso had a dramatic effect on the flow of goods into and out of 
Mexico.  The reduction in imports was immediate as Mexican consumers responded to the 
loss of purchasing power.  An expansion of exports was noticeable but gradual, mitigated 
somewhat by high interest costs.  Trend analysis of these conditions reflects an important 
disruption in trade flows that makes reaching long-term conclusions difficult.  Figure 2.2 
 
                                                          
2 Maquiladoras are manufacturing plants located in Mexico that make products 
primarily with U.S. components; they are sold mainly to the U.S. market.  A large 
percentage are automotive products, electrical components, and consumer goods. The 
Maquiladora program started as an informal agreement in 1966, and was so successful that 
in 1971 was formalized into law as the Border Industrialization Program (BIP). 
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Table 2.2:  Mexican Import-Export, 1999 (millions of dollars) 
 
Country Region % of Total 
Total 100 
United States   88 
Canada      2 
Europe     8 
Japan     3 
 
 Source: Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial (Secofi) 
 
Table 2.3: U.S. Import-Export, 1999 (millions of dollars) 
 
Country % of Total 
Total 100 
Canada  20 
Mexico  11 
Japan    6 
Germany    4 
 
 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
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Figure 2.2: Trade Flow Trend Mexico-United States, 1987-1999 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
 
shows the Mexico-United States trade flow trend during the years 1987-1999, indicating 
that U.S.-Mexican trade increased steadily over the seven years following GATT accords 
and preceding the implementation of NAFTA.  In 1994, two-way trade embarked on a new, 
higher trend line that was stalled in 1995 by economic difficulties in Mexico.  Bilateral 
trade growth again resumed in 1996 from 100 billion U.S. dollars to 210 billion in 1999 
and 240 in 2001. 
 
2.4.5 Principal Commodities 
I will analyze the most important products by category since imports and exports are 
performed under different customs regulations.  Based on total trade between the United 
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States and Mexico (imports and exports) under the Mexican “final”3 category, the most 
important products are mineral fuels, vehicles, nuclear reactors and boilers, and electric 
appliances and machinery.  In the “temporary”4 category, the most important products are 
vehicles, nuclear reactors and boilers, optical instruments, and imports with special 
classifications.  Of the total freight by weight moving southbound across the Mexican-U.S. 
border, 31 percent enters through Nuevo Laredo. The main products moving southbound 
through Laredo are machines (with 39 percent of the market share), nuclear reactors and 
boilers (with 67 percent), automobiles and automotive parts.  Laredo was the busiest 
district with 86 percent of the total trade flow in 1999. For plastics, Laredo was again the 
district with the largest percentage of the total (53 percent in 1999).  Most optical 
instrument products pass through Laredo, which maintained a 52 percent market share in 
1999.  The district of Laredo handles the largest percentage of paper and cardboard 
products and this trade increased through 1999. 
 
The northbound flow of machines, electronics, and electrical equipment is concentrated in 
Laredo, with a 32 percent share of the market in 1999.  Laredo handles the largest share of 
vehicles and auto parts movements, with a 72 percent share of the market value traded by 
borderland in 1999. Laredo also handled the largest share of the nuclear reactors and 
boilers with 55 percent of the total trade in 1999.  Laredo and El Paso dominated the 
border wide trade of optical, medical and photographic equipment products with 48 percent 
and 31 percent shares of total dollar trade in 1999. 
 
2.4.6 Freight Weight (Tons) 
The U.S. data have no consistent information on trade flows by weight between the United 
States and Mexico.  There are, however, some data on quantities of particular goods 
shipped.  In most cases, the quantity is expressed in tons or kilograms; in some cases, the 
quantity is reported in barrels, number of animals, dozens, or various other units. 
 
                                                          
3 Products consumed in the country of destination from traditional trade. 
4 Products that enter temporarily the country of destination that have further value 
added and are then re-exported to the country of origin, such as maquiladora imports. 
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Mexican customs record freight weight for part of its international trade.  However, there is 
no control or verification of the figures reported and in many cases this information is not 
recorded at all (Binational Border Transportation Planning and Programming Process, 
1997, p. 37). 
 
Northbound Freight Movements by Weight  
From 1995 freight weight estimations, not including the product category “mineral oils and 
combustion products that include oil”, 33 percent (18 million tons) moved northbound 
overland across the Mexico-U.S. border.  The main Mexican export commodities by share 
of volume are presented in Figure 2.3.  Only 1995 data are available, but interviews with 
NAFTA experts at the Mexican Embassy indicate that the situation is similar for 2000. 
 
The average value per ton of Mexican exports for 1995 was $222 per ton for freight 
exported through ports, and $2,978 per ton for freight moved across the land border 
(Binational Border Transportation Planning and Programming Preaches, Task 8, p.37).  
These values reflect the economies of transporting low value to-weight for bulk 
commodities sent by ship versus high value-to-weight products sent by truck, air, and 
intermodal rail.   
 
The customs offices at the Mexican-U.S. border that handle the most freight (in tons) are: 
Nuevo Laredo with 38 percent; Matamoros with 14 percent; Ciudad Juarez and Nogales 
with 13 percent each; and Tijuana with 10 percent.  These crossings account for 78 percent 
of the total. 
 
Southbound Freight Movements by Weight 
In 1999 Mexican freight imports totaled an estimated 100 million tons.  Of this total (36 
million tons), 47 percent crossed the Mexican-U.S. land border.  Figure 2.4 presents the 
principal Mexican export commodities transported by land as a percentage of total volume. 
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Figure 2.3: Principal U.S. Export Commodities by Product Type, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: La Empresa estimated based on SECOFI data 
 
Figure 2.4: Principal Mexican Export Commodities Transported by 
Land 
 
 
Source: La Empresa estimates based on SECOFI data 
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2.4.7 Truck as the Main Transportation Mode by Value 
Truck is the primary form of transportation in the trade between the United States and 
Mexico, with roughly 85 percent of this freight by value, currently estimated at $200 
billion annually (Hall, 1998).  Customs reports that at Laredo, Texas, alone, approximately 
5,200 trucks cross northbound daily, carrying 45 percent of the value of Mexico’s exports;  
and 4,800 trucks cross southbound Laredo, carrying 64 percent of U.S. exports to Mexico.  
Approximately 2.5 million trucks crossed at Laredo during the year 1999.   
 
Due to the overriding importance of trucking, this mode is the focus of this research, 
although trains are recognized as competitors, especially in serving the distant southern 
Mexican regions with 7 percent of the market by value.  Other modes of transportation, 
such as air, water, and pipelines share the remaining 8 percent of the market for trade 
between the two countries, and are also excluded.   These modes together represent only 15 
percent of movements by value between the two countries.  Except for air, they consist 
primarily of bulk items whose value to weight ratios are very low. 
 
Although the dominant mode of transportation, cross- border trucking faces a number of 
problems.  National interests, interest groups, the necessity of customs clearance, 
government inspections, and Mexico’s less developed transportation system and logistics 
management practices can disrupt service and cause excessive handling, time delays, and 
added costs.  In a survey of Fortune 500 companies, logistics was identified as the area 
where the greatest opportunities existed for making trade with Mexico more efficient 
(Bonney, 1992, pp.48/3-48/4).  
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) specifically addresses a number of 
cross-border trucking issues, such as foreign ownership, foreign carrier market access, and 
harmonization of safety standards. As shown in later chapters, reality still lags far behind 
the NAFTA formalities. 
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Regardless of the political outcome of  NAFTA, trade with Mexico will continue to 
increase and truck transportation will dominate the transport of high value commodities. 
The roadway (truck) mode is the most important in all cases, varying only with the 
existence of railroads at the crossings facilities and the direction of flow (import or export).  
 
2.4.8 The U.S. Truck Industry Profile 
Approximately 60 million trucks were licensed in the United States in 1997. The estimated 
average age of the U.S. fleet is 5 years (Rojas 1999).  For-hire trucking accounts for only 
16 percent of all trucks used primarily for freight hauling.  Most trucking is not done by the 
for-hire trucking industry but by non-transport companies that provide their own trucking.   
 
Until 1980, for- hire trucking was regulated by federal and state governments.  Regulation 
took the form of limitations on routes and commodities that motor carriers could serve and 
the rates charged.  For-hire trucking was deregulated in two steps. The Motor Carrier Act 
of 1980 permitted free entry into the interstate industry and allowed rate competition.  In 
1994, the second step eliminated intrastate regulation and removed rate-filing requirements 
carried over from the regulatory era.  Motor carriers are now free to carry what they wish 
anywhere in the United States and to charge whatever they can negotiate with each 
customer.  Rates are now secret. Manufacturers and distributors have much larger fleets 
than the for-hire industry and have been freed to look for freight to help them balance in-
bound and out-bound shipments.  Deregulation has blurred the distinction between the for-
hire industry and other operators of trucking fleets. 
 
Deregulation was directly responsible for the bankruptcy of a majority of the 20 largest 
trucking firms and new bankruptcies continue today.  Other carriers emerged to carry the 
freight previously handled by the bankrupt carriers. These new firms use sophisticated data 
management techniques to match truckload shipments.  By refusing less-than truckload 
shipments, hiring non-union labor, and ensuring return loads (back hauls), these new 
operations achieve exceptional productivity levels.  These firms do not need to assemble 
truckloads of freight from individual shippers each with only a few hundred or thousand 
pounds of freight.  They avoid the expense of building and maintaining terminals and have 
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low labor costs.  Some previously regulated (and still heavily unionized) firms survive by 
serving the less-than truckload market.  Their numbers are shrinking, however, as 
bankruptcies continue.  The less-than-truckload industry is more concentrated than under 
regulation. 
 
Three firms now carry more than half of the less-than truckload freight: Yellow Freight, 
Consolidated Freight Ways, and Roadway Express.  None of these firms is large by the 
standards of the rest of American industry.  Yellow Freight’s revenues are smaller than 
those of any major U.S. railroad or airline.  The ten largest railroads and airlines carry 
almost all the traffic of those modes.  However, the ten largest truck fleets account for only 
a small fraction of trucks. 
 
Trucking accounts for more transport than all other forms of surface freight transport in the 
United States . Three times as much is spent on intercity trucking as on railroad, water, and 
oil pipeline transport combined.  Measured in employment, the comparison of trucking to 
other modes of surface transport is even more extreme. 
 
Despite the financial upheaval in for-hire trucking after deregulation in 1980, there were no 
major shifts either between the for-hire and the private trucking sectors or between trucks 
and other forms of surface transportation.  The explanation is that most users of truck 
transport cannot easily switch to other modes in response to minor price changes. 
 
Trucking is the basic means of moving high value goods in the United States.  Railroads, 
water transport, and pipelines are important for carrying bulk commodities , but most 
domestic manufactured commodities are moved by motor carriers.  International trade 
flows between the United States and Mexico are heavily concentrated in manufactures, and 
almost all this traffic moves by truck.   
 
U.S. trucks and drivers are generally barred from operating in Mexico.  Only under very 
limited circumstances are U.S. trucks allowed in Mexico, and even then they can rarely 
return with loads.  Mexican short-haul carriers (drayage firms) shuttle trailers across the 
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border, bridging the logistics gap between the U.S. truckers in the north and Mexican long-
haul truckers in the south.  An informal agreement between the cities of Laredo and Nuevo 
Laredo allows tractors from either side to deliver loads, but the trailers must return empty. 
 
2.4.9 Mexican Truck Industry Profile  
The Mexican trucking industry is not as modern or well equipped as U.S. trucking (on 
average) but is acquiring new vehicles. Sixty percent of the 250,000 trucks operating in 
Mexico are five years old or more (Kellmann International Forwarders, January 11,1999).  
Three thousand trucks were purchased during 1998 through the National Trucking 
Chamber (Canacar), with an additional 3,000 trucks purchased with direct factory 
financing. Similar numbers of trucks are being purchased this year. This means that only 
the 2.4 percent of the Mexican truck fleet is less than 2 years old.  Of the total numbers of 
trucks in Mexico, 60 percent are run by Mexican companies, with the rest of the fleet made 
up of owner-operators, according to Canacar data.  The truck technology of the drayage 
companies is a different story.  These trucks are smaller, older, and present a safety issue. 
 
Many Mexican truckers do not have office telephones, much less mobile radios.  By some 
estimates, the Mexican trucking industry needs up to $ 1.5 billion in capital, a large amount 
for this sector, but interest rates run as high as 30 percent/year and loans are difficult to 
obtain. 
 
Especially in southern and central Mexico, the Mexican infrastructure is inadequate for 
trade expansion, and the Mexican highways and trucking infrastructure cannot support 
modern long-haul trucking.  
 
U.S.-Mexican motor carrier partnerships have been slow to develop.  The Mexican 
trucking industry was deregulated in July 1989.  However, it provides somewhat spotty 
service on the longer hauls between the border and production facilities in the south.  
 
The shortcomings of Mexican trucking, especially on the longer hauls to central and 
Southern Mexico, offer an opportunity for railroads.  The best rail carload and intermodal 
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services can now compete with motor carriers on service quality and reliability, and rail 
retains a definite cost advantage.  The opportunity seems particularly attractive for 
intermodal service. 
 
2.4.10 Border Crossing Infrastructure 
Border crossing facilities are the physical structures at or near a border that are dedicated to 
enforcement of processes by which people enter the country, and by which goods are 
imported and exported.  Broker services, the preparation of documents  and coordination 
between shippers, carriers and receivers of goods, and collection of tolls may also be 
accommodated in border crossing facilities. 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the generic layout of U.S. and Mexican border crossing stations.  In 
general, three broad physical areas at border crossings are dedicated to international trade, 
comprised of facilities for: (1) approaching the inspection facility; (2) accommodating 
legal enforcement (regulatory and inspection functions); and (3) leaving the inspection 
facility. 
 
Government agencies are responsible for the inspection processes and the enforcement of 
laws and regulations.  These agencies include the: U.S. Customs Service (Customs); U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); U.S. Department of Agriculture, Plants and 
Animal Products (USDA/APHIS); Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and Border 
Patrol.  Each agency is responsible for different aspects of the immigration and import-
export laws and regulations.  For example, U.S. Customs is responsible for enforcing laws 
covering inspection of most manufactured products, certain drugs are the responsibility of 
the FDA, and certain agricultural and live animal products are the responsibility of the 
Department of Agriculture.  The Border Patrol Mission focuses on enforcing immigration 
laws along the border.  All of these agencies are collectively known as the Federal 
Inspection Services. 
 
Border crossing facilities are located at land crossings (rail, highway) and other ports of 
entry that service persons and goods transported by marine, air, and intermodal modes of  
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Figure 2.5 
Generic Layout of U.S. and Mexican Border Crossing Stations 
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travel.  The facilities include the border crossing station, accommodations for inspection of 
immigration and cargo documentation, in-depth inspection of cargoes, collection of tolls 
and tariffs, and other enforcement needs. 
 
Government agencies are responsible for the inspection processes and the enforcement of 
laws and regulations.  These agencies include the: U.S. Customs Service (Customs); U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); U.S. Department of Agriculture, Plants and 
Animal Products (USDA/APHIS); Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and Border 
Patrol.  Each agency is responsible for different aspects of the immigration and import-
export laws and regulations.  For example, U.S. Customs is responsible for enforcing laws 
covering inspection of most manufactured products, certain drugs are the responsibility of 
the FDA, and certain agricultural and live animal products are the responsibility of the 
Department of Agriculture.  The Border Patrol Mission focuses on enforcing immigration 
laws along the border.  All of these agencies are collectively known as the Federal 
Inspection Services. 
 
Border crossing facilities are located at land crossings (rail, highway) and other ports of 
entry that service persons and goods transported by marine, air, and intermodal modes of 
travel.  The facilities include the border crossing station, accommodations for inspection of 
immigration and cargo documentation, in-depth inspection of cargoes, collection of tolls 
and tariffs, and other enforcement needs. 
 
U.S. decisions about the location of international bridges and land crossings to Mexico are 
governed by an approval process under the jurisdiction of the Department of State by the 
authority of the International Bridges Act of 1972.  U.S.-Mexican proposals are handled by 
an interagency committee chaired by the U.S.-Mexico Border Affairs Coordinator.  The 
Interagency committee on Bridges and Bridge Crossings has representatives from 10 
federal agencies who participate in the decision process.  These agencies are: the General 
Services Administration  (GSA); Customs; INS; Federal Highway Administration (FHWA); 
Federal Railroad Administration; the Coast Guard; the International Boundary and Water 
Commission; FDA; the Department of Commerce; and the USDA.  When the interagency 
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committee meets with its Mexican counterparts, the entity is known as the Binational 
Committee on Bridges and Border Crossings.  State and local agencies and private sector 
entities participate, as they are typically the proposers of bridges and land crossings. 
 
At some ports of entry, three or more entities may be responsible for the property or the 
facilities.  However, responsibility for the border crossing inspection processes remains 
with the federal inspection agencies. 
 
2.4.11  The Traditional Trade Flow Process 
Appendix A presents the 21 steps of the traditional trade flow process, southbound and 
northbound.  The model presented in Chapter 4 quantifies the times and costs involved in 
the border crossing process.  
2.5 NAFTA  
 
This section describes the aspects of NAFTA that affect truck transportation and border 
crossings. 
 
NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994. The stated six primary objectives are: (1) 
eliminate barriers to cross-border trade in goods and services; (2) increase cross-border 
investment; (3) develop legal frameworks that protect cross-border investment; (4) 
establish rules guaranteeing the permanent access of domestic products to the North 
American markets; (5) obtain the greatest advantages from the complementary elements of 
all three North American economies; and (6) create procedures for implementing and 
administering NAFTA and set up fair and equitable mechanism to resolve controversies 
(Gooley 12/1/1998, pp.1-2). 
 
NAFTA removed significant investment barriers, ensured basic protection for NAFTA 
investors, and provided a mechanism for the settlement of disputes between NAFTA 
investors and NAFTA countries.   
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Trucking and non tariff barriers were not adequately addressed by NAFTA (Moore, 2000).  
Trucking became one of the most disputed elements since NAFTA did not specify how 
trade would be administered by the government agencies of the three NAFTA countries 
(Ehinger, 1998).  
 
2.5.1 NAFTA Implications in the Transportation Industry 
Prior to NAFTA, Mexican-owned trucks had legal access only to what used to be called 
the ICC50-mile zone, that is, they could transit anywhere within 50 miles north of the U.S.-
Mexico international border (Kohn 2001) 
 
According to NAFTA, all countries will issue licenses for buses and trucks and allow 
commercial operators to offer services in the transborder market.  The geographic limits of 
operation were to be phased over time.  Implementation of this provision is behind 
schedule. 
 
U.S. Secretary of Transportation Federico PeZa suspended unilaterally the rules whose 
implementation was to start at the beginning of 1996. This virtually assured that the rules 
will never be implemented in their original form. This action was viewed as a result of 
election-year pressure by organized labor.  NAFTA requires only that Mexican carriers 
operating in the United States meet all U.S. rules and requirements, which angered the 
American Trucking Associations (ATA). The ATA argues that, although few of its 
members plan to operate in Mexico, the failure to open the border has held back 
advancements in other areas, for example the negotiation of new package-express rules and 
harmonizing size and weight standards.  
 
Safety fears have been alleged as a reason for delaying implementation of the trucking 
provisions of NAFTA.  Mexican trucks are considerably older on average than the U.S. 
fleet and are not as well maintained.  The counter argument is that Mexican firms have 
renewed their fleets, buying new trucks in considerable numbers over the last years.  The 
long- haul Mexican fleet certainly can meet the U.S. safety standards (Ehinger, 1998). This 
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should be a matter of technical inspection of individual vehicles rather than a blanket 
prohibition. 
 
While agreeing that safety regulations were important, Mexico challenged the blanket ban 
before a NAFTA arbitral panel. 
 
This issue occurs since trucking may be under-priced with respect to safety, although legal 
liability for trucking accidents provides incentives for safe practices.  Liability insurance 
and the costs of hiring safe drivers are built into the price of U.S. trucking services (even 
though many violations still occur). 
 
The ATA and others have voiced their concerns that Mexican carriers may not be properly 
insured, i.e., the incentives are insufficient and U.S. carriers and drivers would be at risk 
and under compensated. Again, this is an argument for requiring insurance rather than 
prohibiting Mexican trucks.  As the Mexican economy fully recovers from the monetary 
crisis of 1995, the general increase in economic activity has increased transport demand.   
 
The projected future demand for transportation by all industrial sectors will require 
transport firms to increase their fleets or their productivity. 
 
NAFTA also gradually changes the type of goods flowing to and from Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada.  Tariff reductions are being implemented gradually and may eventually 
provide free market access to thousands of product types.  These tariff charges will in turn 
change export and import relationships (direction of volumes and product flow). The 
effects of NAFTA will be greatest in the regions of the member countries currently linked 
by commercial flows, particularly the border zones and the major metropolitan areas 
having a focus of international trade.   
 
Figure 2.6 shows the dominant NAFTA Superhighway System Primary Trucking Routes. 
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Figure 2.6:  The NAFTA Superhighway System Primary Trucking 
Routes  
  
 
 
2.5.2 NAFTA Arbitral Panel Regarding Cross Border Trucking 
Services 
As result of the dispute between Mexico and the United States regarding trucking cross-
border operations, Mexico brought a NAFTA dispute against United States.  The United 
States initiated consultations on Mexican restrictions, but did not pursue a NAFTA dispute.   
The parties’ views are summarized in paragraphs 2-11.  Mexico’s argument was that the 
United States has violated NAFTA by failing: (1) to phase out U.S. restrictions on cross-
border trucking services and (2) by prohibiting Mexican investment in the U.S. trucking 
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industry.  Mexico charged that the U.S. action in maintaining the moratorium violated its 
obligations under NAFTA.  Mexico also asserted that the U.S. was motivated, not by 
safety concerns, but by political considerations relating to opposition by organized labor in 
the United States to the implementation of NAFTA’s cross-border trucking obligations. 
 
Mexico asserted that by refusing to consider applications for operating authority for all 
Mexican Owned service providers, while considering them for U.S. owned providers, 
violated the national treatment provisions of the Services Chapter. 
 
The United States argued that Mexico does not maintain the same rigorous safety standards 
as the regulatory systems in the United States and Canada and, because of that, the 
Mexican trucking service providers were not “in like circumstances” with those of the 
United States.  NAFTA’s obligation is to provide less favorable treatment to service 
providers.  The other parties “in like circumstances” with domestic providers. The United 
States also rejected Mexico’s contention that the failure to implement action with regard to 
cross-border trucking services and investment had political motivation.  The issue, in the 
view of the United States, was rather, “whether Mexico met its burden of proving a 
violation by the United States of its NAFTA obligations”. 
 
The panel’s Findings and Determinations unanimously determined that the U.S.’s blanket 
refusal to review and consider for approval any Mexican-owned carrier applications for 
authority to provide cross-border trucking services breached U.S. obligations.  The panel 
also unanimously determined that the United States breached its obligations to permit 
Mexican nationals to invest in enterprises in the United States that provide truck 
transportation of international cargo within the United States. 
 
The panel recommended that the United States take appropriate steps to bring its practices 
with respect to cross-border trucking services and investment into compliance with its 
obligations under the applicable provisions of NAFTA.  The panel discussed two issues 
during the briefing: (1) cross border point to point service and, (2) ability to invest in U.S. 
service providers (Hathaway 2001).  The complaint was about Mexican owned service 
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providers.  The United States extended a blanket refusal to process their applications to 
operate in the United States.  Exemption from this moratorium was made for the U.S.-
owned companies operating in Mexico.  Most of these companies operate from Mexico 
near the border.  In addition, a small number of Mexican owned providers were 
“grandfathered”, that is, allowed to continue providing cross-border trucking services after 
the moratorium’s initiation.  Two other types of Mexican providers were permitted:  1) 
transit through the United States to Canada, and 2) drayage to NAFTA “commercial 
zones”.  All of these providers were subjected to U.S. safety requirements. 
 
The U.S. Department of Transportation developed special requirements to ensure safety by 
those companies.  In addition to safety requirements, they have to have trucks produced in 
the United States, or imported into the United States.  This meant the trucks had met U.S. 
safety requirements. 
 
The question for the panel was whether the United States was consistent with the NAFTA 
in its blanket refusal to consider Mexican applications for operating authority.  NAFTA 
explicitly authorizes each party to establish its own “level of protection” for matters such 
as health and safety.  However, it may not create unnecessary burdens on trade.  Further, a 
party to achieve the same “level of protection” concerning imports, may provide 
differential treatment to imports.  The parties recognized that some instances may require 
equivalent foreign “certification” by domestic, or an accepted local inspector, like a foreign 
airline.   
 
The United States argued that the circumstances for the Mexican safety system across the 
border were different.  In effect, the U.S. argued that despite the burden it imposed, the 
moratorium was necessary to ensure safety.  The United States refused to review 
applications for Mexican providers.  To be NAFTA consistent trucking safety must be 
considered one of the situations where the importing country could require that the 
exporting country’s safety procedures ensure the level of protection provided by safety 
procedures of the importing country. 
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The panel considered that since there are grand-fathered Mexican carriers that have been 
allowed to operate in the United States since before the moratorium, and over 100 U.S. 
owned Mexican carriers, the panel noted that the treatment may be differential in order not 
to be discriminatory.  In light of the fact that the panel’s decision did not say it was an 
automatic right to provide cross border services.  There is no limitation on the “level of 
protection”. 
 
The panel did not decide the “regulatory measures” to achieve the same level of protection. 
It is up to each country to define its measures.  Fair process should be used in determining 
what regulatory measures should be applied to Mexican services. 
 
The heart of the matter is the level of protection and there is much discretion in it.  
The political picture has changed in the United States and Mexico under Presidents Bush 
and Fox.  Before the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 there were indications that both 
presidents would comply with the panel’s decision.  The Teamster’s Union in the United 
States gave their support to candidate Gore.  President Bush is free from the pressures of 
this interest group to open the U.S. market to Mexican-truck companies.  Fox has 
expressed his aim to bring Mexico closer to the United States; one way is reducing the 
institutional obstacles to border crossing. 
 
The dispute settlement panel under NAFTA ruled against the facto U.S. ban in January 
2001.  Since then, the Bush administration has worked to open the border to Mexican long-
haul trucking.  Bush’s plan was first delayed for months by Congress, which made DOT 
re-write its rules to include a host of safety requirements mandated by legislation.  That 
took the process up to November, when DOT finalized its rules.  After this, Bush lifted the 
ban on Mexican trucks as DOT issued the rules on handling applications from Mexican 
trucking firms for authority to make long-haul trips into the United States.  The January 
2003 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit prevents DOT from 
making any grants of operating authority under those rules until it has performed an 
environmental impact statement (EIS).  Not decision has been made yet on whether to 
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appeal the ruling. That process would take a couple of months.  The U.S. also has the 
option not to appeal, or to petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court (Inside U.S. Trade). 
 
Mexico must now re-evaluate its response to the continued ban on cross-border trucking, 
which could include demanding compensation from the U.S., retaliating with trade 
sanctions or imposing additional restrictions on truck traffic from the U.S. 
 
DOT has received applications from 168 Mexican firms for long-haul operating authority.  
Those operations may be processed, but may not be approved until the EIS is completed.  
The EIS would likely take between six months and two years. 
 
2.5.3 Implications in the Border Crossing Operation 
The NAFTA includes the provision of a uniform border transfer system that is supposed to 
eliminate excessive and non-standard documentation and the wide variation in crossing 
conventions along the border.  
 
Restrictions on border crossing truck operations create greater truck congestion.  The 
current arrangement requires one or two transfers into terminals on each side of the border. 
Nearly half of the truck movements coming north are empties being transferred (Hall, 
12/18/1997). 
 
In general terms, NAFTA has directly impacted the border transportation system at the 
ports of entry.  There has been an increase in commodity flow between both countries.  In 
1995, this increased flow was largely northbound and consisted of consumable goods due 
to the peso devaluation.  Over time, a more important flow is materializing that involves 
industries that take advantage of the unique benefits of both countries’ production 
processes, creating a bi-directional flow or raw materials, intermediate, and final goods. 
 
In theory, a reduction in tariffs should facilitate more expeditious customs process at the 
ports of entry.  However, NAFTA does not eliminate concerns about health, illegal 
migration, transport of illicit drugs, or national security (U.S. Department of Transportation, 
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May 1998. p. 76). In fact, a complex border crossing system exists despite NAFTA and 
creates delays and extra costs that can be considered non tariff barriers to trade.  As I make 
evident in later chapters, the trucking provisions of NAFTA are a good example of what 
Jagdish Bhagwati calls the Law of Constant Protection: “The evidence of increased non-
tariff barriers and administered protection just as tariffs had been reduced to a new low 
suggests the intriguing  possibility that there may be a Law of Constant Protection: If you 
reduce one type of protection, another variety simply pops up elsewhere” (Mansfield, 1995, 
p.14). 
 
2.5.4  Effects of the North American Trade Agreement 
Initially, implementation of NAFTA increased the Mexican trade deficit as producers and 
consumers acquired more, lower cost, goods from the United States.  The exchange rate 
changes and the economic adjustments of 1995 altered the behavior of the foreign trade.  
Bilateral trade in the first year following the implementation of NAFTA was fairly 
balanced.  
 
The rate of growth of the maquila industry at the border is nearly the same 10 percent as 
for the rest of the Mexican manufacturing industry.  Since the beginning of NAFTA in 
1994, 50 percent of all U.S. exports to Mexico have been free of Mexican tariffs.  
NAFTA’s phase-out of non-tariff barriers also benefited U.S. companies.  For example, for 
the first time in 50 years, in October 1994, Mexico approved the establishment of wholly 
owned U.S. financial affiliates.  These included such major U.S. banks as Chemical Bank, 
Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, and Nations Bank. 
 
The opportunities for U.S. sales in Mexico are strong, particularly in infrastructure 
development, which needs significant investment. Companies providing infrastructure-
related products and services have opportunities in telecommunications, port privatization, 
highway construction, railroad services, and water projects. 
 
NAFTA will continue to provide U.S. companies advantages in the post-devaluation 
Mexican market.  Preferential duty treatment of U.S. goods under NAFTA and its 
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proximity to Mexico gives U.S. companies an edge over European or Japanese firms 
whose products are often the principal source of competition.  
 
In sum, many aspects of NAFTA are proceeding on schedule and are achieving their 
intended objectives.  However, as I will show more fully below, other aspects, such as 
trucking are proceeding slowly, if at all.  The reasons have to do with conflicting economic 
interest, which are reflected in the politics and institutional arrangements in Mexico and 
the United States, as analyzed below. 
2.6 Identification of the Problem: Truck Transportation and 
Border Crossing Under Institutional Constraints  
 
2.6.1 Introduction  
The previous sections of this chapter presented the context of border crossings by outlining 
the existing literature on border crossing arrangements and the distinctive features of the 
U.S. Mexican case.  This section presents a conceptual framework for economic analysis 
of truck transportation and border crossings, applied to the present border crossing system 
at the U.S.-Mexican border.  It analyzes the bottlenecks and institutions that affect the role 
of customs and other government and private organizations that participate in the border 
crossing process.  This lays the groundwork for my analysis of the social and institutional 
nature of the barriers applied to the border crossing system present at Laredo,  presented in 
Chapter 3, and allows me to quantify the costs of border crossings presented in Chapter 4. 
 
2.6.2 Cross Border Problems  
International cross-border movements present challenges to transportation.  Border 
crossings create delays in transportation and add uncertainty to transport, increasing the 
time consumed with customs clearance, federal inspections, traffic congestion, and other 
operating procedures and making total transit times highly variable. 
 
The trade literature identifies significant transport problems in U.S.-Mexican trade.  A 
study of problems encountered by 29 U.S. motor carriers involved in Mexican trade in 
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1992 found that, in general, the carriers were only moderately satisfied with the 
transportation performance of the Mexican carriers with whom they interlined or 
interchanged (Valdes and Crum, 1994, pp. 5-20).  Key problem areas included transit time 
and drop off service dependability, equipment compatibility, and carrier information 
systems.  The U.S. carriers also expressed only moderate satisfaction with the Mexican 
freight forwarders and drayage companies involved in the border crossing process.   
Carriers also indicated the importance of several border crossing selection criteria, 
including traffic congestion, cooperation of customs employees, documentation process, 
and border inspections.  Border crossings present a challenge to all firms operating across 
the U.S.-Mexican border.  U.S. carriers view Mexican roadways and the performance of 
drayage operators as less of a problem than the elements of the Mexican customs clearance 
process.  The interviews I conducted for this dissertation support the studies findings and 
indicate that the situation remains unchanged since 1992. 
 
The trade literature identifies four groups of operational problems and obstacles confronted 
by U.S. trucking firms:  (1) problems with carrier operations; (2) equipment problems; (3) 
problems with Mexico’s logistics infrastructure; and (4) delays at the border.  Additionally, 
the ATA contends that the restrictions on foreign ownership of Mexican motor carriers 
create significant problems, leading some U.S. firms to seek a “second best” solution of 
alliances or partnerships between U.S. and Mexican carriers.  A brief discussion of these 
problems follows. 
 
There are restrictions on foreign carrier operations in Mexico: only Mexican tractors and 
drivers are permitted to operate within the boundaries of Mexico. This necessitates an 
interline or interchange between the participating U.S. and Mexican trucking firms.  An 
interline entails the trans-loading of freight between the two motor carriers at the border.  
An interchange involves the exchange of trailers  at the border.  Thus, unlike most U.S. 
domestic truck transport markets, at least two carriers must participate.  Similar processes 
occur for Mexican shippers moving cargo into the United States. 
 
58 
Freight forwarders are frequently utilized to facilitate the interline or interchange.  In most 
cases, the customs broker with whom the Mexican motor carrier is working manages the 
freight forwarding operation in the United States, along with the drayage company that 
takes the trailer through customs and across the border (American Trucking Associations, 
Inc., 1992, pp. 17-18). 
 
The need to trans-load or interchange freight at the border and to utilize various other 
parties to facilitate the border crossing creates problems besides the obvious one of 
interrupted transport.  The chances of damage rise with increased handling of the freight, a 
problem compounded by the difficulty of determining liability when a claim arises.  
Insurance coverage for door-to-door cross border service through one insurance carrier has 
traditionally not been available.5  Additionally, asset utilization, an important productivity 
goal is reduced when U.S. carriers interchange with Mexican carriers, and vice-versa.  
 
Another operational problem is the equipment. Even though Mexico has bought new trucks 
in considerable numbers for the long-haul service in recent years, the average age of the 
Mexican truck fleet is much older than that of the U.S. fleet.  Most U.S. carriers operate 1.5 
to 2 trailers for every tractor on average; the ratio in Mexico is 0.5 trailers per tractor 
(American Trucking Associations, Inc., 1992, p. 10 and 12).  The shortage of trailers has 
resulted in instances of Mexican carriers using U.S. trailers to make other deliveries in 
Mexico (ibid p.18).  Such cases have an adverse impact on equipment turnaround time and, 
thus, asset utilization for the U.S. carrier. 
 
Transit times in Mexico are usually poor because carriers are driven more by convenience 
than by shipper-customer needs (Harrington 1992, pp. 3, 19, 35).  As a result, service is 
very undependable.  For example, a U.S. shipper notes that service from its plant to one of 
                                                          
5  This may change as there is at least one prospective joint venture to offer 
warehouse-to-warehouse coverage for shipments crossing the U.S.-Mexico border.  The 
proposed insurance would be all risk coverage with uniform terms and conditions that are 
good in both countries.  Under the all risk insurance, the problem of determining fault will 
not exist.  See, Hall, Kevin G., “Mexican, U.S. insurers plan ‘seamless’ cargo coverage,” 
The Journal of Commerce, July 17, 1993, p. 10A.  The all risk insurance is already 
available. 
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its Mexican customers can range from four days to fourteen days.  Shorter and more 
dependable transit times are required to improve equipment utilization for interchanging 
U.S. carriers. 
 
Also, incompatible equipment standards have created operating problems for U.S. carriers.  
The 53-foot trailer is prevalent in the U.S., but it is not permitted on the Mexican highway 
system, where the 48-foot trailer is standard equipment (Strah, 1992, pp.3 and 5). 
 
The lack of a well developed Mexican logistic infrastructure also presents operational 
problems.  Less-than-truckload (LTL) shipments face unique obstacles in cross-border 
trade.  There is no breakbulk terminal system in Mexico other than that provided by U.S.-
based carriers.  There is virtually no warehousing and little expertise in handling large 
volume distribution.  Mexican ownership restrictions make it impossible for U.S. shippers 
and carriers to provide such infrastructure or service.  
 
Delays at the border are a serious problem. Traffic congestion at the busiest crossing points 
cause delays ranging from several hours to several days.  Traffic congestion slows 
transportation, and increases the variability of transit time.  
 
A Federal Highway Administration study of U.S.-Mexico border crossings indicates that 
delays may be reduced more effectively and at lower cost by addressing institutional 
problems than by large capital investments in infrastructure (Hall 1993, p. 1A and 8A).   
 
Valdes and Crum (1994, pp. 5-20) identified the most serious problems encountered by 
U.S. motor carriers in cross-border trade.  Their survey of U.S. and Mexican motor carriers 
investigated several alleged problems described in the transportation trade literature. U.S. 
carriers were asked to indicate the criteria employed in the selection of their Mexican 
trucking partners.  Mexican carrier cooperation, dependability, and financial stability were 
rated as the most important criteria.  Equipment condition, scheduling flexibility, and 
geographic coverage were second in importance.  Special services and distribution and 
consolidation services were considered the least important criteria.  They were also asked 
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about the satisfaction with interchange and interline operations.  The only absolute 
dissatisfaction is with the “timeliness of equipment return,” which covers both equipment 
condition upon return and reimbursement for damage to equipment.  The overall 
satisfaction with equipment exchange is moderate at best. The U.S. carriers’ satisfaction 
with “geographic coverage” has the best rating, but they are only moderately satisfied with 
the Mexican carriers’ service.  The carriers that expressed the highest levels of satisfaction 
towards their Mexican partners’ service use no more than three Mexican trucking firms.  
But there are cases of low satisfaction among U.S. carriers that use a like number of 
partners. 
 
The study finds a gap in service between U.S. and Mexican trucking services, with the 
Mexican carriers falling short.  (It is possible that a survey of Mexican carriers’ opinion of 
U.S. carriers would yield a similar opinion.) 
 
The trade literature identifies the following key problems in the U.S. and Mexican truck 
transport services: (1) restriction on foreign ownership of Mexican motor carriers; (2) 
delays and damage in equipment return; (3) incompatibility and poor condition of some 
Mexican equipment; (4) lack of freight insurance coverage in Mexico; (5) unbalanced 
flows with lack of backhaul opportunities; (6) poor communications facilities of Mexican 
carriers; (7) problems at the border crossings; and (8) the U.S. Secretary of 
Transportation’s unilateral suspension of the NAFTA rules allowing Mexican carriers for 
cross-border operations from the six border states in Mexico to the four border states in the 
United States. U.S. firms were supposed to gain parallel access to cross-border shipments 
to and from the six border states in Mexico (Appendix B). 
 
2.6.3 Consequences  
The present border crossing system problem result from: (1) prohibition of Mexican 
carriers in the United States and vice-versa; (2) restrictions imposed by the Mexican laws 
and rules and tolerated by the United States, coupled with the U.S. abrogation of part of the 
accords; (3) problems with data and the lack of a coordinated customs system between 
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Mexico and the United States; (4) inadequate infrastructure; and (5) cultural differences, 
including business practices. 
 
Under the formal provisions of NAFTA, the border crossing should be seamless, clear and 
efficient. This means one truck and one driver could take cargo from point A in the United 
States to point B in Mexico, as shown in Figure 2.7.  In theory, NAFTA assures a seamless 
border for the movement of trade between the Canada, Mexico, and the United States.  To 
implement this ideal, standardized information should be agreed on by these countries, and 
the trucking companies or their agents should provide this information to customs’ and 
other government officials in advance of each truck’s arrival at the border.  In this way, the 
government officials could make their risk assessments and decisions on examination of 
the products, so merchandise, upon arrival at the border, could be released or examined 
based on the pre-arrival information.  Something approximating this ideal situation occurs 
on the U.S.-Canadian border. 
 
The process starts when the truck arrives at the government inspection facility.  On the 
United States side, most of these decisions result in quick release of the merchandise and 
later verification of  the information. This occurs because the United States and Canada 
require each shipper to be covered by a bond or insurance policy that guarantees payments 
of any taxes and fees.  Mexico does not have such a system of bonds and insurance and 
requires payment of taxes and fees before the merchandise is allowed into the country. 
 
The trust between the United States and Canada frees the U.S. officials from providing 
effective enforcement and control with Canada, relying instead on a post-entry audit 
approach.  Thus, trade transportation between Canada and the United States represents a 
good example of seamless border, as envisioned by NAFTA. 
 
Between the United States and Mexico such trust is absent and the current U.S.-Mexico 
border crossing differs from the optimal condition envisioned by NAFTA.  It takes at 
minimum seven movements, at least three pieces of equipment, and three drivers to get 
from point A to point B (Figure 2.8). 
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The present system results in economic gains for: (I) Mexican brokers who provide 
services of warehousing, inspection, and classification, on the U.S. side of the border; (ii) 
the Laredo/Nuevo Laredo drayage industry; (iii) U.S. bankers that finance the construction 
of warehouses; (iv) the state and municipal governments on both sides of the border who 
receive extra toll payments; (v) the Mexican states that receive a share of Customs tax 
collections and import duties; and (vi) the entire regional economy that provides goods and 
services to the above economic agents. 
 
Despite the importance of transportation and border crossings in international trade, 
traditional studies on transportation, economics and international trade do not satisfactorily 
explain the border crossing problem. Church and Reid studied the characteristics of trans-
border initiatives in Europe, concerned with the social, economic and policy decision-
making processes.  These do not include detailed analysis or comment on transport, but 
they give an overview of the intricate nature of the border crossing activity (Reid 2000). 
 
Economists traditionally use rational financial and economic calculations and theoretical 
foundations that assume rational decisions.  The economist’s purely rational analysis of 
problems, however, may not be the way most human beings think or solve their problems .  
Individual economic agents acting in their own rational interest may not be guided by an 
“invisible hand” to produce a socially optimum economic result (or the invisible hand may 
be handcuffed by vested interests and economic regulation). The border crossing presents 
obvious inefficiencies that have persisted since 1994 and now extend into the new 
millennium.    
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3 The Laredo Crossing Point 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Laredo cross point accounts for 40 
percent of U.S.-Mexico overland merchandise trade by weight and 50 percent by value. 
Total merchandise to and from Mexico passing through Laredo during 2000 totaled more 
than $110 billion. Laredo’s proximity to major highways gives motor carriers quick access 
to Mexico’s industrial triangle of Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Mexico City.  Laredo 
handles more freight than all U.S.- Mexico cross-border combined in terms of value, 
volume and number of entries (Figure 3.1). Laredo has more than 10,000 truck 
crossings/day.  
 
This chapter shows that the border crossing process at Laredo is neither simple nor 
transparent; rather, it is complex and some groups benefit from it while others pay extra 
costs and delays.  In Laredo, trucking is a major industry that benefits the entire 
community.  This chapter presents the trade volume, value and nature of movements, the 
infrastructure and the flow process at Laredo. 
3.2 The Problem Context 
 
The Laredo Cross point has a complex physical and institutional environment.  This 
section describes the physical elements of this border crossing. 
 
3.2.1 The Geographical Region  
The border crossing at Laredo, Texas in the United States and Nuevo Laredo, Nuevo Leon, 
in Mexico (Figure 3.2) carries a greater percentage of surface trade among the United 
States, Canada and Mexico than any other U.S. interstate highway. 
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Figure 3.1: Total Merchandise Trade to and from Mexico Passing 
through Border State Ports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Border State Ports include: Port Arthur, Laredo, El Paso, San Diego, Nogales, Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, Houston and Dallas/Fort /Worth. 
Source: US DOC, MISER and Secofi-NAFTA 
 
Figure 3.2: Geographical Region of the Laredo Cross Point 
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NAFTA has boosted the importance of this point of entry.  Since it came into effect, trade 
between Mexico and the United States has grown from $85 billion in 1993 to $240 billion 
in 2001 (Department of Commerce); exports from Texas represent 47 percent of this trade, 
ranking Mexico as the largest importer of goods from Texas. 
 
The dominant trade flow of U.S. exports through Laredo is to Central Mexico, Mexico City, 
Guadalajara, and Monterrey.  These transportation runs are long and likely to be full 
truckloads.  Traditional trade bound to and from the heart of Mexico is primarily shipped 
through Laredo, in Texas, and Nuevo Laredo, in Tamaulipas.  The dominant U.S. export 
shipments are sent from the eastern United States to southeastern border crossings.  Laredo 
handles almost as much international trade as all the other ports of entry.  According to 
customs reports, by value, 64.4 percent of all trans-surface southbound trade moves 
through Laredo, along with  45 percent of the northbound trade.  Of the total freight by 
weight moving southbound across the Mexican-U.S. border, 31 percent enters through 
Nuevo Laredo.  
 
The trade through Laredo differs from that of other border regions.  Although there are 
significant shipments to and from maquiladora factories adjacent to southern Texas, the 
majority of shipments through Laredo are bound to or sent from cities in the interior of 
Mexico, such as Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey.  Mexico has four major 
transportation corridors: the Pacific, Chihuahua, Central and Gulf Coast.  The Central 
Trade Corridor is the most important one, extending from Mexico City  north to San Luis 
Potosí, Saltillo, Monterrey, and finally to Nuevo Laredo/Laredo, Texas. 
 
The most common products are consumer goods, destined for the dominant concentrations 
of population.  Intermediate goods are also found at centers of manufacturing.  These 
centers of production and consumption define the origins and destinations for most trade 
flows between the United States and Mexico.  The consumption of intermediate goods at 
manufacturing centers, especially the maquiladoras, plays an important role in the U.S.-
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Mexican trade flow.  Their main trade flows are located at other border crossings. The 
maquiladora trade flow is relatively low in Laredo and will not be studied here. 
 
3.2.3 Principal Commodities   
The main products moving southbound through Laredo are machines (with 39 percent of 
the market share), nuclear reactors and boilers (with 67 percent), and automobiles and 
automotive parts (with 86 percent of the total flow in 1999). For plastics, Laredo was again 
the district with the largest percentage of the total (53 percent in 1999).  Most optical 
instrument products pass through Laredo, which captured 62 percent of the total cross-
border market in 1990 and still held  a 52 percent market share in 1999.  Laredo handles 
the largest percentage of paper and cardboard products and this trade increased through 
1999. 
 
Among the main products the United States exports to Mexico are electronic and electric 
equipment, transportation equipment; industrial machinery and computers, chemicals and 
allied products, rubber and plastic products; petroleum and coal and textile mill products. 
 
The northbound flow of machines, electronics, and electrical equipment is concentrated in 
Laredo, with a 32 percent share of the market in 1999.  Laredo handles the largest share of 
vehicles and auto parts movements with a 72 percent share of the market value traded 
across the border in 1999. 
3.3 Specific Causes of the Laredo Crossing Point Problem 
 
Delays are the most obvious problem in border crossing at Laredo, leading to congestion 
and higher costs. The increasingly heavy truck traffic underscores the power of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and trade has helped make traffic backups on both sides 
of the border routine.  In Laredo, however, traffic problems are heightened by U.S. and 
Mexican restrictions on trucks and the shipping process. 
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Interstate Highway 35 forms a “river of trade” across the heartland of the North American 
continent.  This corridor carries a greater percentage of surface trade among the United 
States, Canada and Mexico than any other U.S. Interstate Highway.  Over 74% of all goods 
by value traded between the United States and Mexico traverse Texas on I-35.  At Laredo, 
Texas, five-mile lines of trucks are common on Interstate 35, waiting to cross the murky 
Rio Grande into Mexico. For some, the crossing will take several hours, for others, several 
days. 
 
The daily average crossings for March 1999 are: Laredo Northbound 2400 trucks; 
Columbia Northbound 2800.  Southbound volumes are about 95% of northbound flows.  
Congestion is intensified by the transport activity around Laredo’s 1,000 warehouses, with 
more being built. I-35 goes through the city of Laredo, and the warehouses are within the 
city limits, so that congestion is produced by international trade, urban trucking, and 
private cars, as shown in Figure 3.3.  Table 3.1 shows the average distribution of  loaded 
and empty trucks, and of tractors without trailers and the total for March, 1999 (Kramer, 
1999) . Southbound traffic congestion peaks in the afternoon hours; from 12-5 p.m. 
   
 
Table 3.1:  March 99 Truck Volumes - Northbound 
   Laredo Bridge #1 Columbia Solidarity 
Loaded   30,000   40,000 
 Empties   10,000     20,00 
 Tractors w/o Trailers 25,000   15,000 
      Total   65,000   75,000 
 Daily averages 
  Laredo Northbound - 2400 trucks 
  Columbia Northbound - 2800trucks 
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Figure 3.3: Congestion at Laredo Bridge, Southbound6 
  
                                                          
6 Source: Giermanski, 1999. 
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Data from the city of Laredo bridge system, compiled by Texas A&M International 
University, shows that the average of loaded trucks crossing southbound Laredo during the 
years 1989-1995 was 66 percent, and unloaded 34 percent.  In 1998 the average of empty 
crossings had increased to 46 percent (Giermanski, 1999).  As mentioned earlier, empty 
back hauls are a consequence of institutional constraints that create the drayage market and 
do not allow U.S. carriers to return from Mexico with cargo. 
 
Chapter 1, the methodology, conceptually defines the key elements that would lead to an 
efficient cross border for trucks as follows: 
A:  Adequate infrastructure to serve demand for transport: bridges, access 
roads, governmental inspection facilities, commercial infrastructure 
 B: Lack of institutional constraints 
 C: Homogeneous government systems 
 D: Cultural understanding: social, political, and business aspects 
 
The following section analyzes these elements and their characteristics at the Laredo Cross 
point to determine the specific causes of the problem. 
 
3.3.1 Infrastructure 
Laredo, Texas, the most dominant port on the southern U.S. border, is connected to the U.S. 
Interstate Highway system of motorways through I-35 with San Antonio and Dallas; I-30 
linking Dallas and Little Rock; I-40 linking Little Rock, Memphis, and Nashville; I-65 
linking Nashville with Louisville, KY; I-71 linking Louisville to Cincinnati; and I-75 
linking Cincinnati, Dayton, Toledo, and Detroit. 
 
Laredo, Texas, is a city at the end of the U.S. Interstate 35 highway, which is the only  
access road to the Laredo Bridges #1 and #2 that connect downtown Laredo and Nuevo 
Laredo, Mexico. Long lines of trucks park on the Interstate waiting to cross the bridge 
along with buses and automobiles. Adding to the problem is the urban bus and automobile 
traffic. 
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Until September 2000 two bridges used to connect downtown Laredo to Mexico: the 
Colombia Solidarity Bridge located in Nuevo Leon; and Laredo Bridge #2, located in 
Tamaulipas. These bridges handled more cargo by volume, value, and number of entries 
than all other U.S. Mexican crossings combined (Ehinger 1999).  However, Laredo ranks 
below some U.S.-Canadian crossings.  In fact, Buffalo and Detroit each handle more 
freight and value than the entire U.S. Mexican border (Nolle and Kramer, 1999).   
 
Figure 3.4 shows the Laredo/Nuevo Laredo crossing point and transportation system.  
Bridge #1 handled mostly vehicles and non commercial traffic.  Only empty trucks or 
drayage cross through this bridge northbound.   
 
Bridge #2, also called the Lincoln - Juarez bridge, handled most of the southbound 
commercial traffic until September 2000. This bridge, is old, has two lanes in each 
direction  and was build not for today’s volume of traffic.  I-35 provides the only  access to 
the bridge and it frequently became a parking lot for trucks waiting to cross southbound. 
The bridge is in Tamaulipas and the state government has economic interest in keeping the 
revenue generated by the toll bridge, and also receives, under the Mexican system, part of 
the Customs collections. 
 
Texas’ third bridge, the Colombia Solidarity bridge, connects Texas with the State of 
Nuevo León in Mexico.  This bridge was build in 1990 and has four lanes in each direction 
with a capacity to handle 8000 trucks a day.  To take this bridge, the trucks have to exit I-
35 in the north of Laredo and take I472 Road (also called Mines Road) which has two 
lanes, is 15 miles long and is in very bad shape.  On the Mexican side of the crossing 
border is a very bad road that connects Columbia Bridge in Nuevo León  with the Mexican 
highway I-85 in Tamaulipas; I-85 connects Tamaulipas with Monterrey, Mexico D.F. and 
the principal industrial cities in Mexico.   A fourth bridge, the World Trade Bridge, built at 
Laredo was opened in September 2000 in an attempt to solve institutional problems with 
new infrastructure, as it is analyzed in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 3.4 
Laredo/Nuevo Laredo Crossing Point and Transportation System7 
                                                          
7 Source: Laredo Convention &Visitors Bureau. 
 
74 
Phillips, Cook and Cisneros (2001) documented the increased demand on infrastructure in 
the Laredo region.  Phillips looked at strains on roads and bridges and suggested that 
before more money is invested in transportation infrastructure, border policies and 
procedures need to be closely scrutinized to ensure that the current infrastructure is used 
efficiently.  Border traffic imposes costs, since the early 1990's Texas -Mexico border has 
increased dramatically, especially in Laredo, which has seen truck crossings rise 116 
percent from 1.3 million in 1993 to 2.8 million in 1999, and overall vehicle crossings 
increase 21 percent, from 14.1 million in 1993 to 17,1 million in 1999.  With the influx of 
traffic passing through the border come infrastructure and social costs.  From 1993 through 
2000, the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT) spent $388 million on roads and 
highways in Laredo and is projecting to spend another $298 million from 2001 through 
2005. 
 
3.3.2 Institutional  
The legal and institutional restrictions and procedures on the import system, imposed by  
Mexico and tolerated by the United States, are a major contributor to the backups and the 
expensive and slow border crossing process.    
 
The bottlenecks on southbound I-35 are due less to inadequate roads than to the way goods 
are transported across the border:   
 
Southbound trucks must stop before crossing the border to have their cargo 
inspected  and appraised by Mexican customs brokers.  Mexico does not allow 
U.S. citizens to forward freight into Mexico.  So, U.S. truckers must unload their 
cargo at Laredo warehouses.  Then the Mexican freight forwarders shuttle it 
across the border, where it is usually transferred again to a Mexican long-haul 
trucker (Giermanski 1996). 
 
Shipping by land from the United States to Mexico is a unique process due to the practices 
of: (1) Mexican customs brokers on the southern border of the United States; and (2) the 
drayage industry at the border.  At the core of the problem is the Mexican customs mind 
set and the support and obsolete international commercial procedures by some border cities 
and businessmen that lead to a complex border environment.   
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3.3.2.1 The Mexican Customs Broker  
 
 Unlike U.S. brokers, the Mexican Customs broker is legally responsible and liable 
for the content of shipments across the border.  Therefore, the process used by the 
Mexican customs brokers is more rigorous.  The broker typically receives both the 
export declaration and bill of lading in advance of the truck’s arrival at their 
facility.  With this information, the broker begins the preparation of the Mexican 
“Pedimentos” required for cargo entering into Mexico.  If the shipper is a 
frequent customer of the Mexican customs broker, minimal or no inspection may 
be undertaken.  However, if the shipper is unknown to the broker or is an 
infrequent customer, a thorough inspection may be required to verify the contents 
and/or for classification purposes.  When an inspection is required, the U.S. 
shipper may incur fees for the unloading and reloading the truck and for storage 
of the vehicle or trailer during the inspection (Barton-Ashman Associates 1996, 
pp.14 and 17).  
  
Mexican brokers are powerful family-owned businesses passed from generation to 
generation.  Brokers are licensed by the individual States, so a broker licensed in New 
Leon, cannot operate in Tamaulipas.  The brokers specialize in products.  Some brokers 
work textiles; others work for chemicals; others for automotive products; and still others 
for electrical goods.  The Mexican government has opened up the process somewhat and is 
licensing more brokers, so competition is increasing among them (Kramer 1999).   
 
The Mexican Brokers Association is a powerful and wealthy institution.  The Association 
is controlled by 10 families who operate on both sides of the border, are influential in 
politics, and make generous contributions to the political parties and the politicians.  They 
have a vested interest in keeping the border crossing inefficient (Ehinger 1999). There are 
companies that have developed their own trucking transportation system and  have their 
“apoderado”.  Apoderados are legally licensed and empowered to perform broker services 
for certain businesses.  The companies that have their own apoderado can avoid working 
with drayage and the Mexican brokers at Laredo.  Their trucks can go to the United States 
and Mexico without having to wait for drayage (Nolle and Kramer 1998). 
 
Mexican brokers are institutions by themselves.  They usually operate on both sides of the 
border.  They are lucrative businesses that generate revenue for the cities where they 
operate, through the taxes they pay and the employment they generate. 
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The structure of the Mexican broker business is based on the Mexican family concept 
whose members help each other and intervene accordingly.  This has an impact upon the 
efficiency of the system as viewed from the U.S. perspective.  Things in Mexico operate 
accordingly to what is “convenient” for the family that owns the broker business rather 
than what is efficient from an abstract point of view of overall economic efficiency 
(Ehinger 1999). 
 
Dr. Giermanski (1995), in his article “Texas to Mexico: a Border to Avoid”, describes the 
unfair practices by the Mexican brokers on the south border and compares them with 
NAFTA’s provisions to allow pure reciprocity between the United States and Canada with 
respect to freight forwarding by defining an appropriate business visitor to include a person 
who forwards international goods: 
 
With respect to temporary entry into the territory of the United States, Canadian 
customs brokers performing brokerage duties relating to the export of goods from 
the territory of the United States to or Through the Territory of Canada. 
  
With respect to temporary entry into the territory of Canada, United States 
customs brokers performing brokerage duties relating to the export of goods from 
the territory of Canada to or through the territory of the United States. (NAFTA, 
Vol. I, p.16-11).  
  
This opens the possibility that a Canadian may enter into the United States and forward 
freight from the United States into Canada, and a U.S. citizen may enter Canada to forward 
freight into the United States. 
 
3.3.2.2 The Drayage Industry  
The drayage industry is composed of small trucking firms that simply shuttle, transfer, or 
ferry goods across the  border.  Giermanski (1997) points out that the absolute advantage 
of Mexican brokers allows them to influence the drayage industry, contributing directly to 
the congestion, delays, and expense in border crossings: 
 
The U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) limited commercial Mexican 
traffic to just the U.S. border within an officially designated commercial zone in 
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the United States.  Mexico limited U.S. truckers to the border frontier zone of 
Mexico.  Given that the cargo is restricted to delivery in the commercial zones in 
the United States where it is under the control of the Mexican broker, the broker 
may then decide which drayage firm will transfer the cargo into Mexico and when 
that transfer is to take place.  Mexican influence over the U.S. drayage motor 
carriers is, therefore, established, allowing the Mexican brokers, themselves, to 
form drayage firms and partnerships with drayage firms to increase their share of 
the profits.  These business practices also permit the Mexican broker’s influence 
to spill forth into border-city politics.  As a result, border cities acquiesce into 
supporting the practices of drayage firms, which fosters the carriage of cargo in 
one direction only.  The return trip to the country of origin is without cargo and in 
some cases without even an empty trailer. Consequently, more trucks can be used 
and more fees collected because of more trucks! (Giermanski, 1996, pp. 6-7) 
 
A gentlemen’s agreement between Mexico and the United States permits U.S. drayage 
companies to haul trailers southbound and Mexican drayage companies to haul trailers 
northbound.  Many U.S. companies have decided to brake the monopoly of the “drayage 
industry” by crossing the border with their own trucks, avoiding third-party drayage. 
 
Another gentlemen’s agreement grew out of an actual written informal “bilateral 
understanding” between the state of Texas and the Mexican state of Tamaulipas and 
informal “paired city understandings” between Texas and the Mexican states of Chihuahua 
and Coahuila (Texas Transportation Commission Minute Order 106436, November 30, 
1995).  This understanding was about reciprocal registration and taxation on commercial 
motor vehicles.  In effect, if Mexico did not require registration or taxes on commercial 
vehicles, Texas would not either. However, the title of this agreement (paired-city 
agreement) was used in trying to defend a business practice that developed on its own 
where one side did not carry goods back, so the other side would have jobs transferring 
cargo and vice-versa.   
 
In May 1997, the Texas Bill 370 eventually signed into law put in effect of 1 September 
1997 “superseded” any paired city agreement.  The original paired city agreements were 
unconstitutional in the first place.  For a state to enter into an agreement with a foreign 
power, it needs the consent of the U.S. Congress.  Obviously, Texas did not have that 
consent, which was the basis for voiding it in the State Government.  This is an example of 
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perverse “institutional thickening,” where “local initiatives” conspire to place restrictions 
on trade.   
 
Giermanski (1996) explains how this problem appeared after Mexico joined the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Previously, Mexican importers retained a 
customs broker and paid duties within three days, avoiding government storage charges at 
government-controlled locations.  However, the Mexican government lost control of the 
process and was unable to collect all duties.  Within a few years of joining the GATT, the 
problem had grown to the point that the Mexican government changed the system. Under 
the new system, duties are collected prior to entry into Mexico, eliminating the 
government’s responsibilities with storage and the lost revenue.  Given that only licensed 
Mexican brokers could process goods coming into Mexico, the broker business naturally 
shifted to the U.S. side for goods shipped by land.  This control was strengthened by 
eliminating U.S. businessmen from competing with the Mexican broker who was now 
operating in the United States as a U.S. freight forwarder.8 
Further, as the responsibility for storage shifted from Mexico to the United States, 
warehousing flourished on the U.S. side of the border. Mexican brokers operating in the 
                                                          
8 On October 22, 1986, as a result of the Surface Freight Forwarder Deregulation 
Act of 1985, surface freight forwarders were deregulated except for the forwarding of 
household goods.  Freight forwarder is defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) as: “...a person holding itself out to the general public (other than as an express, 
pipeline, rail, sleeping car, motor or water carrier) to provide transportation of property for 
compensation and in the ordinary course of its business 
 a) assembles and consolidates or provides for assembly and consolidating 
shipments and performs or provides for break-bulk and distribution operations of the 
shipments; 
 b) assumes responsibility for the transportation from place of receipt to place of 
destination; and 
 c) uses for any part of the transportation a carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission under subchapter I, II, III of chapter 105 of this title 
regulated by the ICC.” 
 Along the southern border of the United States the term “forwarding agent” is 
often used instead of freight forwarder.  While both, however, perform duties as defined by 
the ICC, the forwarding agent is often an exclusive agent for the Mexican customs broker 
and, therefore, does not forward freight around the world as many freight forwarders do.  
The forwarding agent’s work, then, is merely the clearing of goods for entry into Mexico 
and arranging transport for the border crossing. 
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United States got loans from U.S. banks to build the warehouses, paying interest and 
maintaining large deposits in these banks from the lucrative charges for storing 
international cargo in their warehouses.  Mexican brokers in the United States have no 
outside competition, giving them almost absolute control over releasing of goods for entry 
into Mexico and rates for transportation on the border crossing into Mexico. 
 
3.3.3 Homogeneous Government Systems 
Another deficiency in U.S.-Mexican border-crossing is the lack of automated government 
systems integrated among government agencies and the business community in each 
country  and between the two countries.  These include an integrated, harmonized customs 
system: data problems often cause  delays at the border crossing, and problems are created 
by other government agencies that deal with different aspects of trade and transport, such 
as the Department of Transportation, Immigration, and the Agriculture Department. 
 
Mexican Customs’ practices require that export goods transported from the United States 
to Mexico by land be subject to tariff or duty before they enter Mexico.  The process of 
clearing goods into Mexico involves a series of functions, such as appraisal, classification, 
inspection, and inventory, which take place on the U.S. side of the border.  The importers 
must act in accord with the requirements of a licensed Mexican broker and their exclusive 
forwarding agents, and obtain the two primary documents for clearing goods into Mexico, 
the pedimento and the commercial invoice, which must contain the broker’s letterhead and 
his identifying number.  In this manner, the privilege of using the Mexican broker’s 
number and letterhead comes at the price of  reciprocal business.  
 
The proponents of NAFTA have not challenged this practice although no reciprocity is 
involved.  In fact, Mexico does not allow U.S. brokers to operate as freight forwarders or 
forwarding agents within the territory of Mexico.  No U.S. citizen is allowed to forward 
freight from Mexico into the United States as specified in NAFTA:   
 
A shipper’s export declaration must be processed by a Mexican national licensed 
as customs broker (agente de aduanas) or by the representative (apoderado 
aduanal) employed by the exporter and authorized by the Secretaría de Hacienda 
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y Crédito Publico for this purpose. (U.S. Government Printing Office 1993, Vol. 
II, p. 44)   
 
 
From the viewpoint of the overall economic efficiency that underpins NAFTA, there is no  
rationale for the United States to allow Mexican brokers to come to the United States and 
create such a bizarre and expensive system of south-bound movements at the border. 
 
3.3.4 Cultural Features Including Business Practices 
The U.S.- Mexican border case is unique since interdependency covers virtually every 
aspect of the sociopolitical and economic spectrum, while the cultures, economic and 
social policies, and regulatory frameworks are diverse. This diversity presents serious 
challenges to Mexican and U.S. negotiators in their efforts to harmonize the trade 
facilitation policies across the borders. 
 
The cultural differences on the U.S.-Mexican border include language, with Spanish- 
speaking people in Mexico and the predominately English-speaking people in the United 
States.  Mexico  is a source country for drugs entering the United States, along with illegal 
aliens, and there is a race issue. The Mexican economy is less developed than the United 
States.  Due to the differences in culture, language, and race, there is little trust between the 
United States and Mexico, resulting in institutional frictions between the two countries. 
 
The culture also influences the business practices.  The bridges are open from 7 a.m. to 7 
p.m. from Mondays to Saturdays. On Sundays, trucks cross only under requested operation 
and reimbursable expense, meaning that those who request the opening of the bridge have 
to pay for the associated personnel and operational expenses (Nolle, 1999).  Congestion is 
also caused by the common practice of brokers to process groups of trucks and then 
simultaneously release them to cross the border. Since customs officials cannot anticipate 
these releases, this operational practice overloads the inspection facilities.  As mentioned 
before, businesses in Mexico are oriented towards what is convenient to the parties 
involved, rather than what is efficient from the logistic point of view.  
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3.4 Consequences  
 
These factors show that the present border crossing system is the result of: (1) prohibition 
of Mexican carriers in the United States and vice-versa; (2) restrictions imposed by the 
Mexican laws and rules and tolerated by the United States; (3) problems with data and the 
lack of a coordinated government inspection systems (which include Customs Service, 
Department of Transportation, Department of Agriculture, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Drug Enforcement Administration)  between Mexico and the United States; (4) 
limited infrastructure; (5) cultural differences which include among others business 
practices.  
 
The present system results in economic gains for: (I) Mexican brokers who provide 
services of warehousing, inspection, and classification, on the U.S. side of the border; (ii) 
the Laredo/Nuevo Laredo drayage industry; (iii) U.S. bankers that finance the construction 
of warehouses; (iv) the state and municipal governments on both sides of the border who 
receive extra toll payments; (v) the Mexican states that receive a share of Customs tax 
collections and import duties; and (vi) the entire regional economy that provides goods and 
services to the above economic agents.   
 
The U.S.-Mexican border landscape at the Laredo crossing point is very different from the 
European and the U.S.-Canadian context. Under the formal provisions of  NAFTA, the 
border crossing should be seamless, clear and efficient. This would mean one truck with 
one driver from point A in the United States to point B in Mexico and vice-versa (see 
Figure 2.7).  In theory, NAFTA assures a seamless border for the movement of trade 
between the Canada, Mexico, and the United States.  To implement this ideal, standardized 
information should be agreed on by these countries and presented by the trucking 
companies or their agents to customs and other government officials in advance of each 
truck’s arrival at the border.  In this way, the government officials could make their risk 
assessments and decisions to examine the products, so merchandise, upon arrival at the 
border, could be released immediately released or examined based on the pre-arrival 
information.   
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On the U.S.-Canadian border, most of these decisions result in quick release of the 
merchandise and later verification of  the information. This is possible because the United 
States and Canada require each shipper to be covered by a bond or insurance policy that 
guarantees payments of any taxes and fees.  On the U.S-Mexican border, however,  the 
southbound process starts only when the truck arrives at the government inspection facility.  
Mexico does not have a system of bonds and insurance and requires payment of  taxes and 
fees before the merchandise is allowed into the country. 
 
Further, there are the cultural differences.  There is trust between the United States and 
Canada. The U.S. government does not attempt to provide ex-ante enforcement and control 
with  Canada, relying instead on a post-entry audit approach.  This is adequate for the 
collection of duties and taxes but is not adequate to meet health, safety, transportation, and 
environmental issues (Nolle 1999). 
 
Thus, trade transportation between Canada and the United States represents a good 
example of seamless border, as envisioned by NAFTA and is an example of institutional 
thickness in Church and Reid’s terminology. 
 
With Mexico such trust is absent and the current U.S.-Mexico border crossing differs from 
the optimal condition envisioned by NAFTA.  It takes at minimum seven movements, at 
least three pieces of equipment, and three drivers to get from point A in the United States 
to point B in Mexico (see Figure 2.8). 
 
Congestion on the Laredo border crossing is an industry by itself.  It is in the economic 
interest of the Laredo community to keep the system that produces the congestion.  It has 
its own political-economic system, congestion induced by institutional means.  The rent-
seeking economic agents  find ways to avoid and protect the clutter. 
 
The consequences of this system are paid in the form of extra costs by the shipper.  These 
costs are transferred to the importer who transfers the cost to the consumer, who pays for 
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the inefficiency.  As the southbound crossing is more complex, it is more expensive, and 
the Mexican consumer pays for everything. 
 
For the trade community, data problems add to those already described to make the current 
international trade processing even more complex and costly.  Traders are required to send 
data and/or paper forms to a multitude of government agencies.  Much of this data is 
redundant.  Traders are often unable to determine agency data requirements for an import 
or export transaction and are confounded with incompatible data definitions and exchange 
methods.  With the increasing volumes of trade, border crossings are congested and dealing 
with greater volumes than their capacity to process them efficiently.   
 
The Laredo cross point presents obvious inefficiencies that have persisted since 1994 and 
now extend into the new millennium.  In Chapter 4, I quantify the costs added by these 
inefficiencies and present a theory of personal and institutional behavior to explain the gap 
between economic rationality and reality.  Chapter 5 presents scenarios of improvements, 
including that of the optimal condition of a seamless border, and focuses on empirical 
evidence regarding  the intriguing institutional question of why the inefficiencies have 
persisted over a long period despite a legal framework (NAFTA) based on economic 
rationality. 
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4 Times and Costs of Border Crossing at Laredo 
 
Distance and national borders both 
still matter 
- Frankel 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews some models and approaches for quantifying border crossing costs 
and formulates an economic model for the analysis of truck transportation and border 
crossings at Laredo.  It quantifies costs and times for each activity of the actual cross-
border operation described in Chapter 2.  It then presents a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the institutional-behavioral questions related to the differences between the 
optimal costs and those currently found at the border crossing.  The last section of this 
chapter presents the implications of the border related inefficiencies on the trade flows 
between the United States and Mexico. 
 
4.2 Economic Aspects of Border Crossing    
   
This section develops the underlying theory of border crossing under restricted conditions. 
 
Border crossings occur when the owners of a commodity expect to profit by selling it in a 
different country. “The raison d’etre of market exchange is the expectation of mutual 
gains.” (Buchanan and Tullock 1963, p. 103).   
 
When the commodities exchanged are transported by truck, at least one border must be 
crossed.  Figure 2.7 represents border crossing flows between 2 homogeneous regions (e.g., 
trade between Canada and the United States). In this example, the time and costs 
approximate the theoretical  minimum because the border crossing system is homogeneous 
for truck costs, truck services, infrastructure, and institutional procedures (customs, 
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information, inspections.)   This example assumes the truck can transit directly from point 
A in one country to point B in the other.  The movement of the commodity from point A to 
point B requires one truck and one driver, and after delivery the truck can return from point 
B with a commodity exported to point A.  Under this scenario, capital equipment and labor 
are used efficiently and the delay due to border crossing inspection and customs procedures 
is minimum because government policies are coordinated and restrictions are minimized.  
This situation represents the case of a border crossing as seamless as a border crossing can 
be. 
 
At the Laredo border crossing, in spite of NAFTA, the border crossing system  represents a 
completely different scenario (Figure 2.8). In this example, the movement of a commodity 
from Chicago to Monterrey takes 10 movements with at least four pieces of equipment and 
three different drivers.  This border crossing is very congested; trucks have to stop many 
times; the trailer has to be connected to a drayage truck or be unloaded and reloaded to 
another trailer to be pulled by a drayage truck across the border; inspections take place on 
both sides of the border, performed by Mexican brokers and Customs officials; then, 
finally, the trailer is connected again to a truck owned by the company of the country of the 
final destination.  Each of these steps represent delays and extra costs for the border 
crossing.  They increase congestion and inflate costs. 
 
4.3 Costs in the Trucking Industry  
 
Transport costs for international trade are on average higher than for domestic trade.  Smith 
and Giermanski (1997, p. 5) describe the cost structure of the trucking industry in the 
United States as characterized by an extremely high level of variable costs and a relatively 
low level of fixed costs.  Depending on the type of motor carrier, variable costs range from 
70 to 90 percent of total costs, while fixed costs are 10 to 30 percent (Coyle, Bardi, and 
Cavianto 1994) 
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Typically, fixed costs include interest payments on the vehicles, depreciation, and/or 
interest on other capital expenditure items, such as garages and terminals.  Items such as 
insurance and vehicle licensing and insurance of the cargo may be considered either fixed 
or variable, depending on the firm.  If the vehicle is insured on an annual basis, the costs 
are fixed; if it is insured on a per-trip basis, then the costs are variable.  Cargo is insured on 
a per-trip basis and thus a variable cost. 
 
Kenneth D. Boyer (1997) gives a rule of thumb that in the United States it costs one dollar 
per mile to drive a standard 18-wheel, 80,000-pound  truck.  Of this dollar, approximately 
40 cents go to the driver, 20 cents are spent on fuel, and the remaining 40 cents are spent 
on depreciation, licensing, interest on the tractor and trailer, tires, maintenance, and other 
miscellaneous items. Trucking costs are closely associated with mileage and are far more 
linear with distance than are costs of railroads, water carriers, or even airlines (Boyer 1997, 
pp. 58-59). 
 
Inflation-adjusted trucking costs in the United States have decreased with deregulation 
over the last two decades, due to : (1) decreased real prices of fuel; (2) increased 
competition; (3) lower wages of drivers (between 1980 and 1995, wages paid to over-the-
road drivers fell in both real and nominal terms, since 1995 shortages of drivers have 
reversed this trend); (4) improvement in operating efficiency with  electronic data 
exchange and the development of a system of freight brokers, firms have found return 
loads for their trucks, reducing the amount of time that trucks move empty hauls; and (5) 
increased intermodal long-haul transportation of truck trailers.  Truckload trucking 
companies now move trainloads of trailers between the Midwest and the West Coast.  This 
economizes on drivers, who are concentrated on short-distance movements.  These 
intermodal hauls allow trucking to take advantage of the improvement in service costs and 
reliability that followed railroad deregulation in 1980 (the Staggers Act). 
 
The Mexican trucking industry is characterized by higher fixed costs of equipment, 
insurance, and interest on the vehicles and other capital expenditure items.  This increases 
the costs per mile by 25-40 percent, making the typical cost in Mexico $1.25-$1.40 per 
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mile to drive a standard 18-wheel, 80,000-pound truck, based on an average long-haul trip 
to Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Merida (Kevin 1999). 
 
A trucking company can minimize its shipping costs by controlling the variable costs per 
shipment: (1) using the most direct transportation route, thus reducing costs related to 
mileage; (2) restricting the daily number of hours an individual driver may work, to avoid 
paying overtime, and (3) avoiding, where possible, tolls, extra border-crossing fees, and 
storage and insurance costs. 
 
4.4 Summary of the Border Crossing Problem 
 
The Laredo border crossing problem has the following characteristics: 
 
1) legal institutional restrictions and procedures imposed by Mexico and tolerated by 
the United States, along with a U.S. limitation on operations by Mexican truckers 
in the United States, tolerated by Mexico;   
 
2) excessive stops, interrupting the  transport flows and making the cargo more 
susceptible to damage, loss, and tampering, and generating pollution (pollution 
from diesel engines comes mainly from acceleration and working under heavy 
loads); 
  
3) lack of a coordinated system and data requirements for border crossing; 
  
4) border crossing infrastructure limitations, such as insufficient access roads to the 
crossing bridges; leading to high levels of congestion;  
 
5) the limited capacity of some inspection areas, aggravating congestion; 
  
6) businesses practices that lead to peak hours for border crossing, with truck arrivals 
for some hours that are 40 to 120 percent above the daily average; 
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7) the border crossing services of the drayage industry intensify congestion by 
doubling the number of vehicles crossing the bridges and by using local streets. 
 
8) lack of sufficient Government funds to add the personnel required to provide 
inspections 24 hours/day; 
 
9) lack of leadership in the private sector and by politicians to promote the change 
for a more efficient border crossing system; and 
 
10) the cultural environment on the U.S.- Mexican border, characterized by language 
and race differences, distrust, and acceptance of bureaucracy. 
 
 The following section reviews the literature that address some of these 
characteristics. 
4.5 Literature on the Characteristics of the Border Crossing 
Problem and Transportation Cost Models  
 
4.5.1 Introduction  
The role of transportation in theoretical models of international trade has received little 
attention, despite its conceptual and empirical importance.   In particular, the cross-border 
problem has been little studied.  No single model covers the specific characteristics of the 
Laredo crossing point. Thus, I had to adapt the economic literature and models of 
transportation and international trade to analyze and quantify the times and costs of the 
border crossing. 
 
In the following section I summarize the Laredo cross point problems and review some 
literature transportation cost models developed to date. 
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4.5.2  F.R. Casas: International Trade with Produced Transport 
Services 
F.R. Casas (1983, pp.89-107) states that  
In contrast to the extensive literature on tariffs and trade, the empirical literature 
on the impact of transportation on international trade has also suffered from the 
absence of a clear and simple theoretical framework within which transport 
related problems can be analyzed.  
  
Kindleberger (1962) estimated the importance of the costs of transportation of international 
trade flows, suggesting an adjustment factor of 5 percent in intra-European trade and 10 
percent in intercontinental trade.  Sampson (1978) found that freight and insurance costs as 
a percentage of the f.o.b. prices from the European Economic Community exports to the 
United States in 1974 ranged from a low of 6.6 percent for the United Kingdom to a high 
of 9.6 percent for Italy, averaging 8.2 percent.  However, there are considerable variations 
across commodity groups and among countries.  Prewo (1978) calculated transport costs as 
a percentage of f.o.b. value of exports.  They varied across eight Latin American countries 
from a low of 5 percent for Uruguay’s exports of complex manufactures to a high of 214 
percent for Venezuela’s exports of primary products.  
 
Samuelson (1954) was among the earliest economists to introduce transport into a simple 
general equilibrium model of international trade.  Samuelson was primarily interested in 
the question of the effects of transport costs on the terms of trade in the context of the 
transfer problem.  Mundell (1957) uses the crucial assumption by quoting Samuelson 
(1954, p.268):  
 
To carry each good across the ocean you must pay some of the good itself. Rather 
than set up elaborate models of a merchant marine, invisible items, etc., we can 
achieve our purpose by assuming that just as only a fraction of ice exported 
reaches its destination as unmelted ice, so will...fraction of a country’s  
exports...reach the other country as imports. 
 
 
In 1970, Herberg departed from the Samuelson and Mundell assumptions by considering 
the transport service distinct from the two traded goods and supplied by either country.  He 
assumed the technology in the transport sector linearly homogenous in labor and capital.  
90 
Rather than leaving market forces determine the supplier of transport services, Herberg 
assumed that each country transports its own imports.  Unlike in Herbergs’ model, Mexico, 
however, has legislative constraints on trading with the United States and in Mexico, labor 
is less expensive and capital is more expensive than in the United States. The capital 
intensity of the U.S. transport sector is relatively higher than the capital intensity of the 
Mexican transport sector.  These countries  provide a different level of quality of 
transportation services.   Herberg  also assumes that all the transport services supplied by 
each country involve moving products in one direction only.  The assumption presents a 
conceptual difficulty, recognized by Herberg (1970, p. 579), that 
 
  seems to be acceptable if we think of transport media carrying for technical 
reasons goods in one direction only as, e.g., pipe lines.  It is far less satisfactory 
with regard to media making round trips as, e.g., ships, lorries, freight trains; it 
would imply that they are not used efficiently since they would be empty on every 
outward journey. 
 
The 1976 Falvey model differs from the Herberg model by allowing costs of production to 
determine the supplier of transport services rather than arbitrarily assigning the production 
burden between the two countries.  Falvey assumes that the transport technology is 
identical for the two graded goods: for any given factor price-ratio, the capital-labor ratio 
in transporting the two goods is  the same, but the quantity of transportation services 
necessary to carry one unit of each traded good may differ for the two products. 
 
Casas (1983, p.107) integrates transport costs into the conventional general equilibrium 
model of international trade.   
 
The chronological summary of the major contributions on this issue are: 
 
1) Samuelson and Mundell draw attention to the role of supply and demand 
conditions in the markets for traded goods in determining the division of the 
burden of supplying transportation and the consequent welfare losses and gains 
for the two trading countries. 
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2) Herberg underscores the idea that transport directly absorbs resources and shows  
the role of the transport technology in determining equilibrium commodity prices. 
 
3) Falvey emphasizes the role of technology in the transport sector in determining 
the origin of the resources used in carrying traded commodities.  
  
4) The joint production model suggests that the resources used in transportation may  
and in general will originate in both trading countries, with technology and market 
conditions determining each country’s contribution.  
 
None of these models, however, are well adapted to locating the bottlenecks of the border 
crossing system between two countries.  None of them consider institutional factors, such 
as customs and regulatory practices, coupled with the effects of different levels of 
development, capital/labor ratios, cultures, or infrastructure capacities.  Further, the models 
cannot be used to quantify the impact of different pricing schemes based on the 
improvement in the border crossing procedures. 
 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I develop an economic model to incorporate the 
cost and characteristics of the Laredo border crossing system to study the economic 
consequences of different improvement scenarios. 
 
4.5.3  Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System 
Frankel’s theoretical and empirical analysis of regional trading blocs (1996), argues that  
geography should be part of trade theory:   
 
As surprising as it sounds, most international economists until quite recently 
ignored distance and other geographical factors as determinants of trade. Most 
trade models have until recently had one thing in common: they treated countries 
as disembodied entities that lacked a physical location in geographical space.  We 
will see that one cannot get very far into an empirical analysis of bilateral trade - 
this is, an analysis of trade between pairs of countries- without recognizing the 
strong, inhibiting effect of distance on trade. (Frankel, 1996, p.37). 
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Paul Krugman (1991c, 1995b, 1996) addresses this question, stating that, until recently, the 
standard theories of trade were based on the assumptions of perfect competition and 
constant returns on scale.  It is difficult to analyze many geographic influences with such 
models.  
 
Frankel presents three reasons to care about the role of distance and geography: (i) distance 
leads to agglomeration, so that history can affect what goods are produced in a given 
region or country. The computer industry in the Silicon Valley in California, for example, 
resulted in regional agglomeration, although the tendency toward concentration originally 
began with a single chance event; (ii) distance between a pair of countries is a natural 
determinant of the volume of trade between them; and (iii) countries located close together 
constitute a natural trading bloc, so that a reduction in trade barriers between them can 
more easily be economically beneficial than for distant countries. 
 
Frankel defines three kinds of costs of doing business at a distance: 
 
(1) Shipping costs: although transportation costs are obvious, how to measure 
them is not.  In general, U.S. Customs data show that transport costs for 
international trade exceed the cost of duties (Amjadi, Winters, and Yeats, 
1995, pp. 475-477);  
 
(2) Time elapsed in transporting, which includes interest charges, perishability, 
and adaptability to changing conditions; and 
 
(3) cultural unfamiliarity.  Linnemann (1996) called this category “psychic 
distance,” having in mind that familiarity with another country’s laws, 
institutions, habits, and languages is an important part of marketing.  
  
Frankel discusses the effects of distance and adjacency. One has only to think of the 
Mexican maquiladora strip along the U.S. border, or the large amount of intermediate 
products and consumer goods that go back and forth across the Canadian border, to see the 
relevance of adjacency, as distinguished from beyond distance.  The Netherlands is close to 
France and Korea to Japan, but without the common border the effect is not the same.  
When common borders are held constant, the estimated coefficient on the distance variable 
decreases.  Frankel and Romer (1996) reported the possible interactive effects of the 
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common-border variable and remark that  small adjacent countries are may be more highly 
integrated than predicted by the simple sum of their size and common border effects.  
 
Bhagwati (1992, 1993a) is suspicious of the claim that proximity is an important 
determinant of trade, citing the example of India and Pakistan. He is equally skeptical of 
the notion of natural trading blocs.  Bhagwati asserts that the high level of intraregional 
trade in Europe must be the result of free trade areas (FTAs) and other preferential trade 
arrangements that are already in place. Frankel (1997, pp. 115-148) extends his empirical 
analysis of trading blocs to the effects of political alliances and enmities.  The trade 
between India and Pakistan has been impeded by their historical animosity. 
 
Frankel’s analysis of regional trading blocs is important to the analysis of the Laredo 
crossing point problem.  The inclusion of the geographical location and distance help to 
understand the volumes of trade that cross this border.  Because of the adjacent 
geographical location, the United States and Mexico are a natural trading bloc.  The costs 
of distance, however, are not easy to measure.  It is even more difficult to calculate the 
times elapsed in transporting and processing, or the added costs of the cultural 
unfamiliarity between the United States and Mexico.  These are the equivalent of adding 
thousands of miles to the distance of crossing the U.S southern border in terms of the extra 
time and costs that the process implies.  
 
4.5.4 How Wide is the Border?  
Engel and Rogers (1996) argue that similar goods sold in different locations have different 
prices.  A good at a certain location and the same good at a different location are different 
economic objects.  Only when costs are borne to transport wheat from Chicago to 
Minneapolis will the miller in Minneapolis consider the Chicago wheat equivalent to the 
Minneapolis wheat. 
 
Recent evidence suggests failures of the law of one price are significant, and play a 
dominant role in the behavior of real exchange rates. 
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Engel and Rogers use data for 9 Canadian cities and 14 in the United States.  The basic 
hypothesis is that the volatility of the price of similar goods between cities should be 
positively related to the distance between those cities; but holding distance constant, 
volatility should be higher between 2 cities separated by the national border. 
 
The basic empirical results show that both distance and the border are significant in 
explaining price dispersion across locations.  They provide a measure of how important the 
border is relative to distance - the width of the border. 
 
Nominal price stickiness appears to account for a large portion of the border effect, but 
most of the effect is left unexplained. 
 
Price Dispersion among Locations:  The failure of prices of similar goods to equalize 
between sites is a sign that the markets are not completely integrated.  
 
Geographical separation of markets provides one reason that the price of similar goods 
might vary across locations.   Recent work in international trade by Krugman (1991) and 
Frankel at al. (1995) suggests that much of the pattern of international trade can be 
explained by geographical considerations.  Countries are more likely to trade with 
neighbors because transportation costs are lower.  Transportation costs may also be an 
explanation for the failure of the law of one price.  With the “iceberg” transportation costs 
of Krugman and others, price is not necessarily equalized with the price in location.  The 
transportation cost should depend positively on the distance between locations, so that the 
range of variation depends on that distance. 
 
However, price variation of similar goods over time might be higher if the cities lie across 
national borders holding distance constant.  The markup may be different across locations, 
and may vary with exchange rates.  The marketing services are likely to be labor-intensive.  
To the extent that the two national labor markets are more separated than are local labor 
markets within a country, there would be more variation in cross- border prices than in 
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within-country prices.  There might also be direct costs to crossing borders because of 
tariffs and other trade restrictions. 
 
Goods sold in the United States might have sticky prices in U.S. dollar terms, and goods 
sold in Canada might have sticky prices in Canadian dollar terms.  The nominal exchange 
rate is, in fact, highly variable.  For their purposes, it is natural to choose the United States 
and Canada as the countries to study.  First, the countries share a border.  Also, trade has 
been relatively free between the two countries.  If the border matters, it is unlikely that it 
matters because of trade restrictions.  In fact both countries are mostly English-speaking 
and have similar cultural and political traditions suggest that there is likely to be more 
cross-border migration than between most countries. 
 
They argue that the volatility of the prices of similar goods sold in different locations is 
related to the distance between the locations and other explanatory variables, including a 
dummy variable for whether the cities are in different countries.  The volatility of prices 
between U.S. city pairs is generally slightly higher than that between Canadian city pairs, 
but cross-border city pairs have much higher volatility.  However, cross-border city pairs 
are farther apart, on average. 
 
Distance has a positive effect on price dispersion in all regressions.  The border dummy is 
positive and significant in all cases.  They also split the sample at January 1990, when the 
Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement went into effect.  If trade barriers are an important 
reason why the border variable is economically significant in explaining price dispersion, 
one could expect that the magnitude of this variable would decline after 1989.  They found 
a slight tendency in the opposite direction.  The estimated border coefficients were usually 
larger in the post-1989 period. 
 
How important are Distance and the Border?  Their calculations based on the regression 
tables indicate that crossing the border adds substantially to volatility.  If they use the 
upper end of the confidence interval as the measure of the impact of distance, then crossing 
the border is equivalent to 1780 miles of distance between cities. 
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Why Does the Border Matter so Much?  Crossing the border adds significantly to price 
dispersion.  They tried a direct test for trade barriers and found that the size of the border 
was not diminished when the free trade agreement between the two countries went into 
effect.  This, of course, does not rule out the possibility that informal trade barriers account 
for the price dispersion.  One of the reasons why distance matters for intercity price 
dispersion is that more distant cities have less- integrated labor markets. 
 
The major message of the empirical results is that both distance and the border matter for 
relative price variability.  The literature on price has emphasized that when markets are 
segmented, price discrimination can occur.  Their findings suggest that there is more than 
standard price- discrimination behavior involved in cross-border price movements.  They 
found that distance between markets influence prices of nearby competitors.  Despite the 
relative openness of the U.S.-Canadian border, the markets are still segmented. 
  
Engels and Rogers do not analyze such reasons as price discrimination by corporations 
across national borders and in markets of different sizes.  For example, pharmaceutical 
companies charge such high prices in the United States that elderly U.S. residents who live 
near Canada charter buses to buy their medicines in Canada.   
 
4.5.5 Transport Economics 
Button (1993) analyzes traffic congestion in cities, where  there are regular peaks in 
commuter travel and seasonal peaks.  Transport infrastructure, although flexible in the long 
run, has a finite capacity at any given period of time.  Due to the infrastructure limitations, 
congestion occurs and is an external cost of transport. 
 
Congestion imposes costs on the road user in terms of wasted time and fuel (the pure 
congestion cost). The stopping and starting it entails also worsens air pollution (diesel 
engines pollute primarily when accelerating which occurs with high frequency in stop-and- 
go traffic), which is a particular problem in Laredo.  
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A rough estimate of fuel used by the drayage industry assumes the following: one mile of 
travel equal one gallon of fuel consumption; 7.5 miles is the average queue of trucks 
waiting to cross northbound; the daily average of trucks crossing northbound at Laredo 
Bridge #2 is 2400. Thus 18,000 gallons of fuel are consumed daily northbound.  Given that 
approximately 50 percent of these trips are unnecessary because they were without cargo, 
over 9000 gallons are burned and pollutants emitted without generating any needed 
transport.  Additionally, with tractors traveling through the cities and not counted in the 
actual crossings, much more is wasted, adding costs to the product and the environment 
(Wright, 2000).   
 
Button suggests that the economic costs of road congestion can be calculated using the 
engineering concept of the speed-flow relationship.  This applies to urban traffic, but the 
speed-flow relationship is different in an international trade border crossing environment.  
In the Laredo case, the queues of truck traffic waiting to cross are miles long.  Some 
drivers take a few hours to cross the bridge; others take days. 
 
The speed flow relationship provides a key supply-side input for the analysis.  The density 
function, the number of vehicles on a road at any one time, is a key to this analysis.   
 
However, Button’s basic model includes a linear road, no junctions, homogeneous traffic 
and equally skillful drivers. This model addresses some of the characteristics of the Laredo 
border crossing problem but not all of them.  Other traffic engineering models include 
junctions and traffic lights, but none account for the bizarre situation at the Laredo border 
crossing.  The situation at Laredo presents a more complicated environment.  The 
congestion here is due not only to the limited capacity of the infrastructure (I-35 is the only 
access road to the bridge) but to the imposition of the drayage service, which increases 
congestion by adding unnecessarily crossings without cargo.  If the drayage industry were 
eliminated, an important portion of the congestion problem would disappear.  Another 
cause of congestion at Laredo also differs from the typical case of urban congestion - the 
international trade institutional restrictions on border crossing.  Trucks loaded with 
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commodities have to stop for different inspections along the road on both sides of the 
border, intensifying the congestion. 
 
In sum, the available congestion and capacity models do not account for the complexity of 
the Laredo case.  
 
Button (2000) observes that infrastructure is just part of a chain of requirements for the 
transportation of  international trade.  Bridges and roads are important but infrastructure is 
not the issue.  The institutional issues are far more important to resolve than the 
infrastructure (bridges, roads, inspection booths, ports, etc.).  He sees the constraints on 
borders as mainly legal and institutional aspects, the documentation process and cultural 
issues.  The physical constraints are less important.   
 
Button (2000) says that the amounts of money made at border crossings is astronomical.  
Border areas are not very attractive places but they are very profitable.  Just as a dam in a 
river takes energy out of the system, borders extract money and time from international 
trade flows.  
 
According to Button there are similar interest groups at border crossings in Europe, Asia, 
and South America, just like those in Mexico; even the police has been involved in making 
money. 
 
In Europe, change came about for the first time in 1951 with the Paris Treaty, starting to 
remove all those barriers that are negative to everyone.  In 1957, with the Common Market, 
some more progress was made, but 1992 marked the real start of removing trade barriers in 
Europe.  Button asserts that removing trade and customs barriers would increase trade in 
Europe by about 40 percent (Button 2000 b).   
 
4.5.6 Border Crossing Problems as Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs) 
The border crossing problem can also be analyzed from the perspective of non-tariff 
barriers.  Mansfield and Busch (1995, pp. 1-34) present a model in which  
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Nontariff barriers are expected to be most pervasive when deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions (such is the case of the Mexican Economy where a 
drastic devaluation was introduced at the end of 1995) give rise to demands for 
protection by pressure groups, a country is sufficiently large to give policy makers 
incentives to impose protection, and domestic institutions enhance the ability of 
public officials to act on these incentives.  The findings indicate that the incidence 
of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups 
and policy makers converge.    
  
Mansfield and Busch discuss the concept of societal approaches to trade policy, focusing 
on the effects of demands for protection by pressure groups.  The impact of these groups 
on policy depends on their ability to organize to articulate their demands and gain electoral 
influence. Societal approaches attribute little importance to policy makers and political 
institutions in explaining trade policy.  Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno (1988, pp. 7-8) 
state that societal theories view the state as “essentially passive; it acts as disinterested 
referee for competing groups, and supplies policies to satisfy the demands of successful 
domestic players” 
 
In their model, Mansfield and Busch introduce unemployment and the real exchange rate 
as contributors to demands for protection.  High levels of unemployment are likely to yield 
demands for protection because workers displaced by imports find it progressively more 
difficult to obtain alternative employment. 
 
The statist approach to trade policy  criticizes the societal approach for systematically 
underestimating  the effects of the State’s interests in trade policy and domestic institutions 
(Goldstein, 1988, pp. 179-218).   Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno (1988, pp. 219-243) 
note that these analyses presume that the preferences of public officials  
 
are partially, if not wholly, distinct from the parochial concerns of either societal 
groups or particular government institutions and are tied to conceptions of the 
‘national interest’ or the maximization of some social welfare function. 
  
Many studies conclude that the ability of policy makers to advance the national interest 
depends in large measure on the extent to which political institutions render them 
susceptible to demands by pressure groups and other non-state actors.  These arguments 
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are highly relevant to the present research.  The purpose of NAFTA is the elimination of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to facilitate trade between Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States.  In reality, as the tariffs have been reduced, non-tariff barriers have appeared in the 
form of a complicated and expensive border crossing system on the Mexico-U.S. border.  
The economic gains for the participants in the system are an incentive to exercise pressure 
on policy makers to impose protection.  As noted above, macroeconomic conditions in 
Mexico have been problematic for several years, and conditions give rise to demands for 
protection by pressure groups, in addition to the effects of the devaluation of December 
1995 which reduced substantially the Mexican imports from the United States.    
 
Pressure groups have influenced policy makers on both countries.  The U.S. teamsters 
union has lobbied U.S. policy makers  to keep the border closed to Mexican firms despite 
the commitments of NAFTA, fearing that lower paid Mexican drivers will take jobs from 
U.S. drivers. The Mexican brokers also exercise their power to maintain the bizarre but 
profitable Mexican Customs practices. 
 
The ability of policy makers to advance the NAFTA goals has been frustrated by the 
demands for protection by pressure groups.  
 
The statist theory does not explain the border crossing.  NAFTA exists to facilitate trade 
for economic growth, but in reality it does not, since  NAFTA coexists with bizarre 
international trade practices.  
 
The relationship between tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs)   
Some economists state that NTBs are often used to protect industries that have lost tariff 
protection due to successive rounds of the GATT.  Jagdish Bhagwati refers to this dynamic 
as “the Law of Constant Protection” mentioned earlier in Chapter 1. The results of NAFTA 
support this position: as tariffs have been reduced, non-tariff barriers have appeared in the 
form of bizarre international trade practices that impede, rather than facilitate, trade. 
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Studies of foreign economic policy have found that protection is most pervasive in states 
characterized by vehement demands for protection articulated by well organized groups 
and state institutions that fail to insulate policy makers from the brunt of these demands.  
At Laredo, the different interest groups in both countries have been successful in protecting 
a system that impedes free trade, and the policy makers have failed to advance the interest 
of NAFTA, which advocates free trade. 
 
Economists recognize the inherent difficulty to measure NTBs.  This is one explanation for 
the lack of literature on the analysis of border crossing in international trade.   
 
4.5.7 The Calculus of Consent 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) analyze the rules for collective choice and individual 
behavior that are at the core of the analysis of this research. They assume that individuals 
are motivated by utility-maximizing considerations and that, when an opportunity for 
mutual gain exists, “trade” will take place.  This assumption is one of the foundations on 
which economic theory is constructed. 
 
Their review of behavioral assumptions implicit in orthodox economic theory serves as an 
introduction to the central question of this thesis: What principles can provide meaningful 
theorems concerning the behavior of human beings as they participate in collective and 
private activity?  
 
Buchanan and Tullock assume that human behavior is based on the same basic values that 
motivate individuals, but these values can be interpreted in a different way in economic 
and political activity.  The economic argument requires the acceptance of a skeptical or 
pessimistic view of human nature.  Self- interest, broadly conceived, is a strong motivating 
force in all human activity.  Insofar as possible, institutions and legal constraints should be 
developed to order the pursuit of private gain in such a way as to make it consistent with, 
rather than contrary to, the attainment of the objectives of the group as a whole. 
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Buchanan and Tullock refer to individual rationality in social choice.  A useful theory of 
human action, be it positive or normative in content and purpose, must postulate some 
rationality on the part of decision-making units.  Choices must not only be directed toward 
achieving some objective or goal; the decision-making units must also take such action as 
will assure the attainment of the goal.      
 
Applying Buchanan and Tullock’s analysis to NAFTA and the Laredo border crossing, for 
two countries to agree on an international trade agreement, each must expect to be “better 
off” or at least “no worse off”. 
 
“Better off” and “worse off” are defined in terms of revealed preferences in the political 
process.  If all parties to an agreement expect to improve their individual positions, 
decision- making costs arise since a bargaining range will exist.  Recognizing this, each 
individual will seek to secure the maximum gains possible for himself while minimizing 
the net gains to his partners in the agreement. 
 
Vilfredo Pareto developed a criterion now widely employed by modern welfare economists 
in determining whether or not a given situation or a change is “efficient” or “optimal”. If, 
in a given situation, it is impossible to make any change without making some individual 
in the group worse off, the situation is defined as Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient.  In 
other words, a Paretian P-point is a position from which no change can be made without 
harming at least one individual in the group.  The presence of external costs is equivalent 
to the existence of “mutual gains from trade”, which can be secured to the advantage of all 
parties. 
 
Buchanan and Tullock analyze the ethics of trade, assuming that the terms of trade will 
determine the division of the total benefits among the participating parties.  Since this 
division is essentially a distributional question, the whole problem of “fair shares” arises, a 
problem that can only be discussed in terms of ethical norms. 
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In ordinary exchange no ethical question arises concerning the decision of the individual to 
engage in trade, regardless of whether or not he possesses independent power to influence 
the terms of trade.  Moreover, an ethical issue is posed by this sort of behavior.  Not only is 
the individual presumed to secure some benefit by entering into trade, but he benefits the 
other parties in the contract.  On almost any set of ethical norms, trade is an activity 
accepted as fully consistent with the moral standards of the community. 
 
Buchanan and Tullock refer to pressure groups, special interest, and the constitution, 
defining the reason for the existence of such groups as their ability to promote and to 
further, through the political-choice process, the particular functional interests represented.  
The emergence of such groups to positions of dominant importance during the last half 
century has been one of the most significant developments in the American political scene.  
This fact has understandably weakened the predominance of the traditional model of 
democratic choice-making institutions.  The behavioral premise that calls for the legislator 
to follow a selfless pursuit of the “public interest” or the “general welfare,” as something 
independent of and apart from private economic interest, is severely threatened.  In recent 
years the role of the pressure or special-interest group in democratic political process has 
come to be more widely accepted as inevitable, if not “desirable.” 
 
Most attempts to examine the role of pressure groups have bogged down in their efforts to 
define the “public interest.”  If this cannot be defined, it is impossible to determine, even 
conceptually, the extent to which the activity of special-groups either advances or retards 
progress toward the “general welfare.”  Analysis is impossible without a well-defined 
criterion.  One approach recognizes that definitive meaning can be attached to “social 
welfare” or the “public interest” only if a social-welfare function is fully described.  This 
function conceptually orders all possible states of society, and unambiguously allows for 
the selection of the “best” or from a restricted set of available alternatives, the relatively 
“best.”  In this construction, the “public interest” is what the individual says it is.  “Social 
welfare” or the “public interest” exists, for the individual, as something apart from and 
independent of special group interests, but the usefulness of this approach disappears on 
issues on which individual evaluations of alternatives differ. 
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The Pareto criterion for assessing changes views “better” only those changes that are 
approved unanimously. Any change that secures unanimous support is clearly “desirable,” 
and such a change is “in the public interest.” 
 
The modern argument for efficiency or optimality is based on the concepts of costless 
transactions and hypothetical compensation, so that a change is optimal if total gains 
exceed total losses, that is, if the winners could compensate the losers and still have net 
benefits from the change. 
 
If the political process is conceived as one means through which individuals co-operate to 
attain mutual advantage, conceptually, all persons can be made “better off” by any change 
that produces sufficient “improvement” for mutual advantage to be possible. 
 
Regarding pressure groups and big government, a simple and acceptable hypothesis is that 
interest-group activity, measured in terms of organizational costs, is a direct function of the 
“profits” expected from the political process by functional groups.  The organized pressure 
group thus arises because differential advantages are expected through the political process, 
and in turn, differential advantages for particular groups are produced because of the 
existence of organized activity.  The pressure group will rapidly become a part of the 
political decision-making process.  The ultimate “equilibrium” will be reached only when 
all groups have become fully organized. 
 
An analysis of the ethics of pressure-group activity requires acceptance of special-interest 
or pressure-group activity as an inherent and predictable part of modern democratic 
processes.  This activity is a predictable outcome of the fundamental behavioral 
assumptions and the real world confirms the assumptions.  Scientific progress in the 
analysis of politics cannot be made until this widespread activity is fully incorporated in 
the analytical models.  The analyst need not accept or  reject the activity as morally “good” 
conduct on the part of the practitioners.   The economist assumes that the individual 
maximizes his own utility.  The student of the political-choice process should likewise 
consider the pressure or interest group as an essential building block in political science. 
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The analysis integrates the political and economical problems of social organization. 
Constitutional democracy, in its modern sense, was born as a twin of the market economy.  
With the philosophers of the Enlightenment, this research shares the faith that man can 
rationally organize his own society, that existing organization can always be perfected, and 
that nothing in the social order should remain exempt from rational, critical and intelligent 
discussion.  Man’s reason is the slave of his passions, and recognizing this about himself, 
man can organize his own association with his fellows in such a manner that the mutual 
benefits from social interdependence can be maximized. 
 
One application of this theory to the border crossing case is the bargaining range exercised 
by the U.S. Teamsters’ Union in the form of lobbying to keep the border closed to Mexican 
trucks to avoid the competition of less expensive drivers.  For NAFTA, opening the border 
for free trade was one of the commitments of the agreement.  The Clinton Administration 
supported NAFTA, albeit somewhat late and without great enthusiasm.  The treaty was 
bitterly opposed by third-party candidate Ross Perot.  Current Democratic candidate Al 
Gore effectively defended NAFTA in a televised debate against Perot. 
 
However, Democratic party leaders like Gore and Clinton risked alienating labor unions 
and other groups that were traditional supporters of the Democratic party, but ones that can 
“gone soft” when they feel their interests threatened.  The Clinton Administration was thus 
ambivalent on NAFTA, supporting the idea but avoiding actions that would result in more 
complete or effective implementation. 
 
The argument used by the politicians in the U.S. to keep to border closed to Mexican 
trucks is the safety issue.  This is questionable because Mexicans firms are getting 
considerable numbers of new trucks that meet U.S. safety standards. The explanation is the 
pressure exercised by the U.S. Teamster’s Union to avoid competition of Mexican drivers 
that charge less and could get a portion of the U.S. market.  This is a struggle for the shares 
of a fixed-sized pie.  
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Questioning the bizarre practices of the Mexican brokers operating on the U.S. side of the 
border, the Texas Attorney General considered opening an anti-trust case but has not done 
so.  Second, the United States Department of Justice became aware of the problem as a 
result of a brief presented in 1993, one month before President Clinton signed NAFTA.  
Justice chose not to do anything that would disrupt NAFTA (Appendices C and D present 
the letters from the Offices of the Attorney General and the Trade Representative).   This 
inertia is caused by the conflicting interests of bureaucrats and politicians, along with the 
regional interests of U.S. banks and cities along the border. 
 
4.5.8 Rationality Gone Awry? Decision-Making Inconsistent with 
Economic and Financial Theory 
 
Schwartz (1998) argues that researchers in economics have traditionally used models to 
study and explain a given problem.  They assume rational decisions and complete 
knowledge but very often these assumptions are contradicted by actual behavior.  Shwartz 
believes that behavioral approaches will modify and complement, but not alter, the 
traditional logic of financial and economic analysis and normative models provide an 
inadequate basis for describing and explaining actual decision-making behavior.  
Behavioral economics and finance represent a more systematic effort to improve orthodox 
economics. This applies to policy recommendations at both the micro-and macroeconomic 
levels. 
 
Schwartz presents a behavioral approach for the analysis of economic and financial 
decision making. Producers, and those who succeed -the survivors- possess maximizing 
objectives and respond to incentives and risk in what financial and economic disciplines 
regard as a rational manner.  Achieving full maximization at times is a consequence of 
learning and successful adaptation.  Yet, quite aside from the objectives, the capacity to 
implement goals such as maximization often falls short of what is assumed. 
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The inclination of many economists and financial analysts to continue to use models that 
presume high degrees of rationality reflects what has been termed a conservative, status 
quo bias, rather than an exercise in rational behavior on the part of the model builders. 
 
The behavioral group seeks to supplement the traditional normative models with others that 
replace optimization assumptions with behavioral assumptions that reflect the quasi-
rationality of the “best practice” employed by survivors, and to determine the direction and 
degree of bias from optimization involved in the use of such often successful, but not fully 
rational behavior.  Second, behavioral economists and financial analysts hope to provide 
evidence that will help management experts determine better ways to reduce the gap 
between the near rationality of best practice and the still more approximate rules of thumb 
employed by most economic agents in many transactions.  Third, some of the behavioral 
groups also hope that their studies will help reduce the margin between the sophisticated 
best practice of survivors and full optimization (all the while recognizing that in most cases 
it will never be possible, or cost efficient, to close the gap completely). 
 
An application of behavioral economics and behavioral finance are the assumptions of the 
Mexican economy in the models and projections of NAFTA.  Leading experts in 
international economics, such as Rudiger Dornbusch, estimated that Mexico’s peso was 
over valuated by 15, to 25 percent in late 1994, but the manner in which the devaluation 
was handled (and perhaps other factors) led to concerns that brought dramatic fluctuations 
and a devaluation that soon reached 50 percent.  That was far in excess of all estimates of 
what had been required.  Although it facilitated very large increases in the exports of a 
handful of enterprises with quality products that did not require export financing from the 
Mexican banking system, it also triggered much sharper declines in real income than had 
been anticipated.  The interest rate fluctuated as much as 25 percent from one day to the 
next (real rates ranging between 25 and 50 percent).  This lead to an acceleration of 
unemployment and a severe economic recession from which the country has been much 
slower to recover than economists had predicted.  This occurred despite the rapid and 
marked improvement of the balance of payments position and the recovery of financial 
markets (Schwartz, 1998, p. 33.) 
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The extent of market reactions to the initial December 1994 devaluation in Mexico seems 
inconsistent with the assumption that people - investors in particular- are rational and, for 
the most part, risk averse.  Mexico’s peso devaluation in 1994 indicates the importance of 
developing policy models that incorporate empirically grounded findings into financial and 
economic models. 
 
The U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury offered public testimony citing psychological 
factors along with traditional economic reasoning for supporting several policy 
recommendations.  In the 1960s, professional analysts and the public in general had an 
appreciable confidence in the ever-more rigorous techniques being applied in financial and 
economic analysis.  The shifting estimation of financial and economic analysis may help 
explain the new interest in a behavioral approach. 
 
Other economists, such as Mancur Olson, Douglas North, and others in the emerging area 
of law and economics, have reflected the experience of individuals, groups and nations 
over relatively long periods of time. They have helped to explain how legal and other 
institutions play an important role in determining the character of economic growth.  For 
these writers, the word institutions refers not to associations and entities, but to the formal 
rules and informal constraints (the conventions and understandings) that prevail in a 
society.  Institutions are seen as altering transactions costs and agency relationships, thus 
explaining the at -times- differing behavior of the same economic agents in different 
communities.  This constitutes an important addition to economic analysis, but it has been 
carried out within a neoclassical maximizing framework.  No consideration has been given 
to whether the findings of psychology and the other social sciences  might help to explain 
some of the differences in the institutional evolution.  The New Institutional Economics 
might conclude that institutional arrangements affect economic behavior, because of 
changes in how preferences are reflected and in the capacity for implementing objectives 
that result from those altered institutional arrangements. 
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The border crossing environment at Laredo is not desirable from an overall efficiency 
criterion.  In fact, it undermines the basic objective of NAFTA of facilitation of trade and 
the elimination of non-tariff barriers. 
 
What do individuals, particularly successful businesspeople, seek? Economists and 
financial analysts believe they act rationally, and make decisions that attempt to maximize 
profits.  Psychologists, sociologists and other behavioral social scientists maintain that 
human objectives are broader and affect the full range of human activity, including 
financial and economic decisions.  
 
Many businesspeople declare that they seek profits, but insist that they do not attempt to 
maximize.  Rather, they seek to maximize only after taking into account other objectives.  
This is constrained maximization, that is, they have multiple objectives.  At the same time, 
some of the most successful seem to have an objective that more nearly approximates cost 
minimization/ profit maximization, and that becomes more apparent with increased 
competitive pressures.   
 
Objectives involving less than optimization may have adverse affects on efficiency.  But if  
that reflects less than full exploitation of other actors, the cost of less than full optimization 
might be offset by  greater trust and implicit cooperation.  Experimental economics shows 
that individuals are not as rational as the logic of economics expects them to be, and the 
result can be a larger overall economic pie.  It might be possible to design better public 
policies if we were able to gauge the costs to society that are actually realized when 
objectives reflect alternative deviations from maximization.  Finally, there is an undisputed 
cost to the community of being unable to implement optimization objectives. 
 
Implementation difficulties make the probability of realizing a maximization goal very low, 
unless market interaction and learning provide a major assist.  A decision maker may not 
have access to the necessary information or programs to employ information efficiently.  
Even when alternatives are clear, the manner of presentation may affect choice.  Many 
decision makers assume that data for implementation of objectives are what they seem to 
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be.  Problems of data perception are referred, but almost none of the literature of 
economics and finance indicates how to conduct a reality check.  In the basic economic 
model, of perfect knowledge and perfect rationality, there is no need or room for learning. 
 
Schwarts considers the processing of information highly important in the process of 
negotiation. The key is the lack of information of one or more of the parties involved in 
any transaction and uncertainty about the meaning of some information.  Complaints about 
“information overload” merely restate Herbert Simon’s observations concerning the 
difficulties of achieving maximization because of the lack of adequate programs to deal 
with information. Even the consequences of well-defined alternatives are not well 
understood. What constitutes an optimal search is not all obvious, and second-best 
solutions may be sensed only during experience,  an evolutionary process.  This 
evolutionary process is influenced, but not determined, by the historical and cultural 
context of a society.  Particular management cultures also modify the search process, as 
does the learning process.  
 
NAFTA defined clear goals but failed in two basic aspects: 
 
1) the negotiators did not  obtain the necessary information for the elimination of all 
nontariff  barriers.  Specifically they ignored the Mexican brokers business 
practices at the border crossing.  NAFTA negotiators apparently did not know 
these practices existed on the U.S.- Mexican border, assuming the environment 
there was the same as on the U.S. border with Canada.   
 
2) The negotiators failed to define how to achieve a seamless border, especially 
regarding transportation of goods. This made it difficult to implement measures 
needed to reduce non-tariff barriers.   
 
For example, they did not require implementation of a system such as the International 
Trade Data System (ITDS), a federal government information technology initiative to 
implement an integrated, government wide system for the electronic collection, use and 
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dissemination of international trade and transportation data.  This is a promising but little-
used tool to facilitate the border clearance of commercial goods.  ITDS would give the 
governments the required trade information to take decisions to facilitate the clearance of 
goods.  The introduction of intelligent transportation system technology might produce 
efficiencies that have not been available for border crossings, despite the provisions of 
NAFTA. Technology can be of great help, but the human and institutional factors 
determine the efficiencies.  If resentments and distrust exist between the groups involved, 
the problem may remain. 
 
The challenge is how best to describe the behavior of economic agents in complex 
environments.  The power of traditional economic theory helps in analyzing many 
phenomena, but exclusive attention to the analytical tools can lead economists to restrict 
their investigations to those explanations consistent with the existing paradigm, 
overlooking more important institutional factors.  
 
Expectations by economists are based on observations of objective data.  A more eclectic 
view, used often by psychologists, states that expectations are formed on the basis of (1) 
extrapolation of past ideas; (2) learning (based on the degree of success of past 
experiences); and (3) new information about the individual’s environment.  Some 
economists also have included all three types of information in estimating expectations.  
Experimental cognitive psychology and experimental economics have dealt little with the 
expectations component of decision making.  
 
4.5.9 The Cost Aggregation Model 
Smith and Giermanski (1997) developed a model to calculate the total variable costs 
involved in trans-U.S./Mexican truck shipments of goods in the U.S. automobile industry 
through Laredo, Texas, based on the current condition and from the perspective of the U.S. 
carrier only. The cost data provided by the automotive industry are slightly lower than 
costs for smaller firms for shipment into Mexico, which is consistent with the relative 
efficiency of the automotive industry. 
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This deterministic model presents in a simple way the cost factors involved in the current 
border-crossing operation. I will later modify the model to calculate the costs for the 
scenarios of improving the cross border system. 
 
The model used to calculate the total variable costs, Ycurrent, takes the form: 
 Ycurrent = Xs[a1 + a2 + a3 + a4 + a5 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3  
 +b4X4 + b4X5 + b5X4 + b5X5 + b6X4 + b6X5 + b7X4 + b7X5] 
where, Y  = total variable cost incurred under the current condition 
 Xs = total number of southbound shipments 
 a1 = average forwarding agent fees per crossing 
 a2 = average Mexican brokers fees per crossing 
 a3 = average storage costs per shipment 
 a4 = average crossing fees per crossing (to Mexico) 
 a5 = average crossing fees per crossing (return to U.S. by drayage driver) 
 X1 = average hours driven (U.S. carrier driver) 
 X2 = average hours driven (local/drayage driver) 
 X3 = average hours of wait time (engine idle) 
 X4 = average miles driven (U.S. carrier driver) 
 X5 = average miles driven (local/drayage driver) 
 b1 = average hourly burden (wage and benefits) of U.S. carrier driver 
 b2 = average hourly burden (wage and benefits) of local/drayage driver 
 b3 = average fuel cost per hour (idle) 
 b4 = average cost of tires per mile 
 b5 = average cost of maintenance per mile 
 b6 = average fuel cost per mile 
 b7 = average depreciation expense per mile 
 
Most of the elements in this formula are self-explanatory. However, certain factors need 
clarification. 
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The average forwarding agent fees per crossing, a1, are paid in U.S. dollars, and include 
charges for such services as cargo classification, off-loading and reloading the cargo, 
actual customs clearance, and cargo verification.  The average Mexican broker’s fee per 
crossing, a2, is paid in Mexican pesos; the average storage cost per shipment, a3, depends 
on how many nights the cargo is stored; the average crossing fees per crossing to Mexico, 
a4, and the average crossing fees to return to the United States, a5, are paid in Mexican 
pesos.  The hours driven by the U.S. carrier X1 varies according the length of the trip 
within the United States; the average hours driven by the drayage driver, X2, and the hours 
of wait time (engine idle) X3, can vary from 1 to several hours based upon the delays 
encountered at the crossing site.  
 
Giermanski and Smith (1997) calculate the added costs for trans-U.S./Mexican truck 
shipments at Laredo, south-bound, based on shipments of goods by the automobile 
industry.  This is the most efficient crossing at the border, due to the frequency of the 
shipments and the industry’s capacity to cut deals with Mexican brokers.  The cost 
elements for 1994 and 1995 are shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Smith and Giermanski used the same model to calculate the total variable costs under 
NAFTA conditions, Ynafta. For in the same trans-U.S./Mexico truck shipments, the 
equation takes the form: 
 Ynafta = Xs [a1 + a2 + a4 + b1X1 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X4 +b6X4 + b7X4] 
where, Y =  total variable cost incurred under NAFTA conditions 
 Xs = total number of southbound shipments 
 a1 =  average forwarding agent fees per crossing 
 a2 = average Mexican brokers fees per crossing 
 a4 = average crossing fees per crossing (to Mexico) 
 X1 = average hours driven (U.S. carrier driver) 
 X3 = average hours of wait time (engine idle) 
 X4 =  average miles driven (U.S. carrier driver) 
 b1= average hourly burden (wage and benefits) of U.S. carrier driver 
 b3 = average fuel cost per hour (idle) 
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 b4 =  average cost of tires per mile 
 b5 =  average cost of maintenance per mile 
 b6 = average fuel cost per mile 
 b7 = average depreciation expense per mile 
 
The model for the calculation of the total additional costs, Yadditional, can be derived by 
subtracting the total variable costs incurred based on NAFTA conditions (Ynafta) from the 
total variable costs incurred based on the current condition (Ycurrent).  The model for 
calculating the additional costs is: 
 
 Yadditional = Ycurrent - Ynafta 
 Y additional = Xs[a3 + a5 + b2X2 + b4X5 + b5X5 + b6X5 + b7X5] 
where, Y =  total variable costs in addition to those under NAFTA conditions 
 Xs = total number of southbound shipments 
 a3 = average storage costs per shipment 
 a5 =  average crossing fees per crossing (return to U.S. by drayage driver) 
 X2 = average hours driven (local/drayage driver) 
 X5 = average miles driven (local/drayage driver) 
 b2 = average hourly burden (wage and benefits) of local/drayage driver 
 b4 =  average cost of tires per mile 
 b5 = average cost of maintenance per mile 
 b6 = average fuel cost per mile 
 b7 = average depreciation expense per mile   
 
Smith and Giermanski inserted Yadditional into the model for the estimation of 
the total additional costs associated with trans-U.S./Mexico truck shipments made 
by the automotive industry in 1994.  The model was modified to reflect the costs of 
the hourly wage burden of the drayage driver and the average costs of the tires, 
maintenance, fuel, and depreciation (b2, b4, b5, b6, and b7), which were already 
included in the crossing fees incurred returning to the United States by the 
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drayage driver.  These additional costs, on an average per-trip basis, amounted to 
$82.50 and $85.36 in 1994 and 1995, respectively. 
 
The average cost for crossing the border southbound in 1994 (Table 4.1) is over $400 for 
the automotive industry.  The average cost for crossing the border for other less efficient 
industries, is higher. In 1998, the cost for border crossing southbound for general industry 
was between $350 and $750. However, the tendency of the cost for border crossing 
southbound in 1999 for all kinds of products is approximately $300 (Giermanski, 1999).  
  
Table 4.1.  Cost Element for trans-U.S./Mexican truck shipments, 
crossing Laredo south-bound 
 
 COST ELEMENT        
          
       1994  1995 
1. Forwarding agent fees per crossing (a1)  $ 36.71               $ 22.20 
2. Mexican brokers fees per crossing (a2)  242.60                254.67 
3. Storage costs per shipment (a3)      12.15    12.40 
4. Crossing fees per crossing (to Mexico) (a4)    74.31    80.77 
5. Crossing fees per crossing (returning to U.S.) (A5)  70.34    74.96  
Total     436.11  445.00 
Note: Weighted Average of Selected Aggregated Costs (stated on a per-trip basis). 
Source: Smith and Giermanski (1997) 
 
In an unpublished paper, Giermanski (1999) estimated border crossing costs for 1999, for 
all kinds of cargo, for low and high values (Table 4.2).  It is difficult to quantify who pays 
what due to the privacy of the deals each shipper negotiates with the Mexican broker.  
However, the more savvy the shipper and more frequent the border-crossing operations, 
the higher the possibility that the southbound border crossing costs are on the low side of 
the $275 to $600 range, according to Table 4.2.     
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 Table 4.2.  Estimated Border Crossing Costs Southbound per  
Truck Shipments 1999 
 
Description    United States Side      Low   High 
U.S. forwarding Agent on the U.S. Border  USD   USD 
Classification, Inspection, Verification of freight 110   300 
Unloads and Reloads trailers as needed    90   150 
Arranges for Shuttle/drayage/transfer    75   150 
Description  Mexican side  Border Based Broker-10% I.V.A. on services 
Mexico Broker                Temporary Import/In-Bond      Definite Import 
Fees are based on Ad Valorem of Commercial Invoice Value 
1.Fee on entry Summary (pedimento) (75.00+150.00)x.0045% 75+200+.0045% 
2.Import Duties (range from 10,15,20%)  10%   20% 
3.Value Added Tax (VAT/IVA)      15% 
4.Customs Processing Fee (MPF.DTA)  $13   $13 
5.Mexico Customs Intensive Examination  $90-200   $90-200 
1,2,3,4 are compounded and not cumulative 
1 Adjusted quarterly by U.S. Customs. 
Source: Giermanski, Fall 1999. 
 
The estimated border crossing costs for northbound truck shipments are similar but less, 
since the Mexican broker’s charges are in pesos and the U.S. Customs brokers’ charges are 
less. 
4.6  Border Crossing Costs 
 
This section explains how the charges are configured based on information I obtained 
during discussions with Dr. Giermanski at Laredo in February 1999, through telephone 
conversations, and e-mail in June, 1999 which I corroborated through interviews with 
shippers, officials and consultants.  The Mexican broker’s invoice includes the cost of his 
forwarding agent(s) on the U.S. side for southbound shipments into Mexico.  The 
following is a general description of the charges.  The structure of the charges vary 
somewhat from broker to broker.  In general, however, the charges are divided into three 
groups:  
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1. Disbursements (desembolsos, gastos comprobados).  Disbursements are 
usually related to out-of-pocket expenses with an invoice to support the 
disbursement such as freight, duties, and other expenses like the Merchandise 
Processing Fee (D.A.T), the Value Added Tax (I.V.A.) Prior to November 11, 
1991, the Mexican Value-Added Tax (I.V.A.) was 15 percent ad valorem.  
On November 11, 1991, it was reduced to 10 percent.  On April 1, 1995 it 
was increased again to its current value of 15 percent. 
 
2. Accessorial charges (gastos complementarios).  Accessorial charges are for 
general expenses/overhead related to messenger services, faxes, telephone 
calls, and other import-related costs such as the Customs entry documents 
and processing. However, there is a direct relationship to the invoice value: 
the higher the value, the higher the charge.  On average, this charge is in the 
US$ 100 to US$150 range. 
 
Broker’s commission (honorarios).  The broker’s commission is the fee charged by the 
broker to handle the entry.  To date, most Mexican brokers are charging their fees and 
commission under the old government regulated rates even though the Mexican Customs 
brokers were officially deregulated in June, 1989.  The broker’s fee is found by 
multiplying the sum of the commercial invoice plus disbursements by .0045.  The Mexican 
broker’s total invoice is calculated by adding all three sections: disbursements; accessorial 
charges; and the broker’s fee.  The result is multiplied by 10 percent (I.V.A.) for brokers 
who practice on the border (a special consideration for border brokers), and by 15 percent 
for those brokers headquartered outside the border zone. 
 
Table 4.3 shows that in 1999 the cost for border crossings northbound for the general 
industry was between $150 and $500, or 65 percent of the cost of border crossings 
southbound. 
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Table 4.3 Estimated Border Crossing Costs Northbound Truck 
Shipments 
Description Mexico Broker  Exports on  Exports  
  In-Bond (TIB)  (Definite)  
Fee on Export Entry Summary (pedimento) ($40-75)+.18%AdValorem  ($75-150)+.45% AdV 
Drayage/Shuttle/Transfer    75 - 150     75 - 150 
Unloads and Reloads trailers as needed    75 - 150     75 - 150 
Mexico Customs Intensive Examination 100 - 200   100 - 200 
Description U.S. Broker   Low      High 
Fee for Entry/Entry Summary    45       85 
Duties  
non NAFTA    2.5%       5% 
NAFTA     0%    2.5% 
Merchandise Processing Fee (MPF)   
Non-NAFTA (Ad Valorem: .21%w/$25-485) 25      485 
NAFTA (Ad Valorem: .19%w/ $21- $400) 21      400 
Preparation of Bill of Lading   00         15 
U.S. Customs Intensive Examination  50      200   
Source: Giermanski, Fall 1999. 
 
Each Mexican broker is unique, making it difficult to estimate accurately the typical or 
average costs of crossing the southern border of the United States.  Some state that they 
utilize only a flat monthly fee, regardless of the number of crossings.  Others claim they 
use a flat fee for each crossing regardless the value, difficulty in crossing, or complexity of 
the shipment.  Despite the alleged disparities among brokers, interviews, reviews of 
invoices of Mexican brokers, and documents show a similarity and consistency among 
crossing charges.  Smith and Giermanski obtained empirical data for the actual costs of 
crossing by certain shippers from the major three U.S. auto manufacturers on the condition 
that this information not be released to any particular one of the manufacturers.  Therefore, 
they aggregated their data to reflect the average of costs for this industry for two 
consecutive years (1994 and 1995).  Some Mexican brokers who are uncomfortable with 
these findings for 1994 and 1995 argue that while these costs seem accurate for the years 
studied, costs are coming down. 
 
Additional research done by the International Trade Data System (ITDS) Office of the U.S.  
Treasury Department finds, on average for all ports nationally, the typical broker’s fee is 
$143.86 per transaction, which represents solely the filing of paperwork. This very limited 
and relatively low fee is consistent with only one segment of the costs charged by the 
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Mexican broker, the accessorial charge.  The ITDS study also revealed that there is an 
additional “burden-hour-cost” to the shipper of an average of $144.51 to the shipper to 
utilize paper entries supporting international trade transactions in 1997, amounting to $3.2 
billion dollars nationally (ITDS 1998 pp. 2-10 to 2-13.)  This figure is likely to be low.  
The U.S. treasury and Pennsylvania State University, which cooperated in the federal 
report, show no actual specific data for the southern border of the United States. 
 
Finally, Smith and Giermanski reviewed selected large brokers on the estimated costs of 
southbound and northbound crossings for both truck and rail on the southern border of the 
United States.  Their findings  were consistent with all data obtained to date on crossing 
costs.  In general, the average minimum crossing costs (including drayage and bridge fees) 
either north or south by truck or rail, ranged from US$300 to US$500.  The minimum 
northbound rail costs ranges between US$150 to US$250. The maximum crossing either 
north or south by truck and south by rail ranged from US$600 to US$800. The maximum 
average costs for rail northbound ranged from US$500 to US$700. 
 
While these charges can be fairly well documented by actual invoices when provided, the 
Mexican broker and his U.S. forwarding agent routinely deny these high charges and state 
that the minimum ranges from US$65 to US$150, with a maximum of only US$200 to US 
$250 for truck or rail. No documents or records were provided to confirm these relatively  
inexpensive charges, and the brokers’ claims which are not consistent with empirical data 
supported by actual invoices and research. 
 
In sum institutional constraints have maintained a system of high costs and inefficiency for 
nearly a decade.  In the absence of institutional reform, there is an incentive to find ways to 
circumvent some of the barriers to efficiency and exploit some of the latent competitive 
forces within the system.   
 
There is some empirical evidence that costs are decreasing slightly, for the following 
reasons: (1) more competition among the Mexican drayage firms whose drivers can return 
with cargo; (2) U.S. shippers are learning to obtain better prices through negotiations with 
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Mexican brokers; (3) more Mexican brokers have been licensed by the Mexican 
government, increasing competition among them; and (4) Mexican brokers are buying U.S. 
forwarding corporations, since U.S. rules allow foreigners to own U.S. forwarding 
agencies if one of the officers is a U.S. Customs broker. 
4.7 A Network Representation of the Laredo Border Crossing 
 
Smith and Giermanski present a model of the 1995 cost factors for automotive products 
involved in the southbound border-crossing operation. However, they do not analyze the 
times involved in each step of the border crossing system.   Since these times are very 
important for the current research, I adapt and update the Giermanski-Smith model to 
analyze the transportation of manufactures across the border.  I apply the new model using 
a hypothetical example of a shipment from Chicago to Monterrey.   
 
The first goal of the application is to quantify the times and costs of each step of the border 
crossing system.  The second goal is to identify the bottlenecks and measure their impacts 
on the border crossing system, in terms of time and costs.  These include: (1) trucking from 
Chicago to Laredo; (2)  handling costs and associated times of Mexican broker inspections 
for pre-clearance and storage; (3) costs of loading and unloading; (4) drayage costs and 
times of border crossing transport; (5) inspections in the U.S. and Mexican sides; and (6) 
trucking from Nuevo Laredo to Monterrey. 
 
The third goal is to locate the most serious congestion- causing constraints in the Laredo 
border crossing, including  infrastructure limitations, business practices, bureaucracy, and 
regulations. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the movements of a truck transporting manufactures from Chicago to 
Monterrey.  Table 4.4 shows the times and direct transport costs for the Laredo crossing 
south-bound.  These costs exclude indirect costs such as pedimento, duties, taxes, and 
broker’s commissions. Figure 4.1 and Table 4.4 shows that the transport of a trailer 
with manufactures from Chicago to Monterrey (1750 miles) entails 10 movements of four  
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Figure 4.1:  Current Situation Scenario 
Break-down of Costs and Times Crossing the Border South-bound 
 
Table 4.4: Current Situation Costs and Time 
R
 i o   G
 r a n d e
7
U.S. MEXICO
Mexican Brokers
1
U.S.
Inspection
Mexican
Inspection
Chicago Monterrey
10
9
2
U.S. Truck
Terminal
4
Drayage Co.
Corral
3
5 6
8
Low High Low High
United States side
Trucking Chicago-Laredo 1,338   1,343   30.0 51.0
Warehouse ($12/night) 12        36        12.0 72.0
Inspection, classification, verification 110      300      
Unloads and reloads as needed 90        150      
Drayage 75        150      
US inspection 0.0 1.0
Congestion, waiting time 0.0 8.0
Others
Totals US 1,625 1,979 42.0 132.0
Mexican side
Mexican inspection 0.0 2.0
Unloads and reloads as needed 0.1 0.3
Trucking to Monterrey 188      210      2.5 3.0
Others
Totals Mexico 188   210   2.6 5.3
Total US & Mexico 1,813 2,189 44.6 137.3
CURRENT SITUATION
Costs (US$) Time (hours)
Source: Figure and Table by the Author. 
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different trucks and various pieces of equipment for loading and unloading.  The U.S. long- 
haul truck is barred from crossing  into Mexico, so the U.S. driver leaves the trailer in a 
U.S. trucking terminal facility movement 1)and returns working with or without trailer 
(movement 2).   If there is a team of drivers, the trip from Chicago to Laredo takes 32 
hours, plus or minus two hours; a driver working alone takes about 48 hours, plus or minus 
three hours (Martinez 1999; Weid 1999). The freight bill varies from  $1,338 to $1,343, 
depending on the carrier. The trailer with cargo to Mexico is moved to the Mexican 
broker’s warehouse facility by a drayage truck (movements 3 and 4).  There, the cargo is 
inspected, counted, and assessed by the Mexican broker to complete the pre-clearance 
process for entry into Mexico. This process can take from 12 hours to 74 hours.  The 
charges include: warehouse, $12/night; inspection, classification, verification, ($110-$300); 
unloading and reloading, ($90-$150); and drayage ($75-$150) for a total of $287 to $636. 
 
If the U.S. trailer is going into Mexico, there must be an interline agreement between the 
U.S. trucking company and a Mexican trucking company.  Once the pre-clearance process 
is completed, another drayage truck is called to transfer the trailer through U.S. inspection, 
cross the bridge, go through Mexican inspection and, finally, enter a designated “coral” 
(movement 7). The drayage truck returns to the United States with or without cargo or 
trailer (movement 8). The drayage service charge ranges between $75 to 150.  Mexican 
brokers do paper work in the morning so the trucks are released at about the same time for 
crossing in the early afternoon. The worse congestion is between 1:30 p.m. - 7 p.m. 
 
In the corral, a Mexican trucking company picks up the trailer (movement 9) and drives the 
150 miles to Monterrey (movement 10).  This takes from 2.5 to 3 hours and costs from 
$188 to 210.  The total charges range from $1813 to $2189.  
 
Figure 4.2 and Table 4.5 show the current situation scenario and the break-down of costs 
and times crossing the border north-bound. 
 
These figures reflect the inefficiencies in the Laredo border crossing system and raise 
several questions.  If the time and costs of the border crossing far exceed efficient levels,  
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Figure 4.2: Current Situation Scenario 
Break-down of Costs and Times crossing the Border North-bound 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: North Bound Costs and Time 
Low High Low High
Mexican side
Trucking Monterrey-Border 188      210      2.5 3.0
Unloads and reloads as needed 75        150      0.3 1.0
Drayage 75        150      
Mexican inspection 0.0 2.0
Totals Mexico 338   510   2.8 6.0
United States side
Congestion, waiting time 1.0 6.0
US inspection 0.0 4.0
Unloads and reloads as needed 0.3 0.5
Trucking to Chicago 1,338 1,343 30.0 51.0
Totals US 1,338 1,343 31.3 61.5
Total US & Mexico 1,676 1,853 34.0 67.5
Costs (US$) Time (hours)
NORTH BOUND
Source: Figure and Table by the Author. 
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and could be reduced, why has the system remain so inefficient for so many years? Why is 
the current border crossing system so distant from economic reality?  Why does it take 
longer to travel a few miles near the border than from Chicago to Laredo, which are 1500 
miles apart? 
 
Geographic distance in the United States costs about a dollar a truck mile.  The cost of 
distance is somewhat higher on international routes both north and south of the border.  
But the inefficiencies in the Laredo border crossing system make the Rio Grande a very 
broad river.  If border crossings add several hundred dollars of costs, the Rio Grande is, 
from an economic perspective, several hundred miles wide.  The trucking provisions of 
NAFTA, if implemented, would have the economically equivalent effect of moving 
Mexico northward by shrinking the economic distance of the Rio Grande to something 
nearer its physical dimension.  
4.8 Effect of the Border Crossing Inefficiencies on Trade Flows 
 
In previous chapters this research identified and quantified the microeconomic impact of 
the inefficiencies of border crossing on shippers.  There is of course a secondary impact on 
overall trade, harder to measure because many other variables affect overall trade.  The 
working hypothesis of this research is that an efficient border crossing, with other factors, 
promotes free trade.  The motive for free trade is to create wealth and promote expansion 
and interaction of economic markets.  This in turn leads to more wealth through greater 
specialization, competition, and more efficient combinations of factors of production.  This 
also lowers total costs of production and distribution, along with the costs of all associated 
services and research and development. 
 
Prior Chapters demonstrate that substantial border crossing inefficiencies remain in spite of 
NAFTA.  They benefit specific interest groups, while the extra costs and times affect trade 
in the form of higher prices paid by the importer that eventually are passed on to the 
consumer. 
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This section presents a brief review of the literature on border economies and border 
effects within the NAFTA countries, including a review of econometric models for 
measuring the effects of imposing import duty on trade. Then, the GTAP model is used to 
simulate the reduction of border crossing inefficiencies to see what the effects are in the 
trade between United States and Mexico. To simulate the reduction in border-crossing 
costs, I use the GTAP model to simulate augmenting technical change for products 
imported into Mexico from the United States.9  The experiment reports the impact on 
welfare in each of the regions as well as changes in relative trade flows. 
 
The following scenarios are investigated: a) the Mexican tariff on U.S. and Canadian 
products is increased by the measured friction of border crossing inefficiencies (money 
paid by shippers for charges for non-essential border crossing services; and b) an iceberg 
tariff to account for the value of time it takes to cross the border.  Then the experiment 
involves simultaneously removing both (a) and (b).  The experiment reports the impact on 
welfare (EV) as well as relative trade flows. 
4.8.1 Overview of Previous Work on Border Economy  
Rogers and Smith (2001) observed that “in perfectly integrated markets, prices of similar 
goods ought to be equalized, when those prices are denominated in a common currency.  If 
the price in one location rose substantially above that in another, market forces would tend 
to move prices back towards equality.  However, empirical studies uniformly find large 
deviations from such a benchmark.”  This is the case for the NAFTA countries where 
prices of traded products present big differences, especially U.S.-Mexican relative prices. 
 
Rogers and Smith (2001) estimated the “border effect” on U.S.-Mexican relative prices 
using consumer price indexes from cities in the U.S., Canada and Mexico, and found that it 
                                                          
 9 The technical implementation of this type of productivity=augmenting shock is 
laid out in Itakura and Hertel (2001).  In some sense, this does overstate the benefits of 
removing the impediment.  In the real world, there are certainly those who benefit from the 
presence of these border frictions.  Here we treat the entire friction as a deadweight loss 
eliminated by productivity-augmenting change, but in reality certain aspects of the frictions 
resemble a privately-collected tariff accruing on to certain interests at the border.  The time 
lost in transit, though, can justly be characterized as a pure deadweight loss. 
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is nearly an order of magnitude larger than for U.S.-Canada price differentials.  They 
present evidence on alternative explanations of the large border effect for pairs involving 
Mexican cities.  These explanations include sticky prices and variable nominal exchange 
rates; formal or informal barriers to trade; and labor markets, marketing networks and 
distribution networks. 
 
They present evidence that the U.S.- Mexican prices differential is not primarily due to the 
differences in U.S.-Mexican wages.  Using the prices of 276 highly disaggregated goods 
and services, they estimated the variability of declines during the stable peso sub-period.  
The variability on goods and services prices fell by less than the variability of nominal and 
real exchange rates.  Their results are strong evidence of a “nominal border effect” in 
relative prices within NAFTA that are not explained by the exchange rate differences or 
the U.S.-Mexican wages.   
 
Rogers and Smith (2001) indicate that other real external influences are important:  
1. Even after NAFTA is fully implemented and eliminates formal barriers 
to trade within the member countries, there are important informal 
barriers to trade. 
 2. Marketing and distribution networks are more homogenous within 
countries than across borders, due in part to language, cultural 
differences, and tastes.  Because of these factors, markets are segmented 
and prices can differ for identical products across locations.  
3. Labor markets are more integrated within countries than across borders, 
and this contributes to a large border effect on prices.  
 
Although Rogers and Smith mention generically in (1) the informal barriers to trade, they 
do not provide any substantive analysis regarding their nature, impacts, and how they are 
established and maintained. 
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Engels and Rogers (2001) also mention the informal trade barriers that exist, even after 
NAFTA, as one possible explanation for the relatively large border effect for pairs 
involving Mexican cities, again without identifying or explaining them.   
 
The advent of NAFTA in 1993 reduced formal trade barriers and was supposed to result in 
a smoother border crossing.  However, the price difference between the United States and 
Mexico during NAFTA has been higher than in previous years when the exchange rate was 
more stable. This raises the hypothesis that the non-formal trade barriers have increased 
after NAFTA, decreasing the positive impact of the reduction of formal trade barriers. 
 
The border crossing inefficiencies found at Laredo are important informal barriers to trade 
and a partial cause of the “real border effect”, as are exchange rates, wages, corruption, and 
the psychological effect of dealing with a market that has a different culture, language, 
legal and institutional system.   
 
Hummels (1999) estimates that language effects are a significant trade barrier and that 
speaking a common language lowers costs by an average of 5 percent.  The price premium 
indicates that importers will pay a 3 to 5 percent premium to trade with partners of a 
common language and 1 to 3 percent premium to trade with contiguous border partners.  
 
The growth of trade between United States and Mexico over the past 15 years has been 
impressive, but the restrictions on cross-border trucking generate congestion, long waits 
and extra costs. Both producers and consumers bear the burden of higher transaction costs. 
The result is that U.S. surface trade with Mexico continues to be markedly more expensive 
than U.S. trade with Canada, the United States’ other NAFTA partner.   
 
4.8.2 Implications of Cross-Border Inefficiencies in U.S./Mexico 
Trade 
The time to cross from Laredo to Nuevo Laredo, a 10mile trip, usually takes from 2-5 days 
and may take longer, and the border crossing services cost between $287 – $636/truck. The 
border crossing services times and costs include handling costs and associated times of 
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Mexican broker inspections for pre-clearance and storage; costs of loading and unloading; 
drayage costs and times of border crossing transport; inspections on the U.S. and Mexican 
sides.  These are non-tariff barriers that affect trade.  What are the implications of these 
inefficiencies? 
 
A simple calculation of the microeconomic impact of these extra costs of south-bound 
border crossings shows that the impact is apparently minimal: $285-$636 of border 
crossing costs/ trailer, with an average cost of  $30,000 cargo/trailer represents from 0.95% 
to 2.12% percent.  But there are also hidden costs: the time waiting to cross, the uncertainty 
of time the process takes, pollution, congestion from border crossings with empty tucks, 
corruption, investments in unnecessary infrastructure, and the cost of maintaining the 
infrastructure.  An increase of 1% to 2% in the costs due to border crossing inefficiencies is 
insufficient to explain the big price differences observed between United States and 
Mexico. A more important reason is possibly the time involved.  
 
Hummels (2001) estimates indicate that each day saved in shipping time is worth 0.8 
percent ad-valorem for manufactured goods.  Applying this estimate, and considering that 
manufactures have to wait in Laredo from two to five days to cross the border southbound, 
this is equivalent to a tariff from 1.6 percent to 4 percent or more, according to the number 
of days the cargo has to wait to cross the border. 
 
The border crossing inefficiencies in the southbound trade between U.S and Mexico are 
equivalent to explicit tariffs from 1.8 percent to 6 percent (1- 2% of extra costs charged by 
Mexican Customs for unnecessary services and 0.8 % per day waiting to cross the border).   
The northbound crossing from Nuevo Laredo to Laredo takes less time (1.5 hour – 13.5h) 
and costs less money ($150 – $300).  Hummels (2001) estimates that each additional day 
spent in transport reduces the probability that the United States will source from that 
country by 1 –1.5 percent.  This would help explain why vested Mexican interests have 
introduced border delays in only the southbound direction.  
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Because of the nature of trade between the United States and Mexico, the removal of the 
frictions in border crossing will facilitate the integration of the economies of these 
countries in a more efficient way. Reducing the time and the cost involved in shipping 
products will help the “just in time process” liberating inventory-holding and depreciation 
costs on shippers.  These border crossing frictions have pronounced implications for trade 
and the international organization of production. 
 
The United States sources its imports from all over the world.  Efficient border crossing 
operations are important in the northbound crossing, otherwise Mexico risks  decreasing its 
participation in the U.S. Market.  This explains in partly explains why the inefficiencies 
that exist in the southbound crossing are not present in the northbound crossing to the same 
extent. 
 
The delays are a major contributor to the price difference between the United States and 
Mexico, introducing extra time, uncertainty and difficulties to manage “just in time” 
inventories in the industrial processes, impeding a more efficient combination of the 
factors of production.  This is more a question of integration of the economies (medium 
and long term) and not of trade (over 80 percent of Mexican imports come from the United 
States and the bilateral trade has grown to $240 billions in the year 2001). 
 
4.8.3 The General Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Model 
I apply the GTAP model and database to measure the implications of border related trade 
barriers and to model how reductions in the costs surveyed might impact trade volumes.  
The experiment was developed with the assistance of Alan Fox (2002). 
 
Over the last several decades Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) models have become an 
important tool for analyzing economic issues due to their capability to provide an elaborate 
and realistic representation of the economy, including relationships among all agents, 
sectors and other economies.  
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The GTAP model is a multi-regional AGE model which captures world economic activity 
in 57 different industries and 66 regions (Version 5 of the database).  The underlying 
equation system of GTAP includes two different kinds of equations.  One part covers the 
accounting relationships to ensure that the receipts and expenditures of every agent in the 
economy are balanced.   The other part accounts for the behavioral equations which are 
based on microeconomic theory.  This is pure simulation that indicates what is the optimal 
outcome of supply and demand. 
 
GTAP is used for the analysis because it includes all the economic factors emphasized in 
general equilibrium trade theory, versus the partial equilibrium modeling which focuses on 
a more limited set of factors, such as few products and policy variables. 
 
The GTAP model employs the Armington assumption in the trading sector which provides 
the possibility to distinguish imports by their origin and explains intra-industry trade of 
similar products.  Thus, imported commodities are assumed to be differentiated from 
domestically produced goods and combined in an additional nest in the production tree.  
The elasticity of substitution in this input nest is equal across all uses.  The firms decide on 
the sourcing of their imports and based on the resulting composite import price, they then 
determine the optimal mix of imported and domestic goods.   
 
The GTAP model has been used by many economists to measure the effects and the impact 
of new trade agreements.  For example, Hertel, Walmsley, and Itakura (December 2001) 
used a modified version of the GTAP model to evaluate the impact of the FTA between 
Japan and Singapore on production, consumption, trade international investment flows, 
GDP and welfare. They found that the impact of the FTA on investment, capital 
accumulation and economic growth is significant- particularly in Singapore.  They assert 
that the global benefits from the proposed FTA are substantial, and all regions of the world 
gain from this agreement, 70 % of the gains are captured by Japan, which is the region 
undertaking most of the reforms.  They focused on the implementation of the FTA 
considering the “new age” features such as - e-commerce and automating customs 
procedures – which added facilitate the recognition and calculation of added benefits to 
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other regions and global gains.  They recognize that one of the limitations of their study 
was that they omitted the effects of liberalization of direct  trade in transport services, 
where non tariff barriers are potentially quite large.  Even in the e-commerce era, products 
have to be delivered and transported.  Non-tariff barriers involved in the transportation 
services, specially crossing borders, have a big impact not only on trade flows but also on 
the welfare of the nations. 
 
4.8.4 The Experiment: Simulating Removal of Trade Frictions at the 
U.S.-Mexico Border 
In this experiment we implement the measurement of inefficiencies or border crossing 
frictions in the U.S.-Mexican border at Laredo, the main crossing point. Inefficiencies here 
are defined as money paid by shippers for charges for non-essential border crossing 
services and the times involved in each step of the border crossing operation. Using the 
border friction measurements of Haralambides, Londoño-Kent (2004), we simulate their 
removal as import-augmenting technical change in the GTAP model. 
 
The model used is the GTAP model, version 6.0.  An aggregate data set is constructed with 
5 countries and 11 sectors, as indicated in Table 4.6.10 
 
Haralambides and Londoño-Kent’s surveys have indicated that trade frictions on truck-
based imports from the United States to Mexico are approximately equal to a 5% tariff, 
while northbound trade faces the equivalent of about a 1% tariff due to similar frictions.  In 
order to properly assess the welfare impact of these frictions, we divide the border effect 
into two components: an iceberg tariff to represent efficiency losses and a normal tariff to 
represent border frictions where rents can be captured.  In Table 4.6, those sectors 
predominantly shipped by truck are indicated with an asterisk. 
 
The iceberg tariff captures the inefficiencies of lost time in transit.  Following Hummels 
(2001), we attribute a cost of 0.8% per day to southbound, truck-based trade.  We calculate  
                                                          
 10The GTAP aggregation file is available by request from the authors. 
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Table 4.6: Model Regions and Sectors 
RegionsSectorsi  
Mexico Food and Agriculture* 
United States Coal, Oil and Gas 
Canada Other Primary Production* 
European Union Motor Vehicles and Parts* 
Rest of World Petroleum, Coal Products 
 Minerals and Metals 
 Electronic Equipment* 
 Other Manufacturing* 
 Transport, NEC 
 Sea and Air Transport 
 Services and Activities, NES 
*Sectors included in set T, commodities predominantly shipped by truck. 
 
 
that 3% of the 5% barrier to southbound trade is due to the iceberg tariff, while the 
remaining 2% can be modeled by a Mexican-imposed tariff on imports from the United 
States.  The barriers to northbound trade are considerably smaller, although nontrivial.  The 
1% barrier is divided in a similar manner, with 0.75% attributed to a Mexican-imposed 
export tax, and the remaining 0.25% modeled as an iceberg tariff imposed on U.S. imports 
from Mexico. 
 
In order to simulate the benefits of removing the costly customs brokerage barriers, we first 
take the aggregated data set and then recalibrate it to include the import tariff and export 
tax for U.S.-Mexico trade.  This involves adjusting tms(T,US, Mex) and txs(T,Mex,US) 
such that the tariffs in the database are 2% and 0.75% higher, respectively.  T denotes the 
set of traded commodities predominantly carried by truck between the United States and 
Mexico. 
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There is no need to make any similar adjustment for the iceberg tariffs that are to be 
removed. 11   The variable ams, representing import-augmenting technical change and 
introduced in version 6.0 of the GTAP model, allows us to simulate the removal of an 
iceberg tariff by applying a positive shock to the technical efficiency of the trade flow. 
Essentially, truck-borne goods imported into Mexico become 3% more “efficient” from the 
Mexican consumer’s point of view, while U.S. imports become 0.25% more efficient for 
the U.S. consumer.  Since there are no revenue implications with ams, there is no need to 
recalibrate the benchmark model. 
 
4.8.5 Results 
 
Table 4.7 shows a detailed breakdown of the experiment.  A summary of the welfare 
impact of the results of this experiment is given in Table 4.8.  We can see that under these 
assumptions, the potential benefits from liberalization are substantial for the U.S. and 
Mexico.  Total welfare for Mexico is projected to rise by about $1.8 billion, while the 
United States benefits slightly less, with an anticipated rise in welfare of about $1.4 billion.  
The improvement in Mexico’s welfare is due, unsurprisingly, to the technical efficiency 
gains from reducing time in transit (iceberg tariffs).  As with all preferential trading 
arrangements, this bilateral improvement in efficiency leads to some allocative losses from 
trade diversion.  Mexico, too, suffers a modest loss of welfare due to the terms of trade 
effect, again unsurprising given Mexico’s market power in a model with Armington 
preferences.  Investment and savings rise as the returns to capital rise, leading to a modest 
increase in welfare.  
 
The United States sees a similarly positive outcome, but for different reasons.  The 
reduction in Mexican border frictions leads to a modest increase in allocative efficiency.  
The gains from technical change from the removal of the iceberg tariff are much smaller 
 
                                                          
 11See A Note on Changes Since GTAP Book Model (Version 2.2a/GTAP94), Ken 
Itakura and Thomas Hertel, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.  This is 
available as GTAP Resource Number 721, http://www.gtap.org. 
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Table 4.7: Experiment Structure 
Variable shocked* 
Barrier Southbound Northbound 
Lost time ? ams(T, US, Mex) = +3% ms(T, Mex, US) = +0.25% 
Brokerage frictions ? tms(T, US, Mex) = -2% txs(T, Mex, US) = -0.75% 
*T is the set of commodities shipped predominantly by truck.  See Table 1. 
 
 
than that for Mexico.  However, the iceberg being removed is only one-twelfth the size of 
that faced by southbound shipments.  Mexico’s declining barriers also lead to a substantial 
improvement in the terms of trade for the United States, contributing about $1 billion to the 
U.S. increase in welfare.  Investment and savings effects are about the same as in Mexico, 
modestly improving the overall number. 
 
The welfare impacts for the other countries/regions in the model, however, are negative.  
Allocative efficiency worsens because of the trade diversion between Mexico and United 
States (although Canada faces little trade diversion).  Terms of trade effects and investment 
and savings effects are also negative, since both are zero-sum welfare impacts.  The global 
impact is still positive, though, thanks to the improvement in technical efficiency through 
the shortening of delays at the U.S.-Mexico border. 
 
Trade flows between the United States and Mexico increase substantially thanks to the 
removal of the border frictions.  Quantities traded rise substantially in most sectors, and the 
total value of trade increases by about $1 billion northbound and $6 billion southbound.  
Table 4.8 shows quantity changes, both in value at base-year prices and in percentage 
terms.  The total change in value of goods and services traded is listed in the final row of 
Table 4.9.  The largest relative expansion in U.S. imports occurs in motor vehicles, with 
the quantity of imports from Mexico rising by about 5.5%.  Electronic Equipment shows a 
similar increase of about 4.75%.  Mexican imports see their greatest increase in Motor 
Vehicles and Parts, rising by over 16%, while imports of Other Primary Production rise by 
over 13%.  The most substantial increase in value of Mexican-bound trade occurs in Other  
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Table 4.8: Welfare Impact of Friction Removal (millions of 1997 
dollars) 
Region Allocative Technical 
Change 
Terms of Trade Investment and 
Savings 
Total 
Mexico -137 1962 -82 83 1826 
USA 73 185 1003 98 1360 
Canada -3 0 -75 -7 -85 
EU -107 0 -344 -36 -486 
Rest of World -137 0 -503 -138 -779 
Total -312 2147 -1 -0 1834 
 
Table 4.9:  Changes in Trade Flows Resulting from Friction Removal 
Sector Mexican imports from 
the United States 
U.S. imports from 
Mexico 
 Chg. (mill.) Percent Chg. (mill.) Percent 
Food and Agriculture* 419 8.62 -66 -1.40 
Coal, Oil and Gas 1 0.70 -35 -0.46 
Other Primary Production* 68 13.16 -3 -1.15 
Motor Vehicles and Parts* 1230 16.16 763 5.52 
Petroleum, Coal Products -4 -0.30 -1 -0.37 
Minerals and Metals -26 -0.73 22 0.56 
Electronic Equipment* 880 7.64 709 4.76 
Other Manufacturing* 3339 9.29 -345 -0.88 
Transport, NEC -0 -0.03 -4 -0.94 
Sea and Air Transport -1 -0.32 0 0.01 
Services and Activities, NES 7 0.37 -11 -1.20 
Total (? viws) 6055 8.78 1055 1.21 
*Commodities predominantly shipped by truck and subject to liberalization. 
Note: The full aggregation file is available on request from the author.  the total does not equal 
the sum of the column above.  Note also the rest of the table lists changes in quantity, the 
variable qxs.  In the post-simulation environment, however, aggregating across different sectors 
requires taking into account the relative price changes that have also occurred.  Therefore, we 
provide the sum of viws, the value of import flows. 
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Manufacturing ($3.4 billion in value, not listed in the table).  The substantial increases in 
trade flows are all concentrated in the sectors that use truck transportation and hence 
subject to removal of significant non-tariff barriers to trade in the simulation.
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5 Simulation Scenarios of the Laredo Border Crossing 
 
You cannot solve a problem 
with the same level of 
thinking that created it 
 - Albert Einstein 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 3 discussed the Laredo cross point. Chapter 4 reviewed the models and approaches 
available to quantify border crossing costs and formulated an economic model for the 
analysis of truck transportation and border crossings at Laredo. I assigned costs and times 
to each activity of the actual cross-border operation and identified the most serious 
bottlenecks.  Chapter 4 also reviewed institutional and behavioral approaches that help 
explain high costs, inefficiencies, and non-optimal, rent-seeking behavior. 
 
In this current chapter, I  integrate the quantitative concepts into an economic model that I 
use to simulate solution scenarios of border crossing improvements. I then examine the 
institutional question of why the inefficiencies have persisted over a long period despite a 
legal framework (NAFTA) based on economic rationality.  
 
In the first section I present scenarios of improved border crossing operations including: (1) 
the full implementation of NAFTA provisions; (2) the implementation of International 
Trade Data Systems (ITDS); (3) truck leasing between an American trucking company and 
a Mexican trucking company; and (4) intermodal (combination of truck and train).  In the 
second section I present planned improvements in infrastructure projects and to evaluate 
their impact on border crossing times and costs.  In the third section I present a quantitative 
analysis of the results with an interpretation of the subproblems, and examine the 
intriguing question of why the high costs and delays have remained so high over such a 
long period. 
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5.2 Simulation Scenarios  
 
5.2.1 Introduction  
In this section I develop scenarios that simulate improvements in the most serious 
bottlenecks identified in Chapter 3, particularly the congestion caused by drayage services, 
the multiple movements of trucks, unnecessary loading and unloading operations, Mexican 
brokers’ business practices, and government inspections. 
 
The different scenarios are based on the sequence of operations followed in crossing the 
border and simulated changes in the system and business practices.   
 
5.2.2 NAFTA 
Under NAFTA, at 12:01 a.m. on December 18, 1995, the borders of Mexico and the 
United States were supposed to open to permit access by both nations’ motor carriers to 
their border states.  The implicit  assumption was that, when this occurred, the drayage 
system would disappear or change significantly enough to improve the cargo flow between 
the two countries.  Figure 5.1 represents the movement of manufactures from Chicago and 
Monterrey under these assumptions. 
 
Table 5.1 presents NAFTA scenario, a breakdown of approximate costs and times involved 
in the example of transporting manufactured items from Chicago to Laredo (excluding the 
duties, taxes, and commissions paid to the Mexican brokers). The Table shows savings in 
the range of US$287 - US$ 636, or 16-30 percent less than the present total costs of a truck 
from Chicago crossing the border south-bound.  The time savings are even more dramatic, 
between 12 and 76 hours, or 27 - 58 percent less than current total truck times. 
 
The NAFTA ideal scenario represents faster equipment turnover and additional savings in 
capital investments.  The cost and time saving in the NAFTA scenario are due to avoiding 
payment to the Mexican brokers for warehousing, inspection, classification, and 
verification, unloading/reloading, and drayage, along with the delays this process imposes 
on shippers.  The elimination of drayage by itself would reduce vehicle movements by 50 
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Figure 5.1:NAFTA Scenario 
Break-down of Approximate Truck Costs and Times 
Crossing the Border at Laredo - Southbound 
 
Table 5.1: NAFTA Scenario Costs and Time 
Low High Low High
United States side
Trucking Chicago-Laredo 1,338   1,343   30.0 51.0
Warehouse ($12/night) -       -       0.0 0.0
Inspection, classification, verification
Unloads and reloads as needed -       -       
Drayage -       -       
US inspection 0.0 1.0
Congestion, waiting time 0.0 4.0
Others
Totals US 1,338 1,343 30.0 56.0
Mexican side
Mexican inspection 0.0 2.0
Unloads and reloads as needed -       -       
Trucking to Monterrey 188      210      2.5 3.0
Others
Totals Mexico 188   210   2.5 5.0
Total US & Mexico 1,526 1,553 32.5 61.0
Potential Savings 287   636   12.1 76.3
WITH NAFTA
Costs (US$) Time (hours)
Source: Figure and Table by the Author. 
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percent or more, given the many unnecessary empty truck trips crossing back and forth 
across the bridge.  It would reduce congestion even more. 
 
However, the United States unilaterally decided not to grant entry to Mexican trucks 
(Chapter 1), arguing that they were not safe enough to transit U.S. roads. This would have 
been an argument for technical inspection and training.  Politically, the Clinton 
administration catered to the Teamsters Union’s interest in protecting the jobs of its 
members, fearing competition from Mexican drivers. 
 
As an unstated quid pro quo, the Mexican brokers’ situation remained unchanged.  This 
means that all southbound trucks with goods must stop on the U.S. side of the border 
before crossing, and the drayage industry continues unaltered.  The incentives for the 
trucking industry are against change on both sides of the border.  Unless the Mexican 
government decides to change the pre-clearance requirement for the entry of trucks with 
goods into Mexico, the situation will remain the same. The U.S. firms will probably use 
Mexican drivers and equipment for the part of the trip in Mexican territory. 
 
Giermanski (2000) explains that there are four ways of avoiding the Mexican broker: (1) 
transito interno (bonded shipment); (2) use of a recinto fiscal (bonded warehouse at the 
border side); (3) Rule 98 which lets the importer accept responsibility directly with 
Mexican customs; and (4) use of recinto fiscalizado (now a foreign trade zone site like 
AND plus).  These four ways to avoid chaos, brings the intriguing question, why does it 
exist?  There is the possibility that the ways to avoid the Mexican brokers are not known 
by the shippers, transporter and importers. 
 
 
5.2.3 International Trade Data System (ITDS) 
The ITDS is another border crossing alternative.  The objective of ITDS is to facilitate and 
promote global trade by addressing the problems of the current trade processing 
environment.  ITDS can reduce costs, enhance enforcement and compliance, and improves 
the quality of international trade and transportation data.  ITDS meets this vision through 
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standard commercial- based data, common business functions, elimination of redundant 
and confusing processing, improved risk assessment, convenient access to process 
requirements information, improved data editing and validation, and an integrated 
electronic environment.    
  
ITDS supports four U.S. government roles within the international trade environment: 
 
1) Border operations, which include the processing of conveyance, crew and 
goods, duties, taxes, and fees at U.S. ports of arrival and departure. 
2) Licensing and permitting, which includes verification of export licenses, visas, 
import licenses, and permits. 
3) Statistics, analysis, policy, and reporting, which provide more timely and 
accurate data for imports and exports to assist in economic forecasting, 
analysis, and trade negotiations. 
4) Trade promotion, which provides U.S. business with access to more accurate 
information to identify potential business opportunities. 
 
The following section describes how the ITDS border crossing could operate and how the 
standardization and harmonization of data between Mexico and the United States could 
facilitate the border crossing operation.    
 
Using my earlier example, the originator of a shipment in Chicago, (the manufacturer or 
the exporter), files electronically a commercial document that contains the information of 
the commercial invoice, the DUNS (unique number system).  This commercial document 
file is sent to: (1) the U.S. export broker, who appends it to the file the U.S. export 
government requires, and sends it to the U.S. government export agencies; they process the 
results and hold them pending the export of the goods; (2) the Mexican import broker, who 
appends the file record of Mexican import requirements and sends this information to the 
Mexican import officials, who process and hold the results pending the truck’s arrival. 
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The carrier files a transport declaration with two basic pieces of information: (1) an extract 
of the commercial invoice with the International Transaction Number (ITN); and (2) the 
shipping quantity.  The transport declaration has information about:  (1) the carrier’s 
DUNS; (2) the driver’s registration number or name and date of birth; (3) the truck license 
plate and container number; (4) and the transponder number (ABC).  This transport 
declaration is sent by the driver to the government agency  (Department of Transportation, 
Immigration, etc.), which checks the driver and trucking company information, assess the 
immigration status, and creates a pending arrival file.    
 
There are three stages of processing an ITDS transaction: pre-arrival, arrival, and post-exit.  
The major steps for an entire ITDS transaction are: 
 
(1) Pre-arrival Processing:   
step 1: trade and transportation filers submit declaration data to ITDS; 
step 2: ITDS edits and validates de declaration data; 
 step 3: ITDS sends response messages to trade and transportation filers; 
 step 4: ITDS sends relevant data to appropriate government agencies; 
 step 5: agencies process data; 
 step 6: agencies send processing results to ITDS; 
 
(2) Arrival Processing: 
 step 7: carrier sends advance arrival notification to ITDS through DOT agency; 
 step 8: ITDS sends processing results to port of arrival/departure; 
step 9: carrier sends arrival notification message to ITDS through DOT agency; 
step 10: ITDS sends transaction status messages to agencies and filers; 
 
(3) Post-Exit Processing: 
revenue collection and data storage messaging (TBD).   
    
When the truck approaches the U.S. side of the border, the transponder sends a signal: A 
green light for goods, truck, and driver means the truck, the cargo, and the driver can 
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continue without stopping. If the light is red, the truck has to stop for any of the following: 
driver - immigration; goods - Customs or government agency that have required the 
examination; the truck - Department of Transportation (DOT) (Nolle 1999). 
 
The fees for crossing the bridge can be charged to the transponder’s number account; 
therefore a truck receiving a green light does not need to stop during the border crossing 
process.  The Mexican broker has received complete information in advance regarding the 
cargo and the transport; with this information, he can prepare the pedimento required for 
cargo to enter Mexico.  The duties can be paid in advance or at the moment the truck enters 
Mexico. The Mexican broker submits the pedimentos electronically to Mexican Customs 
using the SAAI.  The whole operation is the same as described in Appendix A, except for 
steps 8 (drayage, which is completely eliminated by ITDS), and 18 (Truck Corral, which is 
unnecessary because the same truck goes to Monterrey). 
 
ITDS can yield substantial improvements in the times and costs of border crossings, as 
shown in Table 5.2.  The major savings are derived from eliminating warehousing, 
unloading and reloading, and drayage, and reducing congestion-waiting time (since there 
are lanes exclusively dedicated to clear ITDS cargoes, so the truck does not have to wait).  
 
If the transaction is not bonded, the Mexican Customs may inspect the cargo in case there 
is any cause for a red light (for either the  goods of the transportation declaration).  When 
the transaction is bonded, if there is any disparity, Mexican Customs claim the bond. 
 
Comparing the current situation with the ITDS situation, the cost and time savings per 
truck crossing the border southbound under the ITDS scenario are in the range of US$ 287 
- US$ 636 and 12.05 - 80.15 hours.  Exporters state they are willing to pay more if they can 
get their cargo across the border faster.  This makes the time issue the principal concern in 
the border crossing problem. 
 
Giermanski (March 1998) describes the advantages of ITDS:  
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Table 5.2 
Break-down of Costs and Times Crossing the Border South-bound 
 
 
 
 
Clearly ITDS allows expedited movement of goods throughout North America and 
creates a seamless, easily monitored automated system that records statistical 
data in all three countries.  ITDS reduces and eliminates certain types of 
paperwork and clearance delays, reduces congestion through pre-arrival 
processing, and improves the timeliness of communication regarding the cargo-
clearance process among customs authorities and trading partners. 
 
Other indirect but substantial benefits for traders who participate in ITDS include 
quicker billing, reductions and elimination in long-term warehousing 
requirements and associated space costs, and lower fuel and maintenance costs.  
The biggest savings come from the diminished use of local border drayage and 
Low High Low High
United States side
Truck Chicago-Laredo 1,338   1,343   30.0 51.0
Warehouse ($12/night) -       -       0.0 0.0
Inspection, classification, verification
Unloads and reloads as needed
Drayage
Change tag, driver
US inspection 1.0
Congestion, waiting time 1.0
Bonds
Others
Totals US 1,338 1,343 30 53
Mexican side
Mexican inspection 2.0
Unloads and reloads as needed
Trucking to Monterrey 188      210      2.5 3.0
Others
Totals Mexico 188   210   2.5 5.0
Total US & Mexico 1,526 1,553 32.5 58.0
Potential Savings 287   636   12.1 79.3
ITDS
Costs (US$) Time (hours)
Source: Author's calculations based on data in text. 
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the reduction or elimination of some transfer and customs brokerage fees, since 
shippers will be able to deal directly with the customs services.  
 
ITDS is considered the best way to do business in the future.  This system represents 
substantial changes in the business practices at the border crossing.  The inspections also 
are facilitated due to the information the agents receive in advance so they can do their risk 
assessments and prepare in advance for the inspection.  This system reduces substantially 
by eliminating drayage and local truck movements, facilitating the border crossing process. 
 
Mexico, at cross-border points,  is reluctant to completely endorse ITDS until the Mexican 
brokers find another way to maintain their incomes (Nolle, 1999).  The banking industry 
would also be  affected by ITDS.  It has  financed the construction of warehouses, so it 
needs assurances that the warehouses are going to be used and the loans repaid.   
 
5.2.4 Intermodal 
This scenario assumes a truck driving from Chicago to the free trade zone in San Antonio, 
50 miles north of Laredo.  There, the truck unloads the container or the trailer in a rail yard, 
which is then loaded onto a unit train of 25 cars or more.  A unit train is not required to 
stop at the border, except for changing the crew and locomotive at the middle of the bridge. 
Then the train goes to Monterrey.  The total journey is 150 miles long (Horn 1999 and 
Nygren 1999). Figure 5.2 and Table 5.3 show the breakdown of costs and times crossing 
the border under the intermodal scenario.  
 
For rail crossings, the Mexican crew does not come to the United States.  Northbound, the 
cars of the train are pushed by a Mexican locomotive to the middle of the bridge, and from 
there a U.S. locomotive with a U.S. crew pulls it across, and vice-versa for south-bound.   
 
The train then goes to the free trade zone in Monterrey for inspections. This cargo is under 
a provision in the Mexican law that allows the importer/shipper relationship to accept 
responsibility for compliance with aduana rules (rule 98, bonded cargo). 
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Figure 5.2: Intermodal Scenario 
Break-down of Costs and Times Crossing the Border South-bound 
 
 
Table 5.3: Intermodal Scenario Costs and Time 
Source: Figure and Table by the Author. 
Note: Rail freight between Mexican border and Monterrey calculated on a 65-75 cents per mile basis. 
Low High Low High
United States side
Truck Chicago-San Antonio 1,338   1,343   30.0 48.0
Warehouse ($12/night) -       -       0.0 0.0
Inspection, classification, verification -       -       
Unloads and reloads as needed -       -       
Rail San Antonio-Border 200      300      2 5
US inspection
Congestion, waiting time 3.0 24.0
Others
Totals US 1,538   1,643   35 77
Mexican side
Mexican inspection
Unloads and reloads as needed
Rail to Monterrey 98        113      4.0 10.0
Others
Totals Mexico 98        113      4.0 10.0
Total US & Mexico 1,636   1,756   39.0 87.0
Potential Savings 178      434      5.6 50.3
INTERMODAL
Costs (US$) Time (hours)
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There are currently problems with the intermodal system, such as security, but the principal 
concern is infrastructure, particularly at the border interchanges. At Laredo, the railroad 
system is constrained by having only a single track on the bridge; that track serves trains in 
both directions (north and south-bound).  That limits train competition for cargo at border 
crossings. On both sides of the border, the inspections are less intensive for cargo arriving 
by train than by truck. 
 
The provision of the right equipment is also a problem.  Specific intermodal equipment is 
needed to service the ports of entry. There are also labor problems with the privatization 
process of the Mexican railroad, with strikes and slowdowns to protest staff reductions.  
These problems have partially offset the effort Mexican railroads are making to improve 
service for rail and intermodal users. 
 
One practical problem is to convince shipper and the U.S. rail system to move trains for 
only 150 miles.  U.S. and Mexican rail companies need to earn about US$ 200 per trailer 
from a point like San Antonio, to the border to find this traffic profitable.  This fee is less 
expensive for the shipper than the average fee of border crossing by truck and can be time 
saving because trains don’t have to stop at the U.S. border to be pre-cleared by Mexican 
brokers (Horn, 1999). 
 
5.2.5 Leasing 
This simulation assumes a U.S. truck and trailer driving U.S. cargo from Chicago to the 
U.S. side of the border, where the truck and trailer change to Mexican tags and get a 
Mexican driver who drives the truck and the trailer to the final destination in Mexico .  The 
U.S. trucking company owns the equipment (truck and trailer) and has a leasing 
arrangement with a Mexican trucking company.  The main concern of the U. S. trucking 
company is the security of the equipment.  The U.S. and Mexican trucking companies 
work out an arrangement under which the U.S. trucking company can lease similar 
equipment from the Mexican trucking company, so at any point in time, if there are any 
problems (for example, in Mexico with the U.S. equipment ) the U.S. trucking company 
withholds Mexican equipment of similar value, and vice-versa.  Also they work out legal 
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aspects and insurance policies for both the equipment and the cargo to cover them in both 
countries (Barnhill, 1999).   
 
The leasing arrangement permits the equipment to return with cargo from the country of 
destination to the country of origin.   The trucking companies using the leasing agreement 
can also benefit from the four ways to avoid Mexican brokers mentioned before or employ 
the bond system.   The advantages of the leasing agreement are: (1) to avoid the drayage 
service; (2) to reduce Mexican brokers’ fees; (3) to enhance the trucking equipment.  
Figure 5.3 and Table 5.4 show the breakdown of costs and times crossing the border south-
bound under the leasing scenario. 
5.3 Infrastructure Projects  
 
The most important changes to reduce congestion at border crossings are institutional 
issues and business practices.  However, some improvements in border crossing 
infrastructure are also necessary.   
 
5.3.1 Bridges and Access Roads 
In addition to the Juarez- Lincoln and the Colombia bridge, a new bridge, called the World 
Trade bridge (bridge #4) was built in Tamaulipas, financed in part with an investment of 
approximately $128 million (NAFTA Works, May 2000), a $15 million contribution from 
the Mexican Brokers Association; American banks are also involved in financing the 
bridge (Dreyfus, 1999).  
 
The border station costs US$ 60 million and is being financed by the City of Laredo.  The 
access roads to the bridge cost US$ 90 million and are being built by the Texas Department 
of Transportation. This new bridge was partially open by April 2000, with 6 lanes in each 
direction. 
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Figure 5.3: Leasing Scenario Break-down of Costs and Times Crossing 
the Border South-bound                                                                    
 
Table 5.4: Leasing Scenario Costs and Time 
Low High Low High
United States side
Truck Chicago-Laredo 1,338   1,343   30.0 51.0
Warehouse ($12/night) -       -       0.0 0.0
Inspection, classification, verification
Unloads and reloads as needed
Drayage
Change tag, driver 0.25 0.5
US inspection 0.0 1.0
Congestion, waiting time 0.0 4.0
Bonds
Others
Totals US 1,338 1,343 30.25 56.5
Mexican side
Mexican inspection 0.0 2.0
Unloads and reloads as needed
Trucking to Monterrey 188      210      2.5 4.0
Others
Totals Mexico 188   210   2.5 6.0
Total US & Mexico 1,526 1,553 32.8 62.5
Potential Savings 287   636   11.8 74.8
LEASING
Costs (US$) Time (hours)
Source: Figure and Table by the Author. 
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In September two additional lanes were opened, one in each direction.  After April 2000, 
Bridge # 2 at Laredo was closed for all commercial traffic.  The trucks are free to go either 
to Colombia Solidarity Bridge in Nuevo León or World Trade Bridge in Tamaulipas.  Built 
on the outskirts of Nuevo Laredo and Laredo, this new bridge is expected to relieve the 
traffic congestion caused by a great number of trucks that until now had to go through the 
city of Laredo to cross the border.  The construction of the bridge consolidates the city of 
Laredo as the most important point of entry for U.S.-Mexico trade. 
 
The commercial traffic projected for Laredo Bridge #4 for the year 2,000 is 3,927 
trucks/day northbound and 4,275 trucks/day southbound.  The projected traffic for the 
Colombia Solidarity bridge in the year 2000 is 3,000 trucks/day northbound and 2,700 
trucks/day southbound (Curtis, 1999).  The construction of the World Trade bridge 
between Texas and Tamaulipas addresses the Laredo bridge infrastructure problem: urban 
and international trade traffic congestion.  But the business practices of the Mexican 
brokers will remain the same and they are the major cause of congestion, as explained in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 6 examines the effort to solve the border crossing problem by 
constructing new infrastructure at Laredo. 
 
5.3.2  The Railroad 
Figure 5.4 presents a map of Mexico’s rail system.  The Mexican railroad privatization 
process has split the system into four parts.  Part one is the North East Railroad (NER), 
privatized  in June 1997 via a concession awarded to Transportacion Ferrovia Mexicana 
(TFM), a company owned by the Mexican transportation group (TMM) and the US 
railroad Kansas City Southern.  NER has 80 percent of the total with 20 percent still held 
by the Mexican government with options for TMM to buy at a later date, for US$1.8 
billion.  The second stage was awarded the Pacific North Railway to Ferrocarril Mexicano 
(Ferromex), a grouping of Mexican industrial conglomerates, for a reported US$1 billion. 
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Figure 5.4: Mexican Railroad Network 
 
Part three of the network was privatized late in 1998, and was awarded to US railroads.  
The final part is 7950 kms of track split up in to short line packages, due for concessioning 
early in year 2000. 
 
The rail and the truck crossing procedures are vastly different.  The rail cross-border 
system is closer to NAFTA’s objective of eliminating barriers to cross-border trade 
(Ehinger 1999).  Rail presents an interesting potential to compete with trucking, not only 
for border crossing but also over the long distances in Mexico.  
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6 The Attempt to Solve Institutional Problems with Improved 
Infrastructure  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the effort to solve the border crossing problem by constructing new 
infrastructure at Laredo: the World Trade Bridge with access roads and inspection booths 
at the Laredo crossing point.  In the following sections I will describe the new bridge and 
discuss the principal characteristics of the Laredo border crossing problem, the various 
parties involved in the border crossing process, their objectives, and how they interact.  
Four different institutional/infrastructure scenarios are examined to assess the impact that 
institutional and/or infrastructure factors have on border crossing efficiency.  I will 
compare operations near the Laredo bridge on the U.S./Mexican border with those near the 
Ambassador bridge on the U.S./Canadian border to show the institutional differences in the 
two border crossing systems and how they impact the flow of trade.   
6.2 The World Trade Bridge 
 
The new World Trade Bridge (Bridge #4) was recently built between Laredo, Texas and 
Nuevo Laredo, in Mexico.   This new bridge is located on the outskirts of the two cities 
and is expected to relieve the traffic congestion caused by a great number of trucks that 
until April 2000 had to go through the city of Laredo to cross the border.  The city of 
Laredo considers that the construction of the bridge will consolidate its position as the 
most important point of entry for U.S.-Mexico trade. 
 
The total investment of the bridge was approximately $128 million (NAFTA Works, May 
2000); it involved a $ 15 million contribution of the Mexican Brokers and financing of 
American Banks, the City of Laredo, and the Texas Department of Transportation.  In 
addition, the city of Laredo financed the border station costs of US $ 60 million, and the 
Texas Department of Transportation financed the access roads to the bridge at a cost of US 
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$ 90 million. Thus a total of US $ 278 million was spent to solve the infrastructure problem 
and remove the truck traffic from the city of Laredo. 
 
Six lanes of this new bridge were opened to traffic during April 2000, with 3 lanes in each 
direction.  In September two additional lanes were opened, one in each direction.  Bridge # 
2 at Laredo was closed to all commercial traffic and is now open only for passenger cars 
and other light vehicles .  Truck drivers are free to go either to the Colombia Solidarity 
Bridge to enter Colombia, Nuevo León, 15 miles west from Laredo, or the World Trade 
Bridge to enter Tamaulipas, 10 miles west from Laredo.   
 
The commercial traffic projected for the World Trade Bridge for the year 2000 is 3,927 
trucks/day northbound and 4,275 trucks/day southbound.  The projected commercial  
traffic for the Colombia Solidarity bridge in the year 2000 is 3,000 trucks/day northbound 
and 2,700 trucks/day southbound (Curtis, 1999), for a total of 14,000 trucks/day  crossing 
at Laredo.  
6.3  The Infrastructure at the Laredo Crossing Point and Border 
Crossing Scenarios 
 
The construction of the World Trade Bridge brings the total number of crossing lanes to 22 
on four bridges: Laredo #1, 2 lanes; Laredo #2 or Lincoln- Juarez, 4 lanes; Colombia 
Solidarity, 8 lanes; and World Trade Bridge, 8 lanes (Figure 3.2).  The projected traffic for 
the year 2000 at the Laredo border crossing is 14,000 trucks daily and 21,000 automobiles, 
and 24 buses (TDOT).  This totals 35,000 vehicles (including trucks, buses and 
automobiles) crossing daily through 22 lines. I include the buses and automobiles to 
include their effect on the capacity of the Laredo bridges in the following paragraphs. 
 
Table 6.1 shows the operating environment for the border crossing at Laredo under four 
scenarios. 
 
Scenario 1 assumes no institutional reform and no new bridge that is, the situation prior to 
April 2000.  There are 35,000 vehicles crossing on 14 lanes (Lincoln-Juarez Bridge, 4  
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Table 6.1: Bridge Operating Environment and Total Times for Border 
Crossings Under 4 Scenarios 
 
Bridge 
Status 
Operational Factors 
No Institutional 
Reform 
Complete Institutional 
Reform 
No New 
Bridge 
 
Total Crossing Time 
Infrastructure Lanes 
Bridge Operation 
Daily Crossings 
Trucks 
Automobiles and Buses 
Throughput Rate 
Scenario 1 
12 - 83.5 hours 
14 
12 hours, 5 days/week 
35,000 vehicles 
14,000 
21,000 
208 vehicles/lane/hour 
 
Scenario 2 
5 minutes - 3 hours 
14 
24 hours, 7 days/week 
29,750 vehicles 
8,750 
21,000 
450 vehicles/lane/hour 
New 
Bridge 
 
Total Crossing Time 
Infrastructure Lanes 
Bridge Operation 
Daily Crossings 
Trucks 
Automobiles and Buses 
Throughput Rate 
Scenario 3   
12.5 - 76 hours 
22 
12 hours, 5 days/week 
35,000 vehicles 
14,000 
21,000 
132 vehicles/lane/hour 
Scenario 4 
30 minutes - 3.5 hours 
22 
24 hours, 7 days/week 
29,750 vehicles 
8,750 
21,000 
450 vehicles/lane/hour 
 
 
lanes, Bridge #1, 2 lanes, and Colombia Solidarity Bridge, 8 lanes).  The bridges are open 
12 hours/day; the throughput is 2500 vehicles per lane per day or 208 vehicles/lane/hour.  
Under the present institutional conditions and business practices, trucks do not have an 
even distribution, presenting high peaks that cause congestion from 1 p.m. to 7 p.m.  This 
is due to the business practice of the Mexican brokers of clearing high numbers of trucks at 
the same time (usually after 12 p.m.),  and the drayage industry that generates unnecessary 
truck crossings in both directions; 46 percent of these crossings are empties. 
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The Highway Capacity Manual (2000) indicates that a multilane highway or bridge has a 
capacity to carry up to 2000 cars/ hour/lane.  If there is a lateral barrier, it reduces the 
capacity by 10 percent, to 1800 cars/lane/ hour.  The conversion factor for trucks varies 
from a minimum of 1.7 to 4 in the worst case scenario, or 1800/1.7 = 1,058 
trucks/lane/hour in the best case to 1800/4 = 450 trucks/lane/hour in a worst-case scenario. 
  
The availability of only one lane can reduce the capacity further if there are breakdowns or 
other irregularities in the flow.  The use of the conservative passenger-car equivalent factor 
of 4 should account for this in the following calculations.  Inefficient toll-charging 
procedures can also limit bridge capacity. 
 
As shown in Scenario 1 of Table 6.1, the throughput/lane/hour at Laredo Bridge # 2 is only 
208 trucks, 46 percent lower than the capacity for the case with a truck having a passenger-
car equivalent factor of 4. That is, a single lane with random dispatching of trucks would 
have excess capacity. 
 
Figure 4.1 indicated that under this scenario, a trailer with cargo waits from 12 to 72 hours 
for inspection, classification, verification, unloads and reloads, and processing of papers. A 
drayage truck can wait up to 8 hours to cross a bridge southbound. Under this scenario it 
takes from 12 to 83.5 hours to cross the border.  
 
These calculations show that the congestion and delays presented at Laredo under the 
situation before the construction of the new bridge were not due to infrastructure capacity 
but to the institutional practices of inspection, classification, elaboration of papers, unloads 
and reloads of cargo, changes of equipment and business practices such as bunching the 
trucks in the afternoon hours and using the bridge only 12 hours per day, five days per 
week.  Inefficient toll-charging procedures can also cause delays, especially when large 
numbers of trucks are released simultaneously by the Mexican broker. 
 
Scenario 2 analyzes the capacity of Laredo bridges before building the World Trade Bridge, 
assuming a complete institutional reform leading to the levels of efficiency of an almost 
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seamless border crossing, as envisioned by NAFTA. A complete institutional reform would 
include 24 hours of bridge operation, seven days/week, standardization and automation of 
information and processes integration among the agencies within each country and among 
the two countries; drayage would be eliminated. This reduces 50 percent the amount of 
trucks crossing daily in each direction on Laredo from about 14,000 trucks to 7,000 trucks 
and assuming a 25 percent of empties due to the trade imbalance, the total number of 
crossings/day would be 8,750 trucks.  Even using the most conservative capacity 
calculation of 450 trucks per hour, they could all cross in about 7 hours, with minimal 
bunching with the bridge open 24 hours.  There would be no significant delays on the 
bridge or its accesses with institutional reform.     
 
Under Scenario 2: no new bridge but complete institutional reform, the total time to cross 
the border would vary between 5 minutes and  3 hours with government inspections on 
both sides of the border, versus 12 - 83.5 hours in Scenario 1. 
 
This shows that the congestion and long waiting times presented at Laredo before the 
construction of the new bridge resulted from the business practices and institutional and 
operational restrictions imposed on the border crossing system. 
 
Scenario 3 simulates the current situation (post September 2000) includes the 8 lanes of the 
World Trade Bridge and assumes no institutional reform.  With the same estimates of 
traffic for year 2000, the throughput is 1,591 vehicles/lane/ day or 132 vehicles/lane/ hour.  
This indicates a very high excess capacity for all 22 lanes, since each lane could carry 
1,800 cars/hour or from 450 to 1,058 trucks/hour.  Under these conditions, there is no 
traffic congestion, even with the present inefficiency of the border crossing system. The 
current situation at Laredo indicates that the new bridge is taking away business from the 
Colombia bridge, but that is because Customs increased the number of personnel for 
inspections.  The World Trade Bridge alone has the capacity to handle 3,600 - 8,472 
trucks/hour.  
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Under Scenario 3, in spite of the new bridge, without complete institutional reform, the 
total time it takes a truck to cross the border is between 12.5 and 76 hours vs.12 - 83.5 
hours under Scenario 1.  The only reduction is 7.5 hours of  waiting time due to congestion 
presented before the construction of the new bridge.  The time used in waiting for papers, 
processes of inspection, classification, verification, changing equipment, and loading and 
reloading are the same.  Also, trucks have to go 30 additional miles in order to access the 
World Trade Bridge, thus increasing the cross border time an average of 30 minutes.  
Under Scenario 2: no new bridge and a complete institutional reform, the time to cross the 
border would be from  5 minutes to 3 hours; with Scenario 3, the new bridge but no reform, 
it takes from 12.5 to 76 hours. The length of the time to cross the border with the new 
infrastructure demonstrates that the institutional and legal constraints are the cause of the 
problem. 
 
Scenario 4 simulates the World Trade Bridge and complete institutional reform.  The full 
capacity of the 22 lanes of bridge, if open 24 hours, and with a complete institutional 
reform would be 950,000 passenger car equivalents/day or 237,600 to 559,152 trucks per 
day or any intermediate combination of cars and trucks. Even with bunching accounting 
for only the equivalent of 8 hours at capacity, 317,000 cars or from 79,200 to 186,000 
trucks could pass daily. 
 
Under this scenario, the total time to cross the border varies from 35 minutes to 3.5 hours, 
still slightly more than Scenario 2 without the new bridge but with complete institutional 
reform, where time would vary from 5 minutes to 3 hours. 
6.4 Comparison of the Present Situation at Laredo with the 
Ambassador Bridge on U.S/Canadian Border  
 
Table 6.2 presents a comparison of the present situation at Laredo (Scenario 3) with the 
situation present at the Ambassador bridge on the U.S./Canadian border.  
 
At the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, approximately 16,000 trucks and about 32,000 
vehicles (cars, other light passenger vehicles and a few buses), cross the bridge daily for a  
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Table 6.2: Comparison of the U.S./ Canadian Crossing at Ambassador 
Bridge with the U.S./Mexican Crossing at Laredo (Scenario 3) 
 
 Factors U.S./Canadian Border U.S. Mexican Border 
Infrastructure 
Factors 
Number of Lanes 
    Cars and other light vehicles 
    Trucks 
    Total Vehicles 
Throughput rate 
 
Bridge Capacity 
4 
32,000 
16,000 
48,000 
450 trucks - 1,800 
cars/lane/hr 
43,200 trucks - 172,800 
cars/day 
22 
21,000 
14,000 
35,000 
132 vehicles/lane/hour 
 
118,800 trucks -
475,200 cars/day 
Institutional 
Factors 
Time of Operation 
 
Bonded Shipments Permitted 
Pre-Clearance Requirements 
Inspections 
Drayage 
Empty Trucks 
Trust Between the two Countries 
Free Operation of Truckers and 
Brokers in Both Countries 
Seasonal Traffic Surges 
Access Time Requirements for 
Specific Products 
24 hours/day, 7 
days/week 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
25% 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
12 hours/day, 5 
days/week 
no 
yes 
yes (more intensive) 
yes 
46% 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
 
 
total of 48,000 vehicles (Zeigler, 2000).  This is greater than the approximately 14,000 
trucks and 21,000 cars that cross to and from Mexico daily via Laredo for a total 35,000 
vehicles per day (TDOT).  Both the number of trucks and the number of cars are greater on 
the Ambassador Bridge than at Laredo.   
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The Ambassador Bridge is a toll bridge and has only four lanes, which trucks share with 
passenger vehicles, and operates 24 hours/day, seven days/week.  As noted, Laredo has 
four city-owned bridges, totaling 22 lanes and operating only 12 hours/day; previous to the 
recent opening of the World Trade Bridge, there were 3 bridges with 14 lanes. 
 
In Detroit, the bridge is congested at times, especially around 12 Noon, but there are no 
lines of vehicles downtown, nor hundreds of warehouses nearby.  About 25 percent of 
commercial vehicles crossing the bridge are empty.  In Laredo, there are more than 300 
warehouses located near the bridges; and about 46 percent of the commercial vehicles 
crossing the bridge are empty (Giermanski, 2000). 
 
The Ambassador Bridge has more traffic than all four Laredo bridges combined.  Yet it has 
only 4 lanes versus the 14 previously available in Laredo and the 22 lanes now available.  
The problem is not the infrastructure, but the institutional barriers to an efficient crossing 
on the U.S.-Mexican border.  The inefficient procedures for these include federal and state 
inspections of cargo and motor vehicles, limited hours of bridge operation, and limitations 
on the operations of trucks in each country. 
6.5  Characteristics of the Laredo Border Crossing Problem. 
 
In Chapter 4, I defined ten characteristics of the Laredo Border crossing problem, only two 
of which are related to infrastructure:  (i) border crossing infrastructure limitations, such as 
insufficient access roads to the Lincoln-Juarez bridge; only I-35 is available (4 lanes in 
each direction) and it is in the middle of the City of Laredo whose urban traffic aggravates 
congestion; and; (ii) the limited capacity of some inspection areas, which aggravates 
congestion. 
 
The construction and operation of the World Trade Bridge removes the infrastructure 
limitations. Crossing the World Trade Bridge does not present the physical problems 
presented by Bridge # 2, which is located at the edge of the city of Laredo.  There are no 
lines of trucks waiting for hours to cross the bridge because Customs has finally decided to 
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open up 5 lanes for Customs processing.  This was an institutional decision, not an 
infrastructure solution. 
 
Though the trucks have to go 30 extra miles on both sides of the border, which adds at least 
30 minutes to transit time, now the trucks do not have to wait up to 8 hours to cross the 
bridge.  However, the extra distance truckers must travel diminishes some of the gains 
from eliminating the “normal” level of congestion (that which is not caused by institutional 
inefficiencies that resulted in bunching). 
 
Regardless of all the new infrastructure, the delays and extra costs on the U.S. - Mexican 
border still persist due to the lack of integrated and automated processes within each 
country and the lack of integrated processes and standardized data between the United 
States and Mexico. It still takes between 12.5 to 75.5 hours to cross the border and requires 
at least two equipment changes.  The eight operational and institutional problems remain. 
 
6.5.1 Operational Factors  
1. Operational restrictions on the trucking operations in each country.  The unilateral 
decision of the United States to suspend the implementation of the NAFTA provision that 
allowed trucks and buses to operate in the trans-border market, reciprocated by Mexican 
restrictions on use of U.S. trucks in Mexico, complicates the border crossing operation and 
generates the usage of drayage with numerous equipment changes and unnecessary trips 
across the border. This unilateral U.S. decision undermines the ability of the U.S. 
government to protest restrictions imposed by Mexican practices at border crossings. 
 
2. Excessive stops, when combined with equipment changes, interrupt the transport 
flows and make the cargo more susceptible to damage, loss, and tampering; they also 
generate pollution (much pollution from diesel engines comes from acceleration and 
working under heavy loads). 
 
3. Bridge operation restricted to 12 hours/day, 5 days/week, instead of 24 hours/day, 
7days/ week. 
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4. There are certain products that must cross the bridge at specific times; failure to 
cross during that window means more delays.  These business practices create a peak 
crossing period from about 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., which overburdens customs personnel 
on both sides.  In Laredo, Mexican customs brokers do not handle border crossings late at 
night or early in the morning, even though customs authorities have said they would extend 
their hours of operation if the brokers and forwarders would use extended hours. 
 
6.5.2 Institutional Factors  
1. The lack of integrated processes within each country and among the two countries 
complicates the inspection processes of the different governmental agencies involved in the  
international trade operations. The inspections take place at the border and they generate 
part of the operational problems described in item 2, section 6.4.1. 
 
Each institution has its own culture and bureaucracy.  Each blames the others for the 
inefficiency; they have great difficulty sharing data with one another. On the U.S. side, the 
different agencies do not collaborate on electronic clearance procedures to speed crossings 
because they do not want to share data with other agencies.  The best technology in the 
world is available but the officials do not want to use it.  Each institution defends its own 
territory, has no particular interest in speed, and feels little pressure to be efficient.   The 
agencies blame each other for delays to shippers (Samuel,  Sept. 2000). The various 
government institutions dealing with  international trade on both sides of the border impose 
a burden on the trade community to file Government international trade forms. These cause 
delays and congestion in the inspection areas and add costs and time from paper work.  
 
Haughton, et al. (1997) calculated the cost to the trade community of filing international 
trade forms as an average cost of $143.86 per transaction.  
 
The documentation required for each institution involved in international trade, such as 
Customs, Department of Agriculture, Drug and Enforcement Administration, Department 
of Transportation, and the Department of Immigration in each country, is redundant and 
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presents problems even if high technology is used in the process.  The computers of each 
agency are not compatible with those of other agencies; there is a lack of trust or interest in 
sharing information; there is interest in keeping information confidential.  Due to the 
reduction of tariffs, U.S. Customs’ importance as revenue collectors has diminished. A 
consequence of this is that they have lost their influence and have now chosen to preserve 
their power by controlling access to or sharing of information (Nolle, 2000). 
In Mexico, the documentation required for trade is enormous, the inspections are done 
manually, take time, and create delays.  
 
2. There are no integrated processes between the United States and Mexico.  The 
cultural environment on the U.S.-Mexican border, characterized by language and racial 
differences, distrust, and the pressure on U.S. customs to cut the northbound flow of illegal 
drugs and aliens, and on Mexican Customs to prevent contraband from entering that 
country, are causes of delays on the border.   
 
3. The legal institutional restrictions and procedures imposed by Mexico and 
tolerated by the United States are still in place.  As explained earlier in Chapter 3, the 
Mexican custom broker is legally responsible and liable for the content of shipments 
entering Mexico from across the border.  Therefore, the process used by the Mexican 
customs broker is more rigorous than on the U.S. side.  On the other hand, Mexican 
Customs’ practices require that products exported from the United States entering into 
Mexico by truck have to be pre-cleared, and pay the tariff or duty before entering Mexico.  
The Mexican brokers are the only ones allowed to forward freight into Mexico.  This gives 
the Mexican brokers a very powerful position.  U.S. truckers must unload their cargo at 
Laredo warehouses, owned by Mexican brokers.  The Mexican brokers and their 
forwarding agents in the United States clear the cargo through the processes of counting, 
identification, and classification of the goods for assigning the proper tariff on the 
pedimento, which is executed by the Mexican broker.   
 
If any required document does not accompany the cargo, the forwarding agent waits for the 
U.S. exporter to send them.  While the cargo is in the Mexican brokers possession, he 
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informs the importer that the goods are ready on the U.S. side for entry into Mexico.  At 
this point, the Mexican importer must pay any duty or taxes owed along with the Mexican 
broker’s fee for all the services rendered before the Mexican broker will authorize its agent 
to release the shipment.  Typically, the paperwork takes from 2 to 5 days, even more 
depending on the season.  During this period, the cargo is stored in a warehouse paying 
daily fees.  Additionally, some Mexican brokers may hold an importer’s payment in the 
bank to earn interest, while the forwarding agent may hold trailers on the U.S. side to earn 
storage revenue (Giermanski, 1999). 
 
If there was complete institutional reform, the two to five days time would be reduced to 
near zero for truckers even without the World Trade Bridge.  Congestion delays were 
created by institutional restrictions that caused enormous bunching of trucks. 
 
4. Lack of leadership in the private and public sector to promote change.  The 
political cost of a complete institutional reform is high and in times of political elections 
candidates are not willing to take the risk to alienate voters. Politicians from Texas have a 
very strong interest in preserving the status quo.  Improving efficiency at the border 
crossing is of little importance for non-Texan politicians. 
6.6 Local Interest in Improved Infrastructure 
 
The new World Trade Bridge solves only the congestion-waiting time to cross the bridge.  
The long times and high costs of crossing the border and continuing the journey remain. 
 
The construction of the World Trade Bridge between Texas and Tamaulipas provides an 
enormous excess capacity.  It also relieves the  urban traffic congestion and the pollution 
emitted by trucks in the City of Laredo.  By getting the new bridge and shifting other 
functions out of the center of the city, Laredo eliminates the negative externalities without 
losing the economical benefits created by the inefficiency.  These benefits accrue to: (i) 
Mexican brokers who provide warehousing, inspection, and classification services on the 
U.S. side of the border; (ii) the Laredo/Nuevo Laredo drayage industry; (iii) U.S. bankers 
that finance the construction of the warehouses and benefit from the effects of spending in 
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the local economy; (iv) the state and municipal governments on both sides of the border 
who receive extra toll payments; (v) the Mexican states that receive a share of Customs tax 
collections and import duties; and (vi) the entire regional economy that provides goods and 
services to the above economic agents.   
 
The interest in constructing infrastructure rather than solving the institutional problem is 
not confined to Texas. Bud Shuster, the U.S. Congressman who is Chairman of the House  
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, has been investigated and accused by the 
House ethics committee of bringing “discredit to the House of Representatives” by 
accepting improper gifts from infrastructure and transportation lobbyists (Eilperin, 2000).  
He has been tied to questionable contracts that benefit a group of road builders in the 
United States (Samuel, 2000).  More importantly, he masterminded passage of the largest 
highway bill in U.S. history by assigning projects to every congressperson’s district except 
those who were disposed to vote against the bill (Washington Post 2000).  Similar 
processes obviously affect the willingness of Texas to build unneeded infrastructure rather 
than undertake institutional reform.  Public works stimulate the local economy.   
 
ITDS offer the best available technology and ideals for an efficient border crossing. Laredo 
can have state of the art infrastructure.  However, if the agents involved are not interested 
in changing their practices, there is little positive impact that technology and infrastructure 
can have on time and costs involved in crossing this border. 
 165
7  Summary, Conclusions, and Discussion  
7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
 
7.1.1 The Context of the Study 
This research examined the economics of border crossing of goods transported by truck 
between the United States and Mexico from the aspects of theoretical efficiency and 
institutional barriers to achieving such efficiency. The general objective is to provide a 
conceptual framework for understanding the economics of cross border trucking problems 
in the trade between the United States and Mexico, a pre-requisite for achieving free trade 
among these two countries. 
 
This research outlined previous work on transfer arrangements on border crossings in 
Europe and North America.  Europe’s trading arrangements are further advanced, both in 
terms of formal agreements and the level of intra-regional trade. Most of this trade can be 
explained by the size of the members of the European Union (EU), their level of 
development, proximity, and common borders.  The European Union accounts for 30 
percent of gross world product. 
 
Church and Reid provide the conceptual elements of the “new institutionalist” perspective 
to examine the broader effects of trans-frontier regions on political analysis in Europe. The 
terms “institutional thickness” and “territorial embeddedness” are used by the 
institutionalists to assess the way individual organizations and networks contribute to the 
process of regional and urban change.  Institutional thickness reflects the relationships 
between old and new structures as institutional legacies create frictions for newly emerging 
entities. 
 
The number of studies reviewed of cross border activity in Europe do not explicitly 
analyze or even comment on transport. They implicitly consider it subject to local 
initiatives.  They address the social, economic, and policy decision-making processes that 
give an overview of the intricate nature of trade transport across borders.  
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Canada and the United States are a good example of two geographical units that share such 
links as similarities of culture, legal systems, language, race, economic institutions and 
development, and capital.  These factors help to create a comfortable trading environment; 
having a trusting relationship facilitates border crossing activities and boosts their bilateral 
trade. 
 
The U.S.-Mexican case is unique since interdependency covers virtually every aspect of 
the sociopolitical and economic spectrum, while the cultures, economic political and legal 
institutions, and social policies are diverse, along with the frameworks, which is not 
characteristic of the previously studied border-specific cases.  This diversity presents 
serious challenges to Mexican and U.S. negotiators in their efforts to harmonize the trade 
facilitation policies across the borders.  Furthermore, the convergence, or institutional 
thickness found in the EU and the U.S.-Canadian border crossings, has not occurred in the 
U.S.-Mexican case.  This requires additional economic theory to elucidate the causes of the 
cross-border problem. 
 
The U.S.-Mexican case also differs from the European context by having the world’s 
longest border between a highly industrialized country and a developing one, 1,933 miles, 
traversing four U.S. states and six Mexican states.  There is some limited cultural and 
economic integration between the two countries.  The population of the U.S. border states 
is 10 percent of Mexican ancestry and shares some of Mexico’s cultural values and 
attributes.   
 
Mexico is a very important trade partner of the United states. The total population of 
Mexico is 100 million people, with 50 percent under 25 years of age. Mexico City alone 
(25 million people) has as many people as all of Canada.  In ten years this younger 
generation will be demanding goods and services.  Both countries would therefore also 
benefit substantially from optimizing efficiencies in transport movements and associated 
logistics of cross-border trade.  The U.S.-Mexican border features sharp differences in 
economic development, language, legal tradition, culture, and race.  In addition, Mexico is 
a major source country for drugs smuggled into the United States, along with illegal aliens.  
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Because the differences of culture, language, and race, a war in which Mexico lost half its 
territory to the United States, and other armed conflicts, there is little trust between the two 
countries. 
 
7.1.2 The Economic Problem 
The conceptual framework for conducting this investigation was the hypothetical model of 
border crossing assumed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
NAFTA took effect in January 1, 1994. In a formal sense, NAFTA expanded trade links 
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, eliminated barriers to cross-border trade 
in goods and services and established rules guaranteeing the permanent access of each 
country’s domestic products to the other North American markets (Izquierdo 1998, p.1).   
  
Trucking became one of the most disputed elements: NAFTA did not specify how trade 
would be administered by the government agencies of the three NAFTA countries. The 
implicit assumption was that it would take only one truck and minimum time to go from 
point A in the United States to point B in Mexico and vice-versa.  In reality, however, it 
takes two days to go from Chicago to Laredo, a 2000 mile trip, while to cross the border 
from Laredo, Texas, to New Laredo, Mexico, just across the Rio Grande, it often takes 
from three to five days and at least four pieces of equipment and three drivers.  Obviously, 
there is a large gap between NAFTA’s underlying assumption and reality.  Some of the 
processing of trade movements are long standing practices of governments, others are 
established by transportation interests, Customs brokers and the traditions of other trade 
businesses. 
 
The non-tariff barriers were inadequately addressed by NAFTA.  The implementation of  
NAFTA  provision that allowed buses and trucks to operate in the trans-border market, was 
unilaterally suspended by the United States, undermining the U.S. ability to protest 
restrictions imposed by the Mexican on border crossings. 
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Trade between the two countries has grown from US$27 billion in 1982 to an estimated 
US$220 billion by 1999. Trucking is the primary form of transportation in the trade 
between the United States and Mexico, with roughly 85 percent of this freight by value.  
 
Due to the overriding importance of trucking, this mode is the focus of this research, 
although trains are recognized as competitors. The other modes represent rather limited 
movements between the two countries.  Except for air, they consist primarily of bulk items 
whose value-to-weight ratios are low. 
 
Under the formal provisions of NAFTA, the border crossing should be seamless, clear and 
efficient. This would mean one truck and one driver from point A in the United States to 
point B in Mexico. In reality, restriction of crossing truck operations creates great truck 
congestion.  The current arrangement requires one or two transfers into terminals on each 
side of the border.  A complex border crossing system exists despite NAFTA and creates 
delays and extra costs that are non-tariff barriers to trade.  The present border system 
presents obvious inefficiencies that have persisted since 1994 and now extend into the new 
millennium.  
 
7.1.3  Results 
The research has found substantial inefficiencies in the border crossing process, and has 
quantified their costs in dollars and time, along with the benefits of an efficient border 
crossing by truck in terms of:   
a) how improvements in border crossing procedures will affect trucking costs; 
b) the impact in the trucking industry and type of operation; 
c) the competitiveness of trucking, against rail. It has also defined and analyzed the 
factors that explain the differences between the economically efficient solution 
and the reality found at the Laredo border crossing.  
d) the impact of the border related inefficiencies on trade flows and the welfare of 
the U.S. and Mexican economies. 
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Based on the working hypothesis that an efficient border crossing, with other factors, 
promotes free trade, I identified an efficient or a seamless border crossing as a function of:  
A:  Adequate infrastructure to serve demand for transport: bridges, access 
roads, governmental inspection facilities, commercial infrastructure 
 B: Lack of institutional constraints 
 C: Homogeneous government systems 
D: Cultural factors: language, race, economic development, legal and 
political system. 
 Under these conditions, I found evidence to reject the following null hypothesis: 
 Ho : Formal NAFTA provisions will lead to an efficient border crossing.  I 
accepted the alternative, Ha : NAFTA provisions will not lead an efficient border crossing.  
A border that could be crossed in 15 minutes (or a maximum of 4 hours with inspection) 
requires three to five days, three drivers, and at least four pieces of equipment. 
 
7.1.4 Comparisons of EU, U.S.-Canadian and U.S.- Mexican Borders 
As Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) stated, the real world is anything but seamless: it 
remains separated by oceans, rivers and deserts, by cultural and language differences, and 
by national boundaries that continue to impose substantial obstacles to trade even when 
there are no formal trade barriers. 
 
The European Union context presents advanced trading arrangements, both in terms of 
formal agreements and the level on intraregional trade.  The size and proximity, the 
similarities in culture and economic development help to explain the level of trade and the 
existence of “institutional thickness” (Reid and Church 1999).  The local municipalities in 
Europe have developed intrarregional initiatives, some of them have overcome institutional 
obstacles and competitive differences, producing positive results and as they mature they 
involve cooperation between local government, and business, resulting in programs such as 
new infrastructure, tourism, education, and cultural interchange.  Some experiences have 
not been that positive and they still experience difficulties establishing initial structures. 
European countries speak different languages than their neighbors and this creates a 
problem in trade and in the process of political integration. 
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The United States and Canada share such links as common language, cultural heritage, 
legal and political systems, and economic development.  These factors have boosted their 
trade and maintain a comfortable cross-border environment with easy inspections that relay 
in a post- audit approach.  The United States and Canada are good examples of institutional 
thickness with a cross-border co-operation and of a “seamless border”. 
 
On the U.S.-Mexican border such trust does not exist due to the sharp differences in their 
legal systems, economic development, culture, language, race, besides the historic conflicts 
and the on-going problem of drugs and illegal aliens, with Mexico a major source. These 
factors make the cross-border environment complex. Specifically, “local initiatives” along 
the border produce institutional and economic inefficiencies, rather than “institutional 
thickness” viz-a viz the European experience.   
 
Most of the problems at Laredo cross point are induced by institutional means. The overall 
economic inefficiency, exemplified by high costs, delays and congestion, generate revenue, 
and employment in the towns on the border.  Since NAFTA took effect in 1994, Laredo is 
the United States’ second-fastest growing metropolitan area with 190,000 residents, up 50 
percent from the last decade.  Another 20,000 more are expected by year 2000 and 50,000 
by 2010. Although the costs and time of border crossing could be substantially reduced, 
vested interests have successfully blocked change for over 6 years.  The United States 
tolerates the situation because the previous administration was reluctant to alienate the 
truckers’ union, the truck owners associations, and other special interests. At local level, 
politicians are strongly influenced by the electorate and the cross-border industry, which is 
a source of revenue and employment.  Overall economic rationality has thus far lost out to 
the interest groups at the Laredo border crossing. 
 
While many aspects of NAFTA are achieving their intended objectives, the provisions for 
trucking and border crossings are delayed and may never be implemented in their original 
form.  Implementation would require solving conflicts of interest that are relevant to the 
trading institutions at national and local level. Safety and environmental regulations and 
anti-smuggling measures should be enforced, but they are not excuses for failing to 
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implement agreements to allow truckers to cross national boundaries. In this regard, the 
U.S. and Mexican authorities have failed to maintain the integrity of this agreement, which 
is also a precondition for creating the trust necessary for an efficient cross border system.  
Trade agreements are not efficient if the parties involved need the courts for their 
enforcement.  
 
The NAFTA trucking case was disputed in court and the NAFTA panel issued its decision 
on February 6, 2001 regarding cross border point to point services and the Mexican ability 
to invest in U.S. truck service companies.  The panel’s decision does not mean an 
automatic right to provide cross border services.  The practical implications of the ruling 
and the regulatory process applied in each country are hard to predict.  These are political 
sensitive issues in both countries, given the interest groups and pressures from service 
providers on both sides of the border. 
 
NAFTA has been an instrument for Mexican economic development. Mexico has 
integrated its manufacturing industry into the productive processes, going beyond the 
assembly functions of the maquila industry.  The progress of manufactures has been 
substantial.  The services sector, however, has been constrained by powerful interest 
groups.  The politicians serve these interests and the political cost of changing this situation 
is high.  The Mexican brokers are a prime example. 
 
The International Trade Data Systems offers a way in the future to cross borders in North 
America.  In the United States and Canada, traders post a bond and they are effectively 
released.  They have a grace period to pay taxes, and the trade moves quickly.  Mexico has 
the technology and capability to implement ITDS.  Mexico’s Customs electronic capability 
is more advanced than that of the U.S. Customs service.  But the Mexican Customs sees 
itself as an enforcement agency protecting revenue, rather than as a facilitator of trade so 
goods can flow as quick as possible.  In Mexico the brokers are the enforcers of the 
Customs law, and constitute a powerful monopoly. They create a system that blocks the 
efficiencies of the electronic technology. 
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A major cause of delay is the requirement that all documents be present and duties paid, 
when products come to the border by truck.   All inspection resources are located at the 
border.  Rather than building new cross-border bridges, there are options to avoid this by 
moving the inspection resources away from the border: (a) leasing; if a trailer is sealed in 
San Antonio and the seal is intact when it arrives to the border, the truck should be able to 
continue to Monterrey without stopping, where the inspection would take place; (b) 
intermodal; if the truck-rail option is undertaken, the truck stops in San Antonio, the 
container is loaded in a train-car and the train can go to Monterrey without stopping at the 
border.   
 
The Mexican trucking industry is hampered by high costs and scarce capital. In the future, 
trains and the other alternatives of border crossing can gradually become competitive, 
braking little by little the monopoly of the Mexican brokers, forcing them to become more 
competitive. This will shrink the economic distance of the Rio Grande to something nearer 
its physical dimension. 
7.2  Conclusions  
 
This research presents the economic implications of the costs and times of crossing the 
border between the United States and Mexico.  While there are other nontariff barriers that 
have not been considered, such as social, political, infrastructure, corruption, and pollution 
costs, delays at the border are a major contributor to the price difference between the 
United States and Mexico.  These frictions lengthen delivery schedules, introduce 
uncertainty into these schedules, and make difficult the implementation of “just in time” 
inventory management and industrial processes, impeding a more efficient combination of 
the factors of production.  While the U.S. and Mexican economies have already achieved a 
great degree of integration (over 80 percent of Mexican imports come from the United 
States and the bilateral trade has grown to $240 billions in year 2001), removal of border 
impediments to trade can lead to still greater efficiencies and welfare for both economies.  
Reducing the time and the cost involved in shipping products will help the “just in time” 
process, reducing inventory and depreciation costs for shippers.  These border-crossing 
frictions have pronounced implications for trade and the international organization of 
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production. The reduction of border crossing frictions will facilitate a more efficient 
utilization of the transport equipment, faster equipment turnover and additional savings in 
capital investments not only in transport equipment but also savings in infrastructure 
construction, maintenance, and pollution. 
 
For these reasons, I consider the estimates of the gains from improved border crossing a 
lower-bound estimate.  The GTAP model as implemented does not consider the impacts of 
a reorganization of the production process, or the other nontariff implications of trans-
border production listed above. 
 
A conservative estimate of the benefits of tighter integration of the economies is that the 
value of trade between the United States and Mexico will rise by over $7 billion, while 
welfare in the United States will increase by about $1.4 billion per year, and that in Mexico 
will rise by over $1.8 billion per year. 
 
While the shipping industry that has blossomed at the U.S.-Mexican border crossing at 
Laredo no doubt benefits any number of special interest groups in the border trucking and 
brokering industries, the overall welfare of the two economies is not well-served by the 
continuation of these artificial frictions at the border.  There is no time like the present to 
finish the NAFTA liberalization process and to remove the not-so-invisible hand slowing 
trade between the United States and Mexico. 
7.3 Implications 
 
7.3.1 Limitations of the Study 
The politically sensitive nature of the Laredo border crossing problem makes difficult to 
obtain precise quantitative data. The cross-border costs are subject to error, although they 
reflect the inefficiency of the cross border operations.  The times are a more reliable 
indicator of the inefficiency of the system than the costs. 
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This research quantifies the costs and times of the non-tariff barriers in the border crossing 
process through an updated and expanded border crossing model.  There are costs that have 
not been considered, like the social costs, the political costs, and the pollution costs.  The 
simulation scenarios presented as alternatives for border crossings present basic 
information. The operating costs can increase or decrease when the scenarios are 
implemented. The simulations indicate substantial savings in times and costs, given the 
assumed simplifications of the border crossing process; they are subject, however, to some 
error. 
 
The complex political, and social nature of the border crossing problem makes it difficult 
to obtain all the information regarding the costs of implementing these options. 
 
7.3.2 Future Research 
An improved border crossing system requires improved estimates of the political, financial, 
and social costs of truck and rail transportation in the United States and Mexico.  Realistic 
costs of truck and railway projects would permit the development of the ITDS approach for 
both modes when modeling or evaluating the simulations for new border crossing systems.  
Continued research is required to determine the overall strategy for transportation 
according to NAFTA ideals. 
 
I documented the importance of the influence of the cultural and pollution issues in the 
creation of non-tariff barriers.  There is a need for future research into how these factors 
work, developing a relevant theory from disciplines such as sociology and political 
sciences, with concrete application. 
 
This thesis examined the topic of transportation and border crossing in international trade 
using the joint framework of economic analysis, public choice theory, and behavioral 
economic theories that include institutional arrangements. The analysis provides insight 
into the characteristics of the underlying economic, social, and political situation, along 
with the likely effects of alternative strategies for dealing with the changes in the cross-
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border transport system.  Future research along the lines suggested may provide a refined 
theoretical and methodological basis for cross-border policy.   
 
The application of the inefficiencies in the border-crossing transportation process in the 
GTAP modeling for the analysis of their impact on trade flows is original since there is 
little modeling work done about non-tariff barriers with concrete examples. 
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 Appendix A:  Traditional Trade Flow Process1 
 
 
 
 Southbound U.S. to Mexico Trade Flow Process 
1. Product Origin - U.S. Shipper 
The U.S. shipper is defined as the company that wants to export merchandise to Mexico.  
The shipper may be the manufacturer of the product itself or a distributor of one or more 
products.  In the United States, the shipper is typically responsible for preparing the Bill of 
Lading (D1) that governs the U.S. portion of the transport to Mexico.  However, the U.S. 
carrier will provide a bill of lading if the shipper elects not to prepare his own. 
 
 The truck and rail bills of lading are2: 
• “the carrier’s formal receipt of the goods shipped; 
• evidence of the contract of carriage between the carrier and shipper, 
including freight charges and the terms and conditions of the carrier’s 
liability; and 
• the consignor-shipper’s means with which to stop or divert delivery of 
the goods shipped.” 
  
An important aspect of filling out the bill of lading is the classification of goods used to 
calculate the freight charges in accordance with the carrier’s filed tariff.  All goods are 
classified by the National Motor Freight Classifications (NMFC) listing.  Freight rates are 
                                                          
 1Binational Border Transportation Planning and Programming Study, Task 3.1: 
Description of Commercial Motor Vehicle Trade Flow Process, Final Report, Barton-
Aschman Associates, Inc. La Empresa, S. De R.L. May 8,1996, Ps. 3,4,10, 13,14, 17-
25,28-30, 37-41.Reviewed with Mexican Customs Official and ITDS team members, 
Washington, D.C. January, 1999. 
 2Disparities in the Law and Practice of Surface Transportation of Goods Between 
the United States and Mexico; National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade; Tucson, 
Arizona, July 1993. 
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established for each classification based on weight and volume and considering 
susceptibility to damage. 
 
An original bill of lading travels with the shipment to the border region destination which 
is one of the following: the carrier’s terminal; a freight forwarder; a U.S. broker; or a 
Mexican broker.  If the destination is not the carrier’s terminal, either an electronic copy or 
facsimile is transmitted to the freight forwarder or broker. 
 
In terms of transport origin and destination, Product Origin in international trade is often 
subject to a loose interpretation of the actual physical location where the product was made 
or assembled.  On the other hand, Country of Origin is tracked with a very high level of 
accuracy, but may not be directly linked to the origin of transport.  For goods to receive 
preferential tariff treatment under the NAFTA accords, a Certificate of Origin (D2) must 
be prepared and kept on file for any goods imported between the United States, Mexico 
and Canada.  The certificates are available in English, French and Spanish. 
 
The breakdown occurs in product origin with the State of Origin, which tends to be open 
to interpretation, and therefore, often incorrectly assigned.  If products are shipped to a 
consolidation point within the United States, the product’s state of origin may be 
reassigned to the state where consolidation occurred.  For Less than Truck Load (LTL) 
shipments, a second (new) bill of lading may also be prepared by the carrier if multiple 
LTL’s are consolidated prior to shipment across the border.  This breakdown in the 
product’s origin makes it difficult to correctly estimate origin and destination pairs for 
transport planning purposes. 
 
2. Transport to Border Region - U.S. Carrier 
Once the carrier picks up the shipment, the land transport of goods to the border region 
occurs either over private rail lines or Federal, State, and municipal highways.  During the 
trip from the point of origin or consolidation to the border region, the Carrier’s truck will 
be subject to the motor vehicle laws of the state or states through which it travels.  All U.S. 
states have vehicle safety and weight requirements enforced at permanent safety inspection 
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facilities and weight stations.  Permanent weight stations are located at the state borders 
(entering the state) and along heavily traveled truck corridors.  In addition, many states use 
roving or temporary units to perform inspections at random locations throughout the state. 
 
3. Border Regional Destination - Carrier Terminal, Freight 
Forwarder, or Broker 
 
Prior to beginning the actual border crossing, a truck will typically go to the U.S. carrier’s 
terminal, a freight forwarder’s facility or a broker’s facility.  In many instances, a U.S. 
broker will have been contacted to facilitate the border crossing process.  The U.S. broker 
will fill out the Shippers Export Declaration (SED) (D3).  This is a standard form 
required by the International Trade Administration, an agency within the U.S. Department 
of Commerce - Bureau of the Census.  Most U.S. Customs brokers participate in the 
Paperless Export Monthly Reporting Program run by the Department of Commerce (DOC).  
This program allows the broker to place a seal on the pedimento or invoice and retain the 
paper copy of the SED.  The information from the SED is later entered into a database 
system and submitted monthly to DOC. 
 
Since this is a census form, there are no legal requirements that a U.S. broker or even a U.S. 
citizen fill out this form.  Therefore, shippers can work directly with a Mexican Custom 
broker by-passing the U.S. broker.  In this event, the shipper or the Mexican broker can fill 
out and submit the export declaration.  Many shippers, however, feel more comfortable 
using a U.S. broker to represent their interests at the border crossing. 
 
Most of the information required to fill out the export declaration is included on the bill of 
lading.  The individual filling out the form must make sure that the commodities are 
correctly classified into the appropriate chapters (1-97) of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule  (HST Schedule B).  Since the broker usually has this information prior to the 
shipment’s arrival at the border, the export declaration is usually filed electronically using 
DOC’s automated Paperless Export Monthly Reporting System prior to or immediately 
upon its arrival at the border destination. 
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It typically takes less than one hour for a U.S. broker to complete the paperwork required 
for export.  One estimate is 20 minutes for the SED for 90-95 percent of the loads handled 
by U.S. brokers, including entering the SED into the Paperless Report System.  Since the 
filling of the SED is usually completed prior to the truck’s arrival at the border, there is 
minimal or no delay to the vehicle. 
 
4. Equipment Inspection - U.S. Equipment Bound for Mexico 
 
If a U.S.- owned trailer is to be taken into Mexico, the trailer may be inspected to assess 
the condition of the trailer prior to leaving the United States.  In addition, some carriers 
require a surety bond or proof of insurance for the equipment; in this event, the inspection 
is also used to determine the value of the equipment.  If there is an interline agreement 
between the U.S. and Mexican carriers, this step can be avoided. 
 
5 Freight Forwarder or Broker Verifies Load 
 
The U.S. broker is not legally liable or financially responsible for the contents of the 
southbound shipment, so the U.S. broker’s verification effort is minimal compared to that 
of the Mexican broker.  For frequent customers, there may be no verification by the U.S. 
broker.  For infrequent or one- time customers, the probability increases that the broker 
wants to verify the load.  Once the broker is satisfied that the information provided 
matches the information on the SED, the export declaration is released to U.S. Customs 
and to the Mexican broker who will prepare the required Mexican paperwork. 
 
6. Mexican Customs Broker 
 
Mexican Customs brokers, unlike U.S. brokers, are legally responsible and liable for the 
content of shipments across the border.  Therefore, the process used by the Mexican 
Customs brokers is more rigorous.  The broker typically receives both the export 
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declaration and bill of lading in advance of the truck arriving at their facility.  With this 
information, the broker begins preparing the Mexican Import Pedimentos (D4) required 
for cargo to enter Mexico. 
 
If the shipper is a frequent customer of the Mexican Customs Broker, minimal or no 
inspection may be undertaken.  However, if the shipper is unknown to the broker or is an 
infrequent customer, a thorough inspection may be required to verify the contents and/or 
for classification purposes.  When an inspection is required, the U.S. shipper may incur 
fees for the unloading and reloading the truck and for storage (parking) of the vehicle or 
trailer during the inspection. 
 
While both the United States and Mexico use HST Schedule B, there are significant 
differences in the method of classification, which account for some of the differences in the 
trade values reported by the United States and Mexico. 
 
The pedimentos, which are similar to the U.S. Entry Documents required by U.S. Customs, 
include an invoice identifying the shipper (exporter).  The Mexican broker submits the 
pedimentos electronically to Mexican Customs using the Sistema de Automatizacion 
Aduanera Integral (SAAI), which is similar to the U.S. ABI/ACS systems.  The SAAI 
server is located at the Customs Broker Association (Asociación de Agentes Aduanales or 
AAA) and can only be accessed by a limited number of broker representatives.  Once the 
pedimentos are approved, an electronic signature and bar code are attached to the 
pedimentos document.  Finally, the pedimentos must include an acknowledgment of the 
pre-payment of any fees, duties or taxes required by Mexican law.  Pre-payment is made 
prior to the border crossing at the Banking Module. 
 
7. Mexican Broker - Agricultural Inspections 
 
 Agricultural inspections are performed at one of three facilities within U.S. 
territory that have been approved by the Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia y 
Desarrollo Rural (SAGAR) of Mexico.  Each facility is designed for the inspection of a 
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particular product type: animal, vegetable, or forest product.  The time for processing 
agricultural products is approximately 30 minutes, which includes a review of the 
paperwork and visual inspection of the products.  It takes another 30 minutes to issue the 
Mexican import certificate (D5) 
 
8. Mexican Broker - Banking Module 
Duties are paid at the Bank of  Laredo upon clearance.  Customs brokers can pay in cash, 
by check, or through wire transfer.  A wire transfer hastens the process, but many 
companies are afraid of untraceable breaks in the paper trail and do not want to pay twice 
to get shipments into the country.  They would rather wait to hand over duties at the point 
of entry.  This does not apply to big shippers who handle their paperwork through faxes 
and pay duties through wire transfers. 
 
The majority of trade flowing across the border is handled by large shippers.  The payment 
of pedimentos does not add any significant delay to the process; however, small brokers or 
infrequent shippers may experience a delay while the pedimentos are paid. 
 
9. Mexican Drayage 
Once all the physical paper work is prepared and the pedimentos are electronically 
transmitted to the Mexican Customs officials, the shipment can move across the border.  In 
the past, the Mexican broker always arranged the drayage across the border due to the laws 
that governed trucking into Mexico, while the drayage company was often either part of or 
directly associated with the Mexican Customs broker.  Regardless of ownership, this step 
required at a minimum that the tractor be switched from the U.S. carrier to the Mexican 
drayage company.  In the event the U.S. trailer not leave the country, the shipment would 
have to be off-loaded and reloaded onto a Mexican trailer. 
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10. U.S. Customs -  Standard Export Declaration  
 
Once the shipment reaches the port of entry, a U.S. Customs inspector checks to see if the 
invoice or Pedimento has been stamped by the U.S. broker indicating that SED will be 
filed electronically with the Department of Commerce. Since most of the SEDs are filed 
monthly, there is  minimal delay exiting the country and processing time is less than 2 
minutes for most exports.  If a SED must be filled out at the time of export, the delay 
corresponds to the time it takes to type out the SED.  There are some commodities, such as 
arms, munitions, and certain electronic/computer technologies, that require an export 
license or have quotas, and U.S. customs inspectors must inspect these loads on export.   
 
11. U.S. Customs - Export Loads Requiring Inspection 
 
U.S. Customs inspectors enforce the laws and regulations of government agencies at U.S. 
ports of entry.  There are several commodities that must be inspected on export. Typically, 
these commodities require a license or permit to export or have export quotas.  The most 
common commodities that require an inspection on export are firearms, ammunition, 
computers, specialized electronic equipment, and hazardous materials. 
 
12. Physical Border Crossing 
 
At Laredo, the toll is typically collected just prior to crossing.  Therefore, the U.S. bridge 
owner collects the southbound tolls and the Mexican bridge owner collects the northbound 
tolls.   Southbound tolls range from U.S. $1  to U.S.$30, depending on the type of shipment 
or the seize/weight of the vehicle or number of axles. 
 
13. Mexican Customs  - Module 1 
 
Module 1 is where the first interaction occurs with Mexican Customs officials.  The 
Customs inspector verifies that the papers carried by the driver match the information that 
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has been filed electronically.  This check takes only 1 or 2 minutes to complete.  If the 
paperwork has not been filed correctly, the truck can be impounded or returned to the 
United States. 
 
If all the paperwork is in order, the truck is subject to the random selection system (red 
light primary inspection, green light pass).  The random selection system is designed to 
select 10 percent of all southbound trucks.  If the truck receives a green light, it proceeds to 
the final check point at the commercial facility.  If it receives a red light, it moves to the 
primary inspection area. 
 
14. Mexican Customs - Primary Inspection   
 
A primary inspection typically does not require unloading the vehicle.  The paperwork is 
sent to the Customs office and is held until the inspection is complete.  The time consumed 
by a primary inspection ranges from 15 minutes to 3 hours. 
 
Once the primary inspection is complete, the vehicle is again subjected to the random 
selection system.  Again, 10 percent of the vehicles passing through the primary inspection 
area, so that 1 percent of all vehicles are selected for a secondary inspection. 
 
15. Mexican Customs - Secondary Inspection 
 
Secondary inspection is more thorough than the primary inspection. Secondary inspection 
often requires that either  port, or all contents of a truck be unloaded.  Secondary 
inspections are carried out by private company (ISOSA) under contract to Mexican 
Customs whose job is to serve as a quality control of Mexican Customs officials.  The 
amount of time required to perform a secondary inspection is also between 15 minutes and 
3 hours. 
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16. Mexican Customs - Final Check Point 
 
The final check point is where all paperwork is collected and the vehicle is allowed to exit 
the import compound. 
 
17. SCT Vehicle Safety Inspection 
 
Typically, SCT maintains a vehicle inspection point at the exit of the commercial 
compound.  This inspection point is used to ensure that both the tractor and trailer are 
cleared to operate in Mexico. 
 
18. Mexican Broker - Truck Corral 
 
Once the vehicle has cleared the SCT inspection, it moves on to either a broker’s facility or 
a truck corral where the drayage company’s tractor is disconnected and the trailer is stored 
until a long-haul carrier’s tractor arrives to transport it to the interior of Mexico. 
 
19. Mexican Carrier 
 
A Mexican carrier is used to transport products to the interior of Mexico. 
 
20. 25km Check Point 
 
This point defines the limit of the free travel zone for foreign travelers in Mexico.  The 
25km check point is operated by Immigration officials.  Each vehicle most stop and 
passengers must declare citizenship.  For commercial shipments the 25km check point 
serves as a final quality control point for Mexican Customs.  Each commercial vehicle is 
again submitted to a random selection process.  If the vehicle is selected by the system for 
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inspection, the inspector verifies three items, the driver’s license, the cargo seal, and the 
bond.  The inspection is carried out by a private contractor to the Ministry of Revenue. 
 
21. Final Destination 
 
The highest concentrations of population are located in the center of the Mexico (Mexico 
City, Guadalajara, Monterrey), which are the primary traditional trade destination. 
The flow charts provided in Appendix B provide for an overview of the southbound trade 
flow process.  The descriptions included in this Appendix are linked to the flow charts by 
the number and title of each discussion. 
  
 Northbound Mexico to U.S. Trade Flow Process 
1. Product Origin - Mexican Shipper3 
 
The Mexican Shipper is defined as the organization or person that wants to export 
merchandise to the United States.  The shipper may be the manufacturer of the product 
itself or a distributor of one or more products.  In Mexico, unlike in the United States, it  is 
typically the receiver of the goods (consignee) that negotiates with the carrier to arrange 
the transport.  For international shipments, however,  it is more common for the shipper to 
arrange transport. 
 
The U.S. and Mexican systems also differ in that the Mexican carrier is usually responsible 
for preparing the Bill of Lading (D1) that governs the Mexican portion of the transport to 
the United States.  Often the carrier prepares and keeps the bill of lading until it is turned 
over to the consignee upon delivery. 
 
                                                          
 3Disparities in the Law and Practice of Surface Transportation of Good Between 
the United States and Mexico; National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade; 
Tucson Arizona, July 1993; July 1993. 
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While the bill of lading in the United States serves as a contractual agreement between the 
consignor and the carrier, in Mexico the terms of the contract (bill of lading) are regulated 
and standardized by the Secretaria of Comunicaciones and Transportes (SCT).   Any 
changes to this format must be approved by SCT. 
 
The Mexican carrier is not required to file a tariff and is free to charge what the market will 
bear.  The carrier’s liability is also negotiable.  If the carrier’s liability is limited, then a 
“less than ordinary rate” can be used; otherwise an ordinary rate is used, which includes 
the charge for increased liability. 
 
An original bill of lading travels with the shipment to the border region destination, which 
is either the carrier’s terminal or a Mexican broker’s facility.  Typically, a facsimile of the 
bill of lading is transmitted directly to the broker in advance of the shipment’s arrival.  If a 
U.S. broker is involved in the shipment’s entry to the United States, a facsimile of the bill 
of lading is also sent to the U.S. broker in advance of the shipment’s arrival. 
 
Product Origin in international trade is often subject to a loose interpretation of the actual 
location where the product was made or assembled.  On the other hand, Country of Origin 
is tracked with a very high level of accuracy.  For goods to receive preferential tariff 
treatment under the NAFTA accords, a Certificate of Origin (D5) must accompany any 
goods imported into the United States, Mexico or Canada.  The certificates are available in 
English, Spanish and French.  
 
 For transport planning and analysis, the problem of determining the actual physical product 
origin is important.  Without accurate origin and destination data, it is impossible to make 
reasonable estimates and/or projections of demand that international trade places on 
existing transport facilities or to plan future transportation facilities. 
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2. Transport Border Region - Mexican Carrier 
 
As stated above, the Mexican Carrier will prepare the bill of lading and pick up the goods 
for transport to the border.  In Mexico, the Federal government is responsible for planning 
and maintaining national and regional roadways.  In many of the most traveled corridors, 
the carrier has the opportunity to use either free or tolled roads.  The toll roads tend to be 
better maintained and to reduce the travel time; however, the tolls represent a direct cost 
that must be included in the total cost of the shipment. 
 
3. U.S. Brokers - Mexican Office 
 
At some ports of entry, U.S. brokers are allowed to maintain small offices in Mexico.  
These offices are typically used as collection points for information forwarded to the U.S. 
broker’s offices in the United States.  The information allows the U.S. broker to prepare 
the appropriate U.S. entry documents and, in most cases, to file them electronically with 
U.S.  Customs using the Automated Broker Interface (ABI).  In addition, the U.S. 
broker’s Mexico offices provide a location where truckers can pick up the U.S. entry 
papers prior to approaching the U.S. border. 
 
The U.S. entry documents for conveyance are: 
 
• Evidence of Right to Make Entry (D2) - goods may be entered only by the 
owner, purchaser, or by a licensed broker.  When the goods are consigned “to 
order,” the bill of lading properly endorsed by the consignor may serve as 
evidence of the right to make entry.  In most instances, entry is made by a person 
or firm certified by the carrier bringing the goods to the port of entry and is 
considered the “owner” of the goods for Customs purposes.  The document issued 
by the carrier is known as a “Carrier’s Certificate.” 
• Entry or Inward Manifest (D3) - typically, the entry manifest is prepared using 
Customs Form (CF) 7533 and the bill of lading may be used as a supporting 
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document.   However, there are other forms for other types of shipments, such as 
CF 3461 for Entry/Immediate Delivery or a Bar Code For Line Release.  District 
directors may specify other types of forms for merchandise release unique to their 
POE operation. 
• Invoice or a proforma Invoice (D4) - this document must identify the buyer, 
seller, and port of entry; it must provide  a detailed description of the merchandise, 
quantities, weights, and measures, purchase price, all charges on the merchandise, 
and country of origin.  While there is no standard format for the invoice, the 
specific content is well documented.  This information can be entered into the 
Automated Invoice system by a broker using the ABI. 
 
In some cases, packing lists may be required and/or there may be documents required to 
determine if the merchandise is admissible to the United States. 
 
The entry must be accompanied by evidence that a bond is posted with Customs to cover 
any potential duties, taxes, and penalties that may accrue.  Bonds may be secured through a 
resident U.S. surety company and may be posted in the form of U.S. dollars or U.S. 
government obligations.  If a customs broker is employed for the purpose of making entry, 
the broker may use his bond to provide the required coverage. 
 
If the goods are to be released from Customs custody on entry documents, an entry 
summary for Consumption must be filed and estimated duties deposited at the port of entry 
within 10 working days of the time the goods are entered and released.  The Entry 
Summary Documentation process is as follows: 
 
• Entry Documents are Returned - the entry documents described above are 
returned to the importer, broker or their authorized agent after the release of the 
merchandise is permitted. 
• Entry Summary (D5) - Customs Form 7501 is called the entry summary and 
which is used to collect classification, values and other statistical information on 
the merchandise entered. 
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• Certificate of Origin (D6) - as described above, this certificate is required to 
benefit from the preferential NAFTA tariffs.  This form does not have to be 
submitted with the entry summary documentation; however, it must be kept on 
file in the event a dispute arises over the tariffs and/or duties charged. 
 
Once the information above is complete, it is submitted within 10 working days to Entry 
Control of U.S. Customs for final review and quality control of the information filed. 
 
4. Agricultural Grading and Market Demand Evaluation 
 
Prior to crossing the border into the United States, agricultural products must be graded 
and an evaluation must be made for products covered by any import demand quotas. 
 
5. Mexican Broker - Preparation of Pedimentos 
 
The Mexican broker prepares the Mexican Export Pedimentos (D7), which are similar to 
the U.S. export declaration.  Both the Mexican and U.S. documents require an invoice and 
certificate of origin.  The process usually begins with the truck arriving at the broker’s 
office in the early morning and the drivers submitting their paperwork to the broker.  When 
the brokers arrive, they typically complete filing the previous days receipts before they 
process the paperwork for the new shipments.  The Mexican brokers may begin processing 
new shipments after 9:00-9:30 a.m. 
 
The preparation of the pedimentos begins with an inspection of each vehicle’s cargo.  
Usually a broker will inspect all of the vehicles prior to beginning the preparation of any 
pedimentos.  Once the pedimentos are prepared for all of the broker’s vehicles, they are 
submitted to a senior broker for final checking.  Only after the senior broker has approved 
the pedimentos are they submitted to the validator.  While the validator reviews the 
pedimentos, the broker arranges the drayage for the shipment across the border. 
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In the northbound direction, the Mexican broker usually works with a U.S. broker to 
prepare the U.S. entry documents.  If the Mexican shipper or carrier did not contact a U.S. 
broker before the shipment reached the border, the Mexican broker will typically facsimile 
a copy of the paperwork to a U.S. broker who will enter the information into the ABI.  This 
step can be critical at some ports of entry.  In Laredo, Customs requires 6 hours of lead 
time for preclearance. 
 
6. Validator 
 
The validator is a broker representative who electronically files the pedimento via the 
Sistema de Automatización Aduanera Integral (SAAI) server located at the Customs 
Broker Association (Asociación de Agentes Aduaneras or AAA.)  SAAI is an electronic 
filling system that the AAA, Mexican brokers, Mexican Customs (port of entry modules), 
and Bank Modules use to track the import and export processes. 
 
Once the pedimento is entered into the system and approved, a validated pedimento with 
an electronic signature and bar code is created that is used to release the shipment to 
Mexican Customs.  Once the pedimentos are released, any taxes or duties must be paid 
prior to the shipment moving north to the Mexican Customs.   
 
7. Payment of Duties or Taxes - Bank Module  
 
The Bank Module is a bank office located at the border that has the responsibility to collect 
any export duties and taxes owed to the Mexican Government.  The pedimentos are 
presented for visual inspection and verification of the electronic signature and bar code.  
The Bank Module is also responsible for confirming that the duty and tax amounts on the 
pedimentos are the same as the amounts entered into SAAI.  The Bank certifies the 
pedimentos and the shipment can be moved north into Mexican Customs Module 1. 
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8. Mexican Drayage Across Border 
 
Once the export pedimentos are complete, the Mexican broker must collect the pedimentos, 
an invoice, certificate of origin (NAFTA requirement for special tariffs), and the U.S. entry 
documents.  Mexican drayage companies transport most of the goods across the 
U.S./Mexican border.  Often the drayage company is associated with the Mexican broker. 
 
By the time the Mexican broker has completed all the pedimentos, paid any duties or taxes, 
and connected the appropriate paperwork from the driver and vehicle, it is often 2 p.m. or 
later.  In most cases, each broker releases his vehicles all at once, even though this often 
results in congestion at the U.S. port of entry. 
 
9. Mexican Customs - Module 1 
 
Upon entering the Mexican Customs Facility, the driver presents the export pedimentos.  
These are compared to the electronic forms filed with Customs using the Sistema de 
Automatizacion Aduanera Integral (SAAI) which is similar to the Automated Broker 
Interface in the United States.  Once the Customs inspector verifies that the paperwork is 
complete, the vehicle is subjected to the random selection system, which separates 
approximately 2 percent of the northbound vehicles for a primary inspection.  The random 
selection system serves as a quality control of the work performed by the Mexican brokers 
and validators. 
 
10. Mexican Customs - Primary Inspection 
 
Once a shipment is selected for primary inspection, the documents submitted by the truck 
driver are sent from the Module 1 to the Vista Aduanal offices at the dock area.  
Depending on the port of entry, the documents may be sent by a customs official that rides 
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back and forth by bicycle from the module to the dock area.  The officer at the module 
directs the driver to the primary inspection area, where the driver parks the vehicle. 
 
At the dock office, a customs official (vista aduanal) confirms that the documents are 
complete and then proceeds to verify pallet, box, and piece counts.  Depending on the type 
of commodity, the truck may also be unloaded.  Unloading is performed by personnel of 
the load/unload unions.  If something is wrong with the shipment, the cargo is impounded 
until the problem is corrected.  If everything is correct, the shipment is released 
(desaduanamiento) using the SAAI, and the documents are returned to the truck driver, 
who then proceeds to Customs Module 2.  The primary inspection time ranges from 30 
minutes to 3 hours, depending on the type of commodity and the way it is loaded in the 
truck. 
 
Once the primary inspection is complete, the vehicle is then again subject to the random 
selection system. This time the system selects 10 percent of vehicles in the primary 
inspection area for a secondary inspection.  Therefore, 0.2 percent of all vehicles are 
subjected to a secondary inspection. 
 
11. Mexican Customs - Secondary Inspection 
 
The secondary inspection is used as a quality control system for Mexican Customs.  
Secondary inspections, called “Dictaminadores Aduaneros,” are conducted by a private 
company. These procedures are identical to the primary inspection. Brokers report that in 
practice very few, if any, secondary inspections occur in the northbound direction. 
 
12. Mexican Customs - Final Check Point 
 
This is the final check point in the Mexican commercial export process.  Once all 
paperwork is completed, the vehicle leaves the Customs compound.  Since the Laredo 
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border crossing has a toll bridge, the vehicle moves forward and the truck driver pays the 
toll on the Mexican side of the border.   
 
13. Physical Border Crossing 
 
In most cases, the driver pays the toll upon reaching the bridge.  CAPUFE is a Mexican 
central government agency in charge of  Mexican toll bridges.  Some bridges are operated 
directly by CAPUFE while others are concessioned to private companies.  Tolls are based 
on the vehicle type.  For commercial trucks, tolls range from US$4 to 85 Mexican pesos, 
depending on the number of axles.  These tolls apply to both loaded and empty vehicles. 
 
14. U.S. Customs Primary Inspection 
 
At the U.S. Primary Inspection station, the Customs inspector begins by determining the 
citizenship of the driver and any passengers in the vehicle, in compliance with U.S. 
immigration law.  The officer then obtains a declaration for any agricultural products, 
narcotics, merchandise, or currency in excess of $10,000.  The response to the questions 
will determine whether the vehicle is sent for inspection or the shipment is processed for 
release into the United States.  
 
There are four basic entry processes: informal entries; at the gates entries; Automated 
Broker Interface (ABI) pre-file entries; and line release entries.  Automated Broker 
Interface (ABI) entries are the most common.  A U.S. customs broker files the release 
documents electronically with U.S. Customs prior to the arrival of the shipment.  Since 
some pre-processing can occur, this form of entry tends to reduce the amount of time a 
shipment is at the port of entry. 
 
The Customs inspector reviews the paperwork presented by the driver.   Most informal and 
at-the-gate entries, are sent to a secondary inspection area to complete the paperwork.  
There are very few informal and at- the- gate entries at the major commercial ports of entry. 
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If the entry is an ABI, the agent compares the driver’s paperwork with the information in 
the Automated Customs System (ACS).  The ACS is the information system that stores 
data originally entered by the U.S. broker using the ABI.  If the entry is Line-Release, the 
driver presents a form that has a series of bar codes on it.  The Customs inspector scans the 
bar codes and the shipment is verified by the ACS. 
 
Once the paperwork and computer information has been verified by the agent (or computer 
in the case of line-release), the computer may indicate that the vehicle needs to undergo a 
secondary inspection.  U.S. Customs will not discuss exactly how vehicles are selected for 
secondary inspection, but there are only two reasons for selecting a particular vehicle: 
enforcement and compliance monitoring. 
 
Depending on the specific product, agricultural, food products, pharmaceuticals, and 
medical equipment shipments may be sent directly to the agricultural inspection docks 
where the U.S. Department of Agriculture and or the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
inspect the loads.  USDA has established some low risk products that can be precleared 
and are subject only to random inspections.   
 
Finally, while vehicles are at the primary inspection station or in the queue, K9 units will 
patrol around the vehicles.  If a dog reacts to a vehicle, it is selected for a secondary 
inspection.  In addition, the agent may send a vehicle to a secondary inspection if he or she 
feels that there is something suspicious about the paperwork, vehicle, or driver. 
 
If everything is in order and no inspections are required, the vehicle is allowed to pass 
through to the final check point and exit the port of entry.  Some Mexican vehicles - 
particularly some tankers - are too large (oversized) for operation on U.S. roadways.  These 
vehicles may have to be trans-loaded onto smaller U.S. vehicles.  This transfer occurs 
within the commercial compound and the oversized vehicles return to Mexico. 
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15. U.S. Customs - Secondary Inspection 
 
Regardless of the type of secondary inspection, the first item of business will be to verify 
the information on the driver and the equipment. The driver must have the appropriate 
documentation, typically a passport and visa, to satisfy the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services (INS).  If the driver does not have the appropriate documentation, 
he is referred to INS, which has offices at most commercial ports. 
 
As there are three types of inspections: random, compliance, and stratified.  The type of 
secondary inspection determines if the trailer is unloaded.  In some cases, the inspector has 
sufficient room to move within the trailer and nothing has to be removed from the vehicle.  
In other cases, the entire contents on the trailer most be unloaded so the inspector can 
examine the goods. 
 
In the event the trailer is unloaded, the shipper typically has to pay a fee for unloading the 
vehicle.  In some ports stevedores unload the trucks by hand.  In other ports, the brokers 
have personnel and equipment for unloading vehicles.  Pelletization of loads has improved 
the efficiency of this process. 
 
Throughout the secondary inspection process, K9 patrols may move in and around the 
trucks and trailer.  If a dog reacts to a vehicle, a Contraband Enforcement Team (CET) 
may be called in to aid in the inspection of the vehicle.  Depending on the level of 
inspection required, processing a vehicle in the secondary inspection area may take from 1 
to 6 hours.  In rare cases an inspection takes more than 6 hours, due to special 
circumstances. 
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16. U.S. Customs - Final Check Point 
 
A vehicle released from primary or secondary inspection proceeds to the final check point 
at the U.S. commercial compound.  All the paperwork is submitted and the vehicle is 
allowed to exit the compound. 
 
17. State Safety Inspection and Weight Control 
 
All U.S. states have vehicle safety inspection and weight station programs. In the past 
Texas performed the inspection within the U.S. compound.  However, when this operation 
was in progress the demand at the port dropped.  Once the inspection team left, the demand 
increased significantly. 
 
18. Border Destination - Carrier, Freight Forwarder, or Broker 
Facility 
 
For shipments destined to the U.S. interior, the drayage company will deliver the trailer to 
a U.S. carrier, broker, or freight forwarder’s facility.  The tractor will either return without 
a trailer to Mexico or pick up a southbound trailer. 
 
19. U.S. Carrier 
 
If a single bill of lading was not prepared in Mexico, a new bill of lading will be prepared 
to cover the transport from the border region to the interior of the United States.  If 
information is transmitted to the carrier in advance of the shipment’s arrival, there may not 
be any additional delay.  Some delays may occur if the bill of lading must be created.  
Once the U.S. bill of lading is prepared, a driver picks up the load and transports it to the 
final destination. 
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20. Weigh Station and Inspections 
 
During the trip from the border region to its final destination, the carrier’s truck will be 
subject to the motor vehicle laws of the state or states through which it travels. 
 
21. Final Destination 
 
In the United States most traditional trade from Mexico goes to distribution centers 
operated by major retailers or importers.  These distribution centers are usually located in 
the border states along the major trade corridors, such as I-35 in Texas.  Mexican products 
are shipped throughout the United States from these regional distribution centers. 
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Appendix B: NAFTA Timetable for Trucking Provisions 
 
18 December 1995: Mexican trucking firm gains the authority for cross-border operations 
to and from Texas to New Mexico, Arizona, and California.  U.S. firms gain parallel 
access to cross-border shipments to and from the six border states in Mexico.  Mexican 
firms are permitted to own 100 percent of U.S. firms moving international cargo between 
points in the United States.  U.S. firms are permitted to own up to 49 percent of Mexican 
firms moving international cargo between points in Mexico.  Only Mexican firms are 
permitted to carry domestic cargo within Mexico; only U.S. firms may carry domestic 
cargo within the United States. 
 
1 January 2000: Mexican trucking entities can obtain operating authority for cross-border 
operations to or from any point in the United States.  U.S. carriers may move cross-border 
freight to or from any point in Mexico. 
 
1 January 2001: U.S. firms may own up to 51 percent of Mexican operations carrying 
international freight within Mexico. 
 
1 January 2004: U.S. firms may own up to 100 percent of Mexican operations carrying 
international freight within Mexico.  These firms must be Mexican operations, using 
Mexican equipment and drivers.  They may not carry domestic cargoes within Mexico. 
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Institutional Arrangements that Affect Free Trade
Agreements:
Economic Rationality Versus Interest Groups
This dissertation presents a time motion study of what actually happens
at the busiest U.S-Mexican border crossing at Laredo. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) assumes seamless border
crossings without detailing however how this would be achieved parti-
cularly in the case of trucking, the most important cargo transport
mode. This dissertation presents evidence that NAFTA has not led to an
efficient border crossing: a border that could be crossed in 15 minutes
with a single truck and driver takes several days, drivers, and pieces of
equipment. In fact it takes longer to cross the Rio Grande than go from
Chicago to Laredo by truck. This is contrasted with a mini-time motion
study of an efficient border crossing at Ambassador bridge between the
United States and Canada, which has more traffic than all Laredo bridges
combined, yet it has only 4 lanes versus the 22 crossing lanes available at
Laredo, presenting the effects of the attempt to solve an institutional
problem by building more infrastructure. The time-motion study
establishes which practices or regulations cause which inefficiencies and
what are the consequences in terms of time, money, and equipment. This
analysis shows the way in which interest groups profit from inefficiency,
and it also reveals the economic forces at work on the local and national
level in both countries. Such inefficiencies not only cost importers and
exporters time and money – they also cause welfare losses to the entire
economy because of the distortions they introduce to consumption and
sourcing decisions. In order to measure the macro-economic impact of
these non-tariff barriers, the dissertation uses the General Trade Analysis
Project – GTAP model – to simulate the removal of iceberg trade costs.
The results of the analysis indicate that the removal of such barriers
would benefit the Mexican economy by $1.8 billion per year, while the
U.S. economy would see a welfare increase of about $1.4 billion per year.
Trade flows between Mexico and the United States would likewise
increase, with southbound trade expanding by about $6 billion and
northbound trade growing about $1 billion per year. This work is
relevant for business and government people pressing the case for well
intended free trade agreements and promoting the technology that can
expedite greater volumes of trade. Further research along the lines of
this work may provide a refined theoretical and methodological basis for
cross-border policy.
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Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by ERIM
is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra-
and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their interde-
pendent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management,
and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in Mana-
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candidates are active in the different research programs. From a variety
of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community is united
in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating new
business knowledge.
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